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Selection of Terminology: ‘Disaster’ – ‘Emergency’ 
Across the world, and within much of the academic literature that has underpinned 
this thesis, there remains an inconsistency in the use of the terms ‘disaster’ and 
‘emergency’.  It is generally accepted by authors that natural disasters lead to crises.  
For example, the eruption of the Icelandic volcano Eyjafjallajökull led to a crisis in 
the European air industry.  What is not so well agreed upon is the difference between 
the use of the word ‘emergency’ and ‘disaster’. Developing nations prefer to use the 
word ‘disaster’, since in declaring a ‘disaster’ they seek to unlock specific national 
legislation allowing the use of (for example) the military and other expensive state 
services.  The word ‘disaster’ also creates an urgency to any request for external 
assistance. The travel and tourism industry prefer to use the word ‘emergency' when 
referring to accidents at sea, hotel fires, and other hazardous tourism related events.  
This is because they perceive the word ‘emergency’ as less negative; both to their 
stakeholders and their clients. The reduced perception of negativity also helps to 
protect their image as being ‘resilient’. 
In this thesis I have chosen to use the word ‘emergency’, although I do refer to 
‘disaster’ management theories and concepts.  In the context of this thesis therefore, I 
regard the two words as inter-changeable across the literature and bearing the same 
meaning.  
Refer to Appendix 1 for differentiating criteria between emergency and disaster.  
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Developing the Concept of an Integrated Emergency 
Response System for the Tourism Industry:  
Case Study of the Cruise Ship Industry 
Madja Hamood Mohamed Al Salti 
Abstract 
The tourism industry is vulnerable to all kinds of emergency events. These events are 
in turn impacted by further complexities arising from a range of consequences, 
themselves exacerbated by inevitable knock-on effects. As a result, the tourism 
industry is vulnerable to physical damage and loss to critical infrastructure and super 
structure. It is also vulnerable to injury and loss to human life, and loss to the 
environment. Finally, it is vulnerable to its reputation in terms of the image portrayed 
of the destinations resulting in a drastic fall in the number of visitors. 
Some impact can be mitigated by the improving links and the understanding between 
the tourism industry and the emergency services thereby facilitating future emergency 
response to any potential incident, particularly in destinations which receive a high 
volume of tourists. The complex nature of emergencies requires the involvement of 
multiple emergency response actors; above and beyond the usual emergency services. 
This in turn requires effective communication and co-ordination in order to ensure a 
successful outcome. 
Despite the fact that several studies have been carried out into the integration of the 
tourism industry with emergency management systems on land, very little research 
has focused on the cruise industry. Cruise ships are an important consideration because 
with their ever-increasing size, they are now floating destinations, hosting thousands 
of tourists. This study seeks to fill that gap by using building-block scenarios within 
which to examine the concept of an integrated emergency response system for the 
tourism industry in Oman with specific focus upon the cruise ship sector. 
To assist in achieving this aim a thorough review of complexity, complex systems and 
complexity theory was conducted in order to better understand the nature of 
emergencies and how tourism works as a complex adaptive system. Planning theory 
	xii	
was also examined, in particular strategic and scenario planning, in order to 
recommend improvements in the planning and management processes of emergencies. 
This research subsequently highlighted a particular aspect of the emergency 
management cycle upon which to focus; namely the response phase. 
The complexity of emergency response, particularly in relation to tourism, was 
examined in order to elicit ways to improve the effectiveness of emergency responses 
to future incidents. The case studies of Costa Concordia, MVs Sewol Korean Ferry 
and Norman Atlantic were utilised as an approach to evaluate the specific challenges 
encountered within the cruise-ship industry in the case of emergency responses. The 
study was conducted within the context of Oman, which has a growing cruise-ship 
industry. 
The study used a range of scenarios to examine issues that arise from emergencies. It 
proposes future coordinating actions to mitigate loss of life and damage to the tourism 
industry. The study used semi-structured, face-to-face interviews to evaluate the 
capabilities of the emergency response system in Oman and used online-semi-
structured interviews to identify the capabilities, requirements and challenges of cruise 
lines in Europe. 
The outcomes of this research indicated that the tourism industry in Oman lacks 
awareness and knowledge about planning and managing emergencies, as well as 
having poor mitigation and preparedness measures. It also revealed that there is an 
absence of cohesiveness and communication between tourism organisations, in terms 
of sharing experiences and feedback. The tourism industry in Oman demonstrated a 
low level of communication and integration with other emergency services. This was 
further compounded by a lack of involvement of the tourism industry within any 
current emergency committees and plans in Oman. To assist in resolving these issues, 
intra-integration (within the tourism industry) and inter-integration (between tourism 
and emergency institutions) structures are proposed. 
Findings drawn from the online-interviews in relation to European cruise lines showed 
that, in general, cruise ships lack coordination and collaboration with local emergency 
services. It was discovered that the sole point of contact for the cruise industry within 
any given destination is frequently the shipping agent. This in turn highlighted a 
potential single point of failure, in that shipping agents confessed to lacking the 
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capability and capacity to provide an effective liaison during times of emergency. To 
improve future integration and relations between cruise lines, local tourism industry 
and emergency services, the research suggested conducting joint drills, developing 
coordinated plans and working collaboratively in the event of emergencies. 
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: Introduction 
 
1.1 Rationale 
The tourism industry is considered one of the leading industries worldwide as the data 
from the WTTC (2016) shows its contribution to the global GDP in 2015 was (9.8%) 
and tourism generated more than 284 million jobs (1 in 11 jobs worldwide). However, 
it is exposed to emergencies for several reasons (Laws et al 1998; Henderson 2002; 
Prideaux et al. 2003; Tsai and Chen 2010; Becken and Hughey 2013). The tourism 
industry depends on natural resources (Jiang and Ritchie 2017) as many tourist 
facilities and activities are located in areas frequently affected by emergencies, such 
as mountains and coasts (Pottorff and Neal 1994; Richter 1999; Evans et al. 2003; 
Laws and Prideaux 2005; Becken and Hughey 2013). Tourism also often takes place 
in areas of outstanding natural beauty, which are often in remote locations, far away 
from the infrastructure needed to respond to emergencies. Moreover, most destinations 
supply natural and cultural resources to build the tourist’s experience, however if these 
resources are affected by a disaster, tourism demand will fall (Jiang and Ritchie 2017). 
For example, hundreds of historical and cultural sites were destroyed by the recent 
earthquake in Nepal in 2015 (including 7 World Heritage sites) which resulted in a 
90% downturn in inbound tourists (Government of Nepal 2015). Furthermore, tourists 
are travelling outside their usual environment; therefore, they might not be familiar 
with the surroundings (UNWTO 1998; Buckle et al. 2001; Lamanna et al. 2012), local 
language and hazard or emergency knowledge (Murphy and Bayley 1989; Drabek 
1995; Burby and Wagner 1996; Whitehead et al. 2000; Bird et al. 2010; Nguyen et al. 
2017). When a destination is confronted by an emergency, it is likely to affect the 
tourists’ facilities, critical infrastructure (e.g. airports, ports, electricity, and water), 
superstructure and perceptions, and in turn, this may result in negative economic 
impacts. Yet, some argue that the industry’s preparation is insufficient (Faulkner and 
Vikulov 2001; Prideaux et al. 2003; Mitroff 2004; Johnston et al. 2007; Hystad and 
Keller 2008; Bird et al 2010; Tsai and Chen 2010; Gruman et al. 2011; Paraskevas et 
al. 2013). This low level of preparedness can be referred to beliefs that disasters are 
not expected (Faulkner and Vikulov 2001; Hystad and Keller 2008), a lack of finance, 
lack of qualified staff, (Spillan and Hough 2003) lack of knowledge, lack of resources 
and no emergency plans in place. A lack of disaster preparedness in the tourism 
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industry results in inadequate disaster response and recovery for individual destination 
stakeholders (Granville et al. 2016). For example, during the 2004 Indian Ocean 
Tsunami in Khao Lak, Thailand, there was inadequate adoption of disaster 
preparedness measures by local hotels (Nguyen et al. 2017). This resulted in high 
levels of tourist casualties (Cioccio and Michael 2007; Calgaro and Lloyd 2008). 
Thus, there is a need for the tourism industry to have a more comprehensive and 
strategic emergency response approach, working with other tourism stakeholders and 
other agencies like emergency services organisations (Ritchie 2009). The UNWTO’s 
decision to develop a policy approach in 2010 is recognition of the lack of an 
integrative approach between tourism and emergency services, requiring urgent 
attention (Beirman 2011). Ritchie (2008) and Tsai and Chen (2011) point to the need 
for tourism managers to shift from a reactive tourism disaster management approach 
to a proactive planning approach and recommend future research in this area. On the 
other hand, Bowen et al. (2014), suggest that there has been a lack of research, 
especially in terms of cruise ship and maritime terrorism, and highlight the importance 
of employing or using scenario planning in order to understand and minimise the 
potential threats that may affect the cruise ship industry. More recently, there has been 
increased attention on the safety and security of people travelling on large cruise ships 
(Greenberg et al. 2006) since the capacity of cruise ships is increasing and the plans 
are in place for cruise ships to carry more than 3,000 passengers (Bowen et al. 2014). 
When a disaster hits a large-scale cruise-ship it will affect the tourists’ perception. This 
is likely to result in an economic downturn for the industry, as has happened following 
the case of Costa Concordia, which resulted in a dip of 14.1% in demand for Carnival 
Cruises and 6.9% for the Royal Caribbean (Howard and Stephenson 2013). This is due 
to the complex nature of disasters and the knock-on effect it bears. 
Complexity and complex systems have been investigated for some time by researchers 
across different disciplines (Coskun and Ozceylan 2011). Complexity theory was first 
applied within the field of social sciences in the mid-1980s in the areas of political 
systems, the working of markets and to study traffic congestion (Hilhorst 2003). Since 
then, studies have applied complexity to vulnerability, such as Louise Comfort (1995) 
on self-organisation following a disaster, Anja Possekel (1999) on the impact of the 
Montserrat volcanic eruption, crisis communications (Murphy 1996; Seeger 2002) and 
maritime accidents (Goulielmos 2004). In line with previous studies (Beirman 2010; 
Becken and Hughey 2013; UNWTO Report 2014) this study recognises the 
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importance of complexity, complex systems and complexity theory. They are highly 
relevant for tourism and emergency studies, as they provide a starting point to 
explaining their nature and the interaction between sub-systems of nature and society, 
or hazards and vulnerability (Faulkner 2001; Hilhorst 2003; Winser et al. 2003). They 
are also related to stability and changes, which occur between the interacting 
components in a complex system (Waldrop 1992). Additionally, researchers have 
studied complexity and complex systems in order to better understand how tourism 
works as a complex adaptive system (Baggio 2008; Stevenson et al. 2009). The 
complex interaction of emergency management is inherent through the participation 
of multi-stakeholders throughout the four emergency phases; mitigation, preparedness, 
response and recovery (Atlay and Green 2006). The focus of this study will be on the 
response phase. The challenges faced by these multi-stakeholders is that their decision-
making takes place during periods of very high stress. This could in turn induce 
irrational behaviour, in a highly time-constrained environment with limited and 
conflicting information (Coppola 2011). In addition, during a response, a lack of 
confidence and unnecessary delays in responding may turn an emergency into a 
disaster or a catastrophe (Coppola 2011). The complex events that include interaction 
between the many components could result in failure of the management, if there is 
insufficient planning and ill-informed individual or organisation actions (Comfort 
2005). Therefore, an integrated approach is required during a chaotic, complex and 
dynamic situation for an effective and successful response (Alexander 2013b). The 
uncertainty of the situation and the responders in emergency circumstances may result 
in the participating players bringing different organisational cultures and opinions on 
how to handle certain situations (Kapucu and Garayev 2011, p.373). This might create 
a problem because the different groups may not necessarily agree on critical issues, 
which results in the slowing down of any cooperation or decision-making processes 
(Kapucu and Garayev 2011). 
The aim of the response phase is to meet the requirement of the affected individuals 
or groups. Its efficiency is measured by how quick the transition of information among 
all partners is (e.g. organisations, people) (Avanzi et al. 2017). Its efficiency also 
depends on policies, procedures, services and roles that direct the coordination of all 
involved stakeholders (Avanzi et al. 2017). Therefore, the successful emergency 
management, in specific response actions requires full integration of all involved 
stakeholders; this integration can be intra- (within the same sector) or inter (across 
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sectors) (Meissner et al. 2002). Furthermore, the distribution of resources for effective 
emergency management, during the response phase, requires coordination inside 
organisations, with stakeholders both within the tourism industry and between the 
tourism industry and external stakeholders, such as emergency services staff (Ritchie 
2009). Yet, few studies have examined integrating the tourism sector and emergency 
services organisations (Morakabati et al. 2016). Thus, the aim of this study is to 
develop the concept of an integrated emergency response system for the tourism 
industry through the use of building block scenarios. This study fills the gap of 
research by identifying the capability of emergency response systems in the destination 
(Oman) by conducting semi-structured interviews. Interviews were conducted in 
Oman as the researcher is based in Oman, so it facilitates the access to information 
and the meeting of people from the same country. Furthermore, the tourism industry 
in Oman has been given a high level of importance in order to diversify the national 
economy. Thus, the researcher sees there is a need for emergency management in the 
tourism industry in order to build economic resilience and also because of the 
somewhat precarious political climate in the Middle East. The study also identifies 
capabilities, requirements and challenges of the European cruise lines by conducting 
online-semi-structured interviews. The purpose of identifying the capability is to know 
how to integrate the tourism industry with emergency services and when is there a 
need for integration. It tackles the emergency response system capabilities to identify 
to what extent the required resources by the cruise lines are available. Identifying the 
destination capability and on the other hand the cruise lines’ needs, expectations and 
challenges serve as basis for integration and to establish long-term collaboration. The 
aim of collaboration is to minimise the future risk and enhance the emergency response 
systems. 
1.2 The Research Aim 
The purpose of this study is to develop the concept of an integrated emergency 
response system for the tourism industry, using building block scenario in the context 
of complexity. The objectives of this study are: 
1.3 The Research Objectives 
● To critically review complexity in relation to emergency response planning; 
● To draw on the complex adaptive system similarities within the tourism industry; 
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● To examine the specific challenges presented by the cruise ship industry when 
undertaking emergency responses; 
● To evaluate the capability of the emergency response system of Oman when 
responding to emergency scenarios on or off shore; 
● To identify European cruise lines’ capabilities, requirements and challenges when 
responding to emergency scenarios near to, or alongside, a destination; 
● To develop the concept of an integrated emergency response system for the 
tourism industry. 
1.4 Research Questions 
The main research question is How to develop the concept of an integrated 
emergency response system for the tourism industry? 
1- What are the emergency response system capabilities within Oman when 
responding to emergency scenarios on or off shore? 
2- How can emergency management services assist the tourism industry in 
Oman? 
3- How can the Omani tourism sector assist and enhance emergency response 
system capabilities? 
4- How can the Omani tourism sector be better integrated with emergency 
services? 
5- What capabilities and capacities do cruise ships have when responding to 
emergency scenarios near to, or alongside, a destination? 
6- What additional capabilities and capacities do cruise ships require from a 
destination’s emergency services and local authorities in the event of an 
emergency scenario? 
7- What are the potential shortfalls that might challenge cruise ships as a result of 
an analysis of their requirements within the given scenarios? 
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1.5 The Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis contains eight chapters. Figure 1-1 shows the overall structure of the thesis. 
 
Figure 1-1. The Structure of the Thesis 
 
Following this brief introductory chapter, Chapter Two is ‘dealing with complexity: 
emergency management planning’. It critically reviews complexity, complex systems 
and complexity theory to establish the context and to get better understanding of the 
nature of emergency situations. The chapter then addresses planning, planning theory 
and investigates the relationship between planning and complexity. After that, the 
chapter highlights emergency management planning by briefly describing all phases 
of emergency management (mitigation, preparedness, responses and recovery). The 
last part in this chapter is allocated to emergency planning, specifically strategic and 
scenario planning because the good management of emergency depends on good 
planning. 
Chapter Three is ‘Emergency response in Tourism’. It discusses the vulnerability of 
the tourism industry and what hinders the tourism industry from developing plans for 
emergency management. Due to the large number of stakeholders in the tourism 
industry, in time of response there is a critical need to manage response tasks by 
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4 •Case Studies
5 •Case Study of Oman
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applying different strategies. These strategies are briefly highlighted in this chapter 
(coordination, collaboration, cooperation, decision-making, leadership, resource 
allocation, communication and information sharing). If all these strategies are 
managed well among all stakeholders, they help enhance the emergency response 
resilience; the last topic discussed in this chapter. 
Chapter Four presents ‘Case studies’. It starts with an overview of the cruise ship 
industry and the development of the market. It mentions the potential hazards that 
might occur during the different operational phases of the cruise (Passenger 
embarkation, departure, cruise, docking, arrival and disembarkation). After that, the 
chapter highlights the important topic of mass casualty management due to the large 
number of passengers travelling on cruises. Finally, it illustrates a multiple case study 
of cruise-ship incidents (Costa Concordia, Mv Sewol Korean Ferry and Norman 
Atlantic). 
Chapter Five sets out the ‘Case study of Oman’ and aims to provide the study context. 
It begins with an overview about the country Oman, its location, population and the 
historical development of the tourism industry. Then it moves to the importance of the 
tourism industry in Oman. Finally, it critically reviews the emergency management 
system in Oman. 
Chapter Six presents the ‘Research approach’. It explains the research philosophy and 
the approach that guided the study justifying the methodological approach that was 
adopted by the study. Next, it gives details of the research design. After that, it 
discusses why the specific data collection and analysis methods were used in this 
study. This chapter also covers different subjects related to the sampling, pilot study, 
interview process, transcribing and coding. Finally, it concludes with study ethics, 
reliability, validity and limitation. 
Chapter Seven presents the ‘Findings and discussion’. It is divided into two parts; the 
first part presents findings and discussion of interviews conducted to achieve the fourth 
objective of the study. While the second part presents findings and discussions carried 
out to achieve the fifth objective of the study. Finally, it presents the conceptual 
framework of the study. 
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Chapter Eight concludes the thesis. It reviews the study objectives and to what extent 
they have been achieved. It describes the main research findings as well as the 
contribution of the study to theory, practice and methodology. Finally, it presents the 
study limitations, recommendations, and opportunities for future research. 
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: Dealing with Complexity: Emergency 
Management Planning 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is threefold. It starts by examining complexity; complex 
systems and complexity theory in order to better establish the context and understand 
the nature of emergencies. The chapter then moves on to explain planning for 
emergencies by starting with planning theory and then focusing on strategic and 
scenario planning. Finally, it highlights the emergency management cycle.  
 
2.2 Complexity and Complex System  
Complexity is a term used within the complexity sciences to illustrate “a materially 
identifiable mechanism” and also works as a conceptual framework for a range of 
supports, understanding and arguments (De Roo et al. 2012, p.3). Complexity science 
concepts help in gaining a better insight and understanding of flows and uncertainties, 
which appear in different physical and natural occurrences (Chambers 2008; De Roo 
et al. 2012).  Complexity means, “A state of being composed of two or more parts not 
simple” (Webster 1956) with features of inaccuracy and vagueness according to 
Grunau and Schonwandt (2010). Although complexity is still not clearly defined, it is 
not a concern because one can have a systematic approach to solving a problem 
(Holland 2014). For example, if a complex incident occurs there must be a strategy or 
plan to handle it, even the event is complex and may cause chaos, therefore its 
management should be more organised. Coskun and Ozecylan (2011, p.2) define 
complexity as “a difficulty metric, particularly with respect to understanding multiple 
relationships or interactions among two or more components of an object, entity, 
system, or situation in emergencies”.  Complexity focuses on “the dynamical 
properties and structural transformation of non-linear, far-from equilibrium systems” 
(Martin and Sunley 2007, p.575). For example, there is a complexity if related parts 
cannot be fitted within the whole system, and if events occur in a system not following 
linear time (Mol and Law 2002). Therefore, complexity according to Cilliers (1998) 
results from the interactions between simple elements of a system.  Thus, a complex 
system is not represented by the sum of its elements, but also by the complex 
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interactions between them (Cilliers 1998). Overall, complexity focuses on interactions 
and relationships (McDaniel and Driebe 2001). For example, in case of an incident 
occurring in a destination, the focus is how the stakeholders will act to manage it and 
what kind of relations they have with other stakeholders.   
Moreover, Taborga (2012) relates complexity to a system. This system consists of a 
group of elements that interact dynamically through processes by following certain 
procedures (Kuhn and Beam 1982; Nicolis and Prigogine 1989; Taborga 2012). These 
interacting elements are recognised as an entity concerning the whole environment 
where its boundaries can be closed or open (Chettiparamb 2013). In an open system, 
there are no boundaries in exchanging materials and information, whereas in a closed 
system the boundaries are absolute (Flood and Carson 1988). In a closed system, the 
determining elements are easily observable and controllable and concentrate on 
handling particular events (Hayek 1955). However, Hayek (1955, p.27) states that 
there are no closed systems in the universe and argues the need to try to single out “the 
points of contact through which the rest of the universe acts upon the 
system”.  Cilliers (1998) mentions that open systems are complex 
systems.  Morowits (1995) states that complex systems have common features 
including a large number of components, high dimensionality and a large number of 
probabilities. This result in unbalanced system and changes will be unpredictable and 
non-linear (Hilhorst 2003). Complex systems according to Waldrop (1992) and De 
Roo (2010b) can be found between order and chaos, where the world is never in 
balance (Figure 2-1).   
 
 
Figure 2-1. The Position of Complex System 
Source: Developed from Waldrop (1992) and De Roo (2010b) 
 
Order ChaosComplex System
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Features of the complex system are listed in Table 2-1. by Cilliers (1998) and 
explained as following.    
Table 2-1. Features of the Complex System 
Features of Complex System 
• Complex systems consist of a large number of elements.  
• These elements interact dynamically.  
• Interactions are rich; any element in the system can influence or be                         
influenced by any other.  
• Interactions are non-linear.  
• Interactions are typically short range.  
• There are positive and negative feedback loops of interactions.  
• Complex systems are open systems.  
• Complex systems operate under conditions far from equilibrium.  
• Complex systems have histories.  
• Individual elements are typically ignorant of the behaviour of the whole 
system in which they embedded.  
Source: Cilliers (1998) 
First, the complex system consists of a large number of elements.  Cilliers (1998) 
mentions two examples for complex systems. These are the social systems that consist 
of a huge number of individuals and languages. He explained how languages are 
considered to be a complex system by having large numbers of words where their 
meaning is developed through their relationships with each other. Second, the 
interconnected elements of the complex system interact dynamically (Nicolis and 
Prigogine 1989; Cilliers 1998; Bergströn et al. 2016). He explained that the system 
changes overtime and the interactions do not have to be physical, they can be thought 
of as the exchange of information. McKercher (1999, p.425-427) mentions an example 
of business environment dynamics where there are hundreds or 
thousands of companies entering and existing in the market, changing ownership or 
repositioning themselves drastically, annually. According to Kozuch et al. (2015), 
modern organisations and the new world are complex systems as they have connected 
and interacting elements (Jiang and Zhang  2014).      
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Third, the interaction between elements is rich because any element can influence, and 
is influenced by others (Cilliers 1998). For example, the external factors that might 
affect the elements of the social system might be the culture, the political or the 
economic situations and vice versa; these systems can be affected by people’s 
activities. Fourth, the interaction in the system has features that are non-linear. This 
means a minor cause can lead to major consequences and vice versa (Cilliers 1998). 
This, according to Cilliers (1998), is a prerequisite for complexity. Fifth, the 
interaction is short range, although long-term interaction can occur; however, the real-
world restrictions usually force this concern (Cilliers 1998). Because according 
to Szabo et al. (2014) the interaction occurs only with neighbours, as one of the reasons 
for emergence. Sixth, positive and negative feedback loops result from the interactions 
(Cilliers 1998). Memory and feedback influence the system elements (Cilliers 1998). 
For example, past incidents have an effect on the present events, and when incidents 
happen, they have a cascade effect. Regarding feedback, the reactions in the system 
are results from feedback within the system and from the external 
environment (Taborga 2012). Both simple and complex systems share the same 
principles of the feedback, which refer to the dynamics and information flows 
(Chambers 2008). In the former, the feedback may be linear, predictable and steady 
(Chambers 2008). While in the latter, feedback is about the effects of non-linear 
unsystematic changes over time as suggested by Byrne (1998).  
Seventh, complex systems are open systems thus their borders cannot be identified 
(Cilliers 1998). This in line with Hayek (1955, p.27) who declared that there are no 
closed systems in the world.  For example, Cilliers (1998) mentions that elements of 
the complex system interact with their surroundings like the social system interacts 
with the ecosystem or with the economic system. Eighth, complex systems operate 
under conditions far from equilibrium (Cilliers 1998).  Thus, complex systems need a 
continuous flow of energy in order to be able to change and to ensure its survival 
(Cilliers 1998). Ninth, complex systems have histories. The agent’s history and 
perception have the role to adapt themselves to their 
strategies (Taborga 2012). Cilliers (1998) mentions that the past cannot be disregarded 
when one thinks in the present since the present behaviour of the elements in the 
complex system is a result of the history (Cilliers 1998). Finally, individual elements 
are typically ignorant of the behaviour of the whole system in which they are 
embedded (Cilliers 1998). This is because each element responds based on limited and 
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locally available information (Cilliers 1998). The behaviour of the complex system 
represents the interaction of the whole set of elements rather than individual elements 
(Cilliers 1998).   
A complex system is adaptive because it influences and is influenced by its 
environment (Brain Arthur et al. 1997; Harvey 2001). Some complex systems can 
present features that are not applicable within linear systems (Gleick 1987; Waldrop 
1992; Chettiparamb 2013). These include self-organisations leading to overall order, 
the emergence of order and chaos simultaneously and resilience or 
adaptive behaviour in the face of incidents (Gleick 1987; Waldrop 
1992; Chettiparamb 2013). Specifically, resilience or adaptive behaviour has been the 
scope of research of a specific division of complex systems known as complex 
adaptive systems, which constitute entities working at the same time 
(Chettiparamb 2013). McMillan (2008, p.60) describes complex adaptive systems as 
“complex dynamical systems, which are able to learn and adapt to changes in their 
circumstances and their internal and external environment. They can modify their 
behaviours and to reconfigure their internal structures” unlike the non-adaptive 
complex systems, and they have many interacting parts that show non-linear 
behaviour, leading to unpredictability (Apgar et al. 2009). For example, the effect of 
disasters on critical infrastructure, such as disruption of power supplies can result in a 
loss of water supplies, breakdown of transport networks and the capacity of medical 
support, compounding the nature of the disaster. The Tsunami in Japan is also a good 
example of this with the triggering of the nuclear disaster, which resulted in a level-7 
nuclear breakdown, and release of radioactive materials in addition to the original 
Tsunami disaster (Oskin 2017). They are all complex groups of interacting elements 
in which modifications may occur because of learning processes; that is, they are 
complex adaptive systems (Axelrod and Cohen 1999). Hence, complex adaptive 
systems are not complicated (Anderson and McDaniel Jr 2000). This is because when 
adapting complex adaptive systems, the researchers’ and managers’ concentration 
shifts from looking for the answer to approving the logic of a situation; from predicting 
the future to designing the future; from finding the ideal structure to keeping the 
structure flexible and adaptive; and from overcoming the boundaries of the system to 
releasing the dynamic potential of the system (Anderson and McDaniel Jr 2000). This 
shows how adapting complexity provides a new and better way of thinking. It is not 
about solving a problem or answering a question, but it articulates the problem better. 
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Overall, a complexity accepts that the relationship between cause and effect in 
complex change processes is unpredictable and is associated with high levels of 
uncertainty (Ling 2012; Baggio 2007) and evolving consequences (Rogers 2008). 
However, it also prepares projects to be adjustable and responsive to any changes that 
might occur in their surroundings (Ling 2012). For example, the occurrences of 
unpredictable and uncertain events like emergencies require a proactive response. 
Therefore, a more thoughtful development of plans and scenarios to respond to 
uncertain and complex events may depend on the adoption of complexity 
theory.  Ferreira (2001) added that complexity theory studies and analyses complex 
systems in order to understand their structure and behaviour.    
2.3 Complexity Theory   
Complexity theory was integrated into social sciences in the 1980s (Hilhorst 2003) and 
was derived from the study of  “complex systems and theorisations of the same in the 
natural, biological and social sciences” (Chettiparamb 2013, p.8). Waldrop (1992) 
argues that complexity theory generally refers to instability and changes in a complex 
system that comprises of many interacting elements. Complexity theory according 
to Chettiparamb (2013, p.9) “deals with the study of entities that reveal non-linear 
dynamics; entities that though having determinate properties, yield indeterminate 
results”. Whereas a linear system is “one you can understand by understanding its parts 
individually and then putting them together”, a non-linear system “is one in which the 
whole is different from the sum of the parts” (Mitchell 2009, p.22-
23). Thus, Bergströn et al. (2016) declared that one of the basic standards of 
complexity theory is that it is not easy for any actor to get comprehensive 
understanding of the working system as a whole. This is due to the large number of 
elements and their non-linear interactions. For example, complex incidents are by their 
nature multi-organisational, it is not possible for one organisation to handle a complex 
incident solely. According to Parrish and Edelstein-Keshet (1999, p.99), “Complexity 
theory indicates that large populations of units can self-organize into aggregations that 
generate patterns, store information and engage in collective decision- making.” In 
terms of disaster response systems Comfort (1994 and 1995) argues the phenomenon 
of self-organisation makes the response system more complex. Hence, different 
challenges occur during the response since many stakeholders are involved with 
different objectives, different priorities and bearing different information. These all 
result in poor coordination and communication.   A further example is that of Sussman 
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(2000) who mentions the application of complexity theory to the complex and dynamic 
system of transportation and how policy makers introduce non-linear strategies that 
affect the whole system by modelling the system on different scales (e.g. city level, 
state level and country level).  
 
Moreover, complexity theory and its main principles of “emergence, self-organization, 
non-linearity, adaptiveness, and connectivity” are very suitable for examining “the 
dynamic and collaborative nature” of emergency or disaster management (O’Sullivan 
et al. 2013, p.238). Regarding emergencies, incidents cannot be controlled or planned 
for as the interaction will be random. Therefore, the dynamic nature of emergency 
management is inherent in the different effects of an emergency in the short or long 
run. While the collaborative nature is inherent in the number of involved stakeholders 
to manage an incident, they could be from one country or different countries. These 
dynamic complexities and collaboration arise because of the knock-on effects of an 
emergency.  To clarify the knock-on effects or the indirect effects of disasters or 
emergencies is that if an emergency occurs at local or national level, it might have an 
international effect or vice versa. For example, the Icelandic volcanic eruption, which 
occurred in 2010, had a worldwide effect especially on the airline industry. 
Furthermore, in case of emergency management, although there is a linear plan on 
different levels (international, regional, national and local) the system is still dynamic 
and complex. In the case of an emergency occurring at the national level for example, 
there will be a dynamic interaction between different stakeholders across different 
locations. For example, if an international hotel branch in a local area is affected by a 
terrorist attack, the main international branch will be involved in the management of 
the incident. Another example is that emergency cases are managed locally, but when 
its impact crosses the country and overwhelms the available resources it becomes 
complex. This indicates that the complexity is not only inherent in the incidents and 
their effects, but also in their management. Accordingly, the wider effect the 
emergency has, the more complex it is in its management. Thus, understanding the 
complex nature of an emergency can facilitate and support good preparation and 
effective response.   
2.4 The Complex Nature of Emergency   
According to Shen and Shaw (2004, p.2110) “Emergency is any natural or man-caused 
situation that results in or may result in substantial harm to the population or damage 
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to property”. An emergency is defined by Alexander (2002, p.1) as “an exceptional 
event that exceeds the capacity of normal resources and organization to cope with it”. 
Four levels of emergency have been identified by Alexander (2002, p.1-2) according 
to their magnitude and scope of impact. The lowest and first level includes the daily 
routine cases or issues, for example a guest falling down in a hotel or the crash of a 
single passenger car. The second level involves a situation that can be managed by a 
sole responsible organisation without substantial need for external resources. A major 
case or incident is on the third level and requires regional assistance and resources. 
The last level is an event that can only be tackled by the national government and 
sometimes with the aid of international organisations.  
  
Although complexity is “an undesired” consequences of an emergency case, it should 
be clearly explained and better understood to enhance the level of its management and 
response (Coskun and Ozecylan 2011). O’Sullivan et al (2013, p.238) add that 
complexity is not only a feature of large-scale incidents but also many routine and 
frequent incidents like floods, tornados etc. This is because these incidents bear high 
levels of uncertainty, as well as having indirect effects and the need to be managed in 
collaboration with different stakeholders, which are part of complex adaptive systems 
(Ansell et al. 2010; Okros et al. 2011; Wyche et al. 2011). Examples of disasters that 
showed the complexity of the response across different countries and organisations are 
the Indonesian tsunami (2004), global pandemics like SARS and H1N1, and the 
earthquake in Haiti (2010) (O’Sullivan et al. 2013). Managing these disasters was 
complex because they were unexpected, their scope of impact was high, handling them 
was a collaborative effort with the participation of different countries, and the number 
of affected people was high as well as the lengthy time taken to recover the affected 
areas. The complexity of such incidents and disasters indicate that the prepared plans 
or the available plans are ineffective, and resources are insufficient. According to 
Coskun and Ozecylan (2011), emergencies have become more complex in nature as 
well as in their management process, due to the extended effects on large numbers of 
people. In addition to this, the impact of emergencies on the critical infrastructure, for 
example the Tohoku Earthquake and the following tsunami in Japan in 2011 left more 
than 430,000 households without gas and electricity (SEEDS Asia 2011).  The 
complex nature of emergency management creates many challenges to 
emergency responders and decision makers according to the study of Coskun 
and Ozecylan (2011). Therefore, emergency is complex, but complexity is not an 
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emergency.  Coskun and Ozecylan (2011) identified six types of complexity for 
emergency management and disaster response information systems. These are human 
complexity, technological complexity, event complexity, interaction complexity, 
cultural complexity and decision-making complexity.  
 
Coskun and Ozecylan (2011) referred the first complexity (human complexity) to the 
responders’ wrong doing (not following the given instructions) or to decision-makers 
who make decisions based on unclear information. This is might be a result of 
organisations not having appropriate response plans that have been tested. To 
overcome this complexity, organisations must have clear plans and responders should 
be trained. In addition, there should be a platform for information sharing among all 
involved stakeholders that facilitate decision-making.  Unclear information in the 
limited time of incidents makes it a challenge to make the right or decisive decision, 
resulting in the wrong decision creating another incident. For example, Moore (1994) 
suggests that human errors during operations caused 65% of catastrophic marine-
related accidents; wrong doings in a complex system can cause complexity (Coskun 
and Ozecylan 2011).   The second complexity (technologic complexity) can affect the 
functioning of the system. Computer technology and software can help accomplish 
tasks quickly, enable rapid decision-making, increase information flow and raise 
situational awareness among systems and operators according to Coskun 
and Ozecylan (2011). However, if the system itself is affected, it will lead to 
complexity, especially when several stakeholders are involved and totally dependent 
on the technology. For example, during major incidents, communication channels can 
be affected. This is what happened in New York City on September 11th due to 
communication failures around 300 fire-fighters lost their lives (Coskun 
and Ozecylan 2011). The third type (event complexity) is inherent in the event 
(e.g. floods, earthquakes, tsunamis, storms, hurricanes etc.) that caused the disaster 
and requires immediate emergency responses (Coskun and Ozecylan 2011). This is 
because the response to each event is different in terms of the required resources, 
personnel, tools etc. (Coskun and Ozecylan 2011). The fourth type of complexity 
(interaction complexity) is inherent in organisational, coordination and management 
complexity. Although in times of emergencies organisations and responders share 
common goals, their practice or values may conflict (Grabowski 2010). This occurs in 
cases where the stakeholders are from different countries, or within the same country 
but from different sectors. The interactions occur between different stakeholders, 
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between systems, between responders, all of which make the system more complex 
(Coskun and Ozecylan 2011). If the country is multicultural, perhaps due to 
immigration, the fifth complexity (cultural complexity) may occur (Coskun 
and Ozecylan 2011).  It may be the case that expatriates are working at managerial 
level and in charge of decision-making. Cultural complexity in times of emergencies 
can also occur, such as the case in this study, a European cruise ship affected in a local 
destination (Oman) where cultures differ greatly. Finally, decision-making 
complexity, where the shared knowledge among different individuals, teams and 
organisations makes decision complexity, if information is not accessible to those 
involved and unclear to them (Chen et al. 2009; Coskun and Ozecylan 2011). This 
results in decision-making difficulties during emergencies (Coskun 
and Ozecylan 2011). Unclear information in the limited time available during an 
incident is a challenge and wrong decisions can create further incidents.  
 
According to Faulkner (2001) emergencies are chaotic situations and demonstrate the 
complex relationships between human and natural systems. They increasingly become 
complex in nature, without boundaries and interrelations (Hills 1998; Boin 
and Lagadec 2000; Ren 2000). Deleuze and Parent (2002) agree and argue that there 
are far more stakeholders involved today, but that the relationships between those 
stakeholders are often not stable and subject to change over time (e.g. variables and 
individuals). Their argument recognises that even when the individuals remain the 
same, the relationships between them do not, therefore, relationships cannot be 
considered to be stable ‘things’; they are the outcome of practices. Kwa (2002) took 
this argument even further by suggesting that if you could identify particular 
patterns in the ways these relationships are formed, they are only short-term and 
multiple relationships can cause changes that are outside such patterns. Therefore, 
from the point of view of management, it is necessary to take cognisance of the fact 
that politics and relative power will change relationships (Hiller 2012). For that reason, 
relationships between stakeholders are more important than the stakeholders 
themselves. So, to assume that there is a linear relationship involved when looking at 
disaster management may result in the response to an emergency being sub-optimal. 
It would be better to have a decision-making system , which extends beyond the 
approaches generally accepted in social sciences, a system more informed and 
subjective.  Whether the number of emergencies is increasing annually or is fixed, their 
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effects are becoming more devastating. This indicates that we are living in an 
increasingly open and complex world (Richardson 1994).  
 
The reason for the ineffectiveness of the traditional emergency response approach may 
be the use of linear cause-and-effect emergency management plans (Paraskevas 2006). 
Since managing emergencies is not sequential, it is important to link them to 
complexity theory (Ritchie 2008). The first point is that the organisation, as a complex 
system, is vulnerable to any early circumstances, which are erratic. Response 
efficiency will be a result of emergency tactics and not of a linear cause-and-effect 
emergency planning approach (Paraskevas 2006). The second point is that because of 
the dynamic nature of internal and external organisational environments, the early 
circumstances of an emergency continually change, with substantial impacts on the 
organisation’s sustainability (Paraskevas 2006). According to O’Sullivan et al. (2012) 
complexity is an obvious feature of large-scale, frequent disasters, like floods, 
tornados and pandemics. These incidents bear high levels of ambiguity and need 
collaboration between different sectors in order to respond effectively; part of complex 
adaptive systems (Ansell et al. 2010; Okros et al. 2011; Wyche et al. 2011). Therefore, 
the boundaries between natural disasters and those that are human induced are vague 
(Waldrop 1992; Capra 1996). For example, Winser et al. (2003) mention, war and 
post-war distractions linked with famine, drought and out-breaks of diseases make it 
difficult for people to survive (e.g. in Afghanistan, Sudan). Furthermore, an emergency 
in other industry sectors (such as agriculture or manufacturing) could impact on other 
sectors, like tourism, due to sectorial inter-dependence (Paraskevas and Altinay 2013; 
Othman and Beydoun 2013). An illustration of this is the case of the foot and mouth 
outbreak in the UK. This event started as an agricultural incident and ended up as a 
disaster for the tourism industry (Miller and Ritchie 2003). The model in Figure            
2-2 shows how emergencies or disasters are complex events and how one disaster (for 
example, a flood) can lead to several disasters, Helbing et al. (2006).  
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Figure 2-2. How One Kind of Disaster may Trigger Another One 
Source: Helbing et al. (2006) 
 
In essence, complexity may be an undesirable aspect of emergencies, but it needs to 
be understood, explained and considered in the decision-making processes, if effective 
emergency management responses are to be realised (Coskun and Ozecylan 2011). It 
also needs to be understood in order to plan well for the responses. The increasing 
number of complex emergencies occurring around the world require proactive 
planning to reduce their negative impacts and for effective handling. Complexity of 
emergencies can have a positive effect on affected countries as it can enhance the 
country’s resilience and ability to handle future incidents. 
2.5 Planning for Emergency Management  
2.5.1 Planning and Planning Theory  
Planning can be a powerful tool to improve life, communities and organisations, 
especially when people have the knowledge of the planning process and use the tools 
of ethical planning (Sybouts 1992). Mannheim (1940) believes that planning is 
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inevitable because the world is witnessing rapid technological development and rapid 
population growth, requiring urban planning, land use planning, economic planning 
etc. Planning has been defined as a process of setting goals and identifying the way to 
achieve them as well as a process for solving problems by following certain procedures 
(Cullingworth 1997) and directing changes in a social system (Friedmann 1967). 
Faludi (1973) notes that planning is a logical accomplishment supporting human 
progress. Cullingworth (1997) argues that planning in different disciplines has a 
common factor that is future oriented, and Waterman emphasises that it must be 
directed to change (1987) with its different categories. Planning has been put into three 
different categories: strategic, tactical and operational (Hartl 2004; Lassner 
2008; Mikoluk 2013). Strategic planning comprises all organisation management 
areas, so it is the role of the organisation’s director and executive (Lassner 2008) and 
its content is at a high-level overview (Mikoluk 2013). Its main objective is 
determining the organisational priorities, describing its vision, clarifying its values and 
stating its strategic goals (Hartl 2004). The scope of its plan may extend from two to 
ten years (Mikoluk 2013).  
 
Strategic planning is often directed by many participants, works on unpredictable 
future concerns and comprises strategic matters that will affect the already existing 
mission, goals and priority settings (Sybouts 1992). Tactical planning is more specific 
and pays attention to certain programmes (Lassner 2008). It identifies tactics and 
objectives that are followed by the organisation in order to accomplish its strategic 
plan (Hartl 2004), so it is more flexible (Mikoluk 2013). It is handled by mid-level 
managers (Mikoluk 2013), and its scope is medium-term extending up to one year 
(Hartl 2004). The tactical plan is an answer to “How?” while the strategic plan is an 
answer to “What?” (Mikoluk 2013). Operational planning describes the daily work of 
an organisation (Mikoluk 2013) so; it has short-term scope (Lassner 2008). 
Operational plans can be single use plans created for a specific event or continuous 
plans that can be used in multiple situations (Mikoluk 2013). It is the task of the 
working teams representing any operational unit (Lassner 2008; Mikoluk 2013). All 
these types of planning are crucial in planning for emergencies depending on their 
types (natural or human-induced) and its effects (high-medium-low). Additionally, the 
increasing number of incidents occurring around the world require proactive planning 
for effective responses. Planners, according to Galloway and Mahayn (1977) are 
dealing with open and complex systems where science is limited in representing and 
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anticipating changes in such a system. To ensure the vitality and continuity of planning 
as a profession, it should be linked to planning theory according to Friedmann (2003).  
 
Planning theory is the basis of planning practice as well as being important to planning 
practitioners to understand the epistemology that constitutes their actions 
(Rukmana 2011). It is not easy to define planning theory for the four main reasons 
identified by Campbell and Fainstein (1996). First, planning theory overlaps with 
other theories in the social science disciplines, so it is difficult to bind its scope to the 
planning field. Second, there is no mutually exclusive interaction between planners 
and related specialists, like real estate developers, or architects. This means that 
planners don’t just plan; non-planners also plan. For example, in the field of disaster 
and emergency management emergency organisations managers and other 
organisations' managers can plan for future incidents, they do not need to be specialist 
planners in disasters.  Third, the planning field may be divided by the intention of 
planning, either according to its purpose, like land use, or its approach, for example, 
the process of making decisions. Fourth, the theoretical base of planning theory cannot 
be stated easily because planning derives its various methodologies from different 
disciplines, where many disciplines are defined by a specific set of methodologies. 
 
The focus of planning theory is concentrated on the practical side of planning as well 
as pushing the work into modern tracks and challenging reactions (Stiftel 2000). 
Furthermore, Watson notices, “over the last several decades planning theory has 
shifted towards a closer engagement with practice” (2008, p.244). It perceives 
planning practice and determines the required skills, either individual or interactive 
ones that planners should have in order to work effectively (Schon 1991; Healey 1992; 
Forester 2008). The importance of planning theory clarifies and explains models, 
mechanisms, techniques and toolkits that can support planners’ understanding and 
enable them to do their job perfectly (Chettiparamb 2014). In addition, it fulfils the 
objective of explaining the planner's role, what should they do as such and the required 
knowledge depends on evaluating the current situation accurately which facilitates the 
planners’ job (Fainstein 2000). Planners today are working on reflections of what they 
have understood about the practical side and what they have read and heard about 
planning theories or the ideas and opinions of others, which in turn are introduced by 
theories (Beaurgard 1995; Sanderock 1998). Both within the practical and theoretical 
sides, it always examines the ability of the planner to be a good leader, decision-maker 
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and enabler (Thomas 2004; Chettiparamb 2005; Van der Broek 2008). Overall, it is 
crucial to link planning to complexity as it helps to improve the planning and 
management process by taking advantage of complexity, rather than striving to 
simplify it (Axelrod and Cohen 2000). The next part discusses the relationship between 
planning and complexity.  
2.5.2 Planning and Complexity  
It is still not clear how complexity might work as a concept within planning, as it has 
several meanings according to De Roo (2010a). In contrast, Christensen (2012) 
indicates that planners can make use of the complexity considering it as building 
blocks and ways to solve problems and add new patterns (after Webber 1978). 
Furthermore, he emphasises that to achieve effective planning outcomes, planners 
should understand or be familiar with complexity and complex systems dynamics. One 
approach to manage complexity is to simplify the planning assignments either by 
disregarding complexity or by establishing regular tasks and techniques for coping 
with it (Christensen 2012). Additionally, Axelrod and Cohen take advantage of 
complexity rather than simplifying it (2000). Moreover, effective planners to 
accomplish their goals can and do work within the complex system by using a certain 
set of actors at specific time and place in order to decrease complexity and ambiguity 
in a specific situation (Christensen 2012). However, they cannot make planning in a 
straight way and “make their planning situation simple, clear, ordered and rational”, 
hence their approved clarification will need to be corrected and will alter over time 
(Christensen 2012, p.89). Planners in the open system are dealing with “wicked” 
problems (Table 2-2) as opposed to “tame” problems in sciences indicate Rittle and 
Webber (1973). According to Rittle and Webber (1973), a tame problem can be solved 
in a linear way like the mathematical equation where it has a clear mission and validity 
of testing the solution. Contrary to this, wicked problems are not clear and have 
uncertain and ambiguous goals like large-scale emergencies (Morakabati et al. 
2015). Examples of wicked problems are climate change, globalisation, obesity, 
strategy and sustainability (Batie 2008; Camillus 2008; Head 2008; Periyakoil 2007; 
Frame 2008).  
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Table 2-2. Characteristics of the Wicked Problems 
Characteristics of the wicked problems 
1. Wicked problems have no definitive formulation. The required information to 
understand the problem depends upon one’s idea for solving it. That is to say: in 
order to describe a wicked-problem in adequate detail, one has to develop a 
comprehensive list of all possible solutions in advance.  
2. Wicked problems have no stopping rules. As the process of solving the problem 
is like the process of understanding its nature, because there are no measures for 
appropriate understanding and because there are no ends to the causal sequences 
that link interacting open systems, one can always try to do better.  
3. Solutions to wicked problems can be only good or bad, not true or false. 
Normally, many parties are equally prepared, interested, and/or authorised to 
critique the solutions, although none has the command to set formal decision rules 
to determine correctness. Their judgments are likely to differ widely to accord with 
their group or personal interests, their special value-sets, and their ideological 
predilections.   
4. There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a wicked problem. 
With wicked problems any solution, after application, will create waves of 
consequences over an extended period of time.   
5. Every solution to a wicked problem is a “one-shot operation”. With wicked 
planning problems, every applied solution is important – every trial is considered.  
6. Wicked problems do not have a set of potential solutions, nor is there a well-
described set of acceptable procedures that may be integrated into the plan.   
7. Every wicked problem is unique. Despite long lists of correspondences between 
an existing problem and a former one, there always might be an additional 
distinctive property that is of overriding importance.  
8. Every wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of another problem. 
One should try to resolve the problem on as high a level as possible.  
9. The existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked problem can be 
explained in various ways. The choice of explanation decides the nature of the 
problem’s resolution. There is no rule or procedure to determine the “correct” 
description or a combination of them.  
10. The planner has no right to be wrong. Designers are responsible for the effects 
of the actions they cause.   
Source: Rittle and Webber (1973) 
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Large-scale emergencies are wicked problems because managers are dealing with 
unknown circumstances that are complex and uncertain (Edzén 2014). Many 
emergencies bear the characteristics of wicked problems (uncertain, complex, and 
having no clear solution) as opposite to tame problems (simple or complex but having 
possible-to-define solutions) (Stubbart see Edzén 2014, p.1978). For example, 
terrorism attacks can be considered as wicked problems because nobody knows who 
is planning them, when, why and how they are going to happen. Although several 
terrorism attacks happened in developed and developing countries, there is still no 
definite solution to prevent them from happening or to control them. While, tame 
problems can be managed by using the traditional command and control system in 
managing incidents, this approach cannot handle wicked problems. Command and 
Control is defined as “the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated 
commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission” 
(JP1-02 2016). The traditional command and control is derived from the military 
domain where participants act upon orders received from a commander (Alexander 
2016). However, Roberts (2000) suggests we need collaborative strategies to tame 
wicked problems, which is a view also supported by Verweij et al. (2006) Camillus 
(2008) and this study. Because wicked problems when they occur affect large numbers 
of people, wider geographical areas and their impact often cascade, so collaboration 
among several stakeholders is required. When saying collaboration, it could be either 
between organisations within one country or between even different countries. 
Because managing wicked problems in developed countries is not like the developing 
countries, due to lack of resources, awareness, plans and other capabilities. For 
example, managing an earthquake in Japan is not similar as managing an earthquake 
in Haiti. Japan as a developed country has more capabilities than Haiti, as a developing 
country that mostly depends on external funding. Having said this, the magnitude of 
the earthquakes destroyed the good and poor infrastructure of both countries.   
Managing wicked problems requires more work in the pre-disaster phases (mitigation 
and preparedness phases; see pages 44-45) (O’Brien 2010). Alexander (2016) argues 
that the direction of managing emergencies in the modern world is shifting from 
command and control towards a more supportive and collaborative approach. This is 
because command and control system is ill prepared “to deal with uncertainty, 
complexity and variability” (Chaudhury et al. 2012). Hence, overcoming wicked 
problems (e.g. large-scale emergencies) requires communication and collective action 
among all involved stakeholders (Fodness 2017).   
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Overall, it is crucial to link planning to complexity as it helps to improve the planning 
and management process by taking advantage of complexity, rather than striving to 
simplify it (Axelrod and Cohen 2000). Christensen (1985) introduced complexity as 
“a phenomenon that could help construct a view of planning that has to cope with a 
reality that differentiates degrees of complexity”. The degree of complexity increases 
from operational to strategic planning due to the number of actors involved in each 
type, the higher the number, the greater the complexity.  Figure 2-3 shows the 
relationship between planning and complexity; for example, strategic planning can 
reach different bodies in a country the more it reaches, the more the degree of 
complexity increases (Sybouts 1992) because of the large number of stakeholders 
involved who are representing different areas of knowledge.  
 
 
Figure 2-3. The Relationship between Planning and Complexity 
Source: (Author 2018) 
 
Using the degrees of complexity (simple or complex) as a criterion enables planners 
to deal with problems of certainty and uncertainty (De Roo et al. 2012) like planning 
for predictable and unpredictable emergencies. Although there is a need for planning, 
complexity challenges this planning because there are different stakeholders with 
different objectives and priorities. For example, even if something bad happens, it does 
not matter if all stakeholders are involved, they might not have the same objectives or 
priorities. Therefore, the way to handle an incident will be different based on the 
priorities set by stakeholders.  
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2.6 Emergency Management Planning  
Emergency management is not a new field, but has roots as old as early hieroglyphics 
when people took shelter during natural disasters or wars, in other words when dealing 
with incidents (Haddow et al. 2011, p.1). Emergency management is defined as “The 
organization and management of resources and responsibilities for addressing all 
aspects of emergencies, in particular preparedness, response and initial recovery steps” 
(UNISDR 2009, p.13-14). Accordingly, an emergency is a threatening situation that 
requires immediate response to prevent it turning into a disaster (UNISDR 2009). The 
term “disaster management” is sometimes used instead of emergency management 
(UNISDR 2009, p.14). Emergency management involves plans and organised 
arrangements to direct and coordinate all comprehensive efforts of all involved 
stakeholders (governmental and non-governmental agencies) to fulfil the whole range 
of emergency requirements (UNISDR 2009, p.13). While, emergency Services “The 
set of specialized agencies that have specific responsibilities and objectives in serving 
and protecting people and property in emergency situations” (UNISDR 2009, p.14). 
Emergency services include police, fire, ambulance, civil defence, coastguard, specific 
emergency units of electricity, transportation, communications and other related 
services organizations (UNISDR 2009, p.14). Generally, emergency management is 
divided into four phases: mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery (Waugh and 
Hy 1990; McEntire 2007; Edzén 2014). These phases are related to each other 
(Uhr 2009). however, each phase has different objectives and different degrees of 
complexity in terms of time required, involved organisations and practical needs to 
work with others (Kahan et al. 2009; Wyche et al. 2011).  
 
The management of emergency and disaster events requires the participation of many 
organisations and agencies (Haddow et al. 2011) in order to share knowledge, 
experience, to quantify the available resources and to evaluate the current 
capabilities. As stated before, emergencies are multi-organisational due to their 
complex nature. According to Alexander (2002) the first two phases occur pre-
emergency, while the last two phases occur post-emergency. Dividing this process into 
phases has the advantage of simplifying the understanding of disaster management as 
a process by “breaking the complexity and uncertainty” resulting from a disaster into 
a specific number of phases, where each stage could be inspected with respect to its 
concentration, policies, actions, involved organisations and players (Ireni Saban 2014, 
p. 24). However, O’Brien et al. (2010) noted that although the phases may divide the 
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model equally, the actual focus is on the response phase. They pointed out that for 
instance the response phase with its long-term recovery, creates more interest in media 
coverage more than the mitigation and preparedness stages. In addition, the response 
phase has the solution for the incident, so it determines to what extent a country or 
organisation is able to deal with an incident. It also determines to what extent there is 
a need for further development of plans or resources.   The focus of this study will be 
on the response phase and the emergency procedures taken at this stage in addition to 
the deployment of the required resources. These phases are explained briefly on the 
following paragraph.  
Mitigation  
The first phase in the emergency management process is mitigation, which according 
to Haddaw et al. (2011), is the measures taken to reduce the effect of emergencies and 
to increase the resilience of the vulnerable community (Emergency management 
Australia 2004). Mitigation is defined by the UNISDR as “the lessening or limitation 
of the adverse impacts of the hazards and related disasters” (2009, p.19). See 
Appendix 2 for related activities and procedures taken in the mitigation phase. When 
planning for mitigation, it should be clear that the public are fully aware of the potential 
hazards to protect themselves as much as possible and support the measures provided 
to protect them (Nateghi 2000). Some examples of mitigation measures, stated by 
Lindsay (2012), are building codes that refer to risks such as fires or earthquake, flood 
mapping to relocate homes, building dams to prevent flooding etc. information is an 
important element in planning for disaster mitigation (Nateghi 2000). This information 
can be collected from literature, previous experiences of having such emergencies or 
through asking experts, for example collecting information regarding the potential 
hazards, vulnerable groups, areas etc. Sanjeewa et al. (2012) highlight the advantage 
of taking a professional expert’s opinions on disaster identification and mitigation as 
they can provide more practical and the latest information. Besides consulting experts, 
it is important to integrate the community in managing a disaster in the mitigation 
stage according to Nateghi (2000), who mentions that it may be by conducting public 
meetings and consultations, free inquiries and discussing the decisions in order to 
design the mitigation plan. Accordingly, mitigation measures are a collaborative 
process between the government and local community not only to reduce the impact 
of an incident, but also to enhance their resilience to bounce back after incidents (Berke 
et al. 2012). As it is a cycle management process, mitigation may include applying 
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policies after recovering from certain disaster, for example, rebuilding anti-seismic 
houses based on a good standard as a result of earthquake damage (Ireni Saban 2014). 
However, when taken mitigation measures the complexity of incidents should be 
considered because some mitigation measures might be very expensive like the anti-
seismic houses or placing tourists resorts in areas less vulnerable to cyclones. 
Therefore, mitigation is the opportunity to pass an incident with least cost. In sum, 
most mitigation measures are lessons from previous incidents and correcting what 
went wrong in previous cases. However, mitigation measures should put into a priority 
scale in terms of the impact of the incidents like the mitigation measures applied to the 
critical infrastructure should be a high priority. Hence, the more advanced mitigation 
measures that help reduce the impact of future incidents, the more the country or 
community are able to recover.  
Preparedness  
The second phase is preparedness and it is “The knowledge and capacities developed 
by governments, professional response and recovery organisations and communities 
and individuals to effectively anticipate, respond to and recover from the impacts of 
likely, imminent or current hazard events or conditions” (UNISDR 2009, p. 22). 
Appendix 2 lists the related activities and procedures taken in the preparedness phase. 
The development of the preparedness strategies or emergency plans is vital in order to 
provide support in times of emergencies (Ritichie 2009). Ireni Saban (2014) mentions 
that the preparedness phase is complementary to the mitigation phase activities, while 
Blaikie et al. (1994) highlight its importance in providing strength and resilience to 
emergencies, thereby contributing to reducing community vulnerability. Similarly, 
Cavallo (2014, p.48) views that it is “about preparing communities and response 
systems to face the risks that have been identifies in a certain area ”. To differentiate 
preparedness from mitigation, Alexander (2002) explains that planning for evacuation 
is a mitigation procedure, whereas its implementation is preparedness. Consequently, 
preparedness phase focuses more on training and educating people because responders 
should be trained how to execute the evacuation.   This phase has more inputs in terms 
of transmitting knowledge, developing plans, enhancing awareness and culture of 
emergency management and other activities that improve overall preparedness. 
Moreover, preparedness is not only at the organisational or country level, but it is also 
at individual level. When there is a possibility for an incident to happen, people care 
about their safety first and then other things come later. In addition, to ensure its 
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effectiveness a collaborative coordination should be established among emergency 
management program of actions, volunteers and vulnerable communities in order to 
improve local capabilities and coordination (Ireni Saban 2014). Overall, the main aim 
of the preparedness phase is to ensure that the response will be effective.  
Response  
The focus of this study is on the emergency measures taken during the response phase. 
Response is “the provision of emergency services and public assistance during or 
immediately after a disaster in order to save lives, reduce health impacts, ensure public 
safety and meet the basic subsistence needs of the people affected” (UNISDR 2009, 
p.24). Related activities and procedures of the response phase are presented in 
Appendix 2. Response phase activates preparedness measures and plans to use 
effective procedures to deal with emergencies and disasters, if and when they happen 
(Emergency Management Australia 2004, p.4). 
  
Responders represented by public and private organisations, individuals, and societies 
provide the activities and resources, such as search and rescue, provision of food and 
water, medical assistance, shelter, and advice (Ireni Saban 2014). These activities are 
explained briefly Coppola et al (2011, p.310) who divide actions involved in search 
and rescue as “1) locating victims; 2) extracting (rescuing) victims from whatever 
condition has trapped them; and 3) providing initial medical first aid treatment to 
stabilize victims so that they may be transported to regular emergency medical 
practitioners”. Emergency medical services, is one of the first steps taken by 
responders to manage an emergency’s first aid, this is establish a triage, which is “a 
system by which many victims are ranked according to their seriousness of their 
injuries, ensuring that the highest priority cases are transported to medical facilities 
before less serious ones” (Alexander 2002, p.190; Coppola et al. 2011, p.311). 
Evacuation and shelter is the process of transferring people and other living creatures 
from vulnerable or affected areas to more safe and secure areas (Evacuation and 
Shelter Guidance 2013, p. 9). The type of disaster indicates whether it should be total 
or partial evacuation to remote or close locations and if it is a long or short-term 
process (Apte 2009). While “shelter is a place where evacuees can stay and receive 
support (Evacuation and Shelter Guidance 2013, p. 9)” it “includes buildings, 
humanitarian assistance and support for individuals” (Evacuation and Shelter 
Guidance 2013, p.31). The fourth activity is casualty-tracking systems, which aim to 
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work as a central point to reply to all public enquires regarding missing people in case 
of disasters (Cappola 2011; Jackman and Beruvides 2013; UNWTO 2014). It enables 
the responders to look for missing people in the affected area when they receive 
information from their relatives, friends, work colleagues, embassies and employers 
(Cappola 2011; Jackman and Beruvides 2013; UNWTO 2014). The fifth activity is 
victim identification and according to Alexander (2013a) there are several ways of 
identifying bodies, including visual recognition, fingerprints, dental records, surgical 
scars, personal effects, and estimation of the age. One of the largest and most complex 
disaster victim identification operations was the Thai Tsunami because the group 
consisted of a multi-national, multi-agency and multi-disciplinary team (Wright et al. 
2015).  
  
Although the response phase is the more critical phase as it determines the 
effectiveness of the emergency response system, it is very complex. Its complexity is 
inherent in every single activity of this phase. In addition to the above-mentioned 
activities, there is a need for communication, coordination, cooperation and 
collaboration for information sharing, resources allocation, decision-making and 
effective leadership. However, each single strategy has its own complexity due to the 
large number of involved stakeholders and the interaction between them.  Overall, the 
wider impact of the disaster and the more casualties it has, the more complex its 
management.   
Recovery  
The last phase of emergency management is recovery and is defined as “The 
restoration, and improvement where appropriate, of facilities, livelihoods and living 
conditions of disasters-affected communities, including efforts to reduce disaster risk 
factors” (UNISDR 2009, p.23). Its activities are listed in Appendix 2. It is also defined 
as the development and application of certain strategies and measures to return the 
affected area to its pre-emergency situation (the new normal situation) and it could 
start immediately after the emergency or may be postponed until the affected area is 
able to recover (Mair et al. 2016). Additionally, it has an important part to play in 
encouraging the community and stakeholders to reflect on their past and review their 
plans for future incidents (Ritchie 2009). Overall, Coppolla (2011) concluded that 
recovery is always a long-term process that could extend to decades and communities 
recover quickly when provided with suitable assistance. According to Stahura et al. 
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(2012) the success of emergency management depends on a good emergency 
planning.  
2.7 Emergency Planning  
Alexander (2000) notes that emergency planning and emergency management should 
be regarded as interrelated activities as planning is the starting point to form the 
structure for emergency management. Emergency planning can help in times of 
disaster or emergency which can affect positively to strengthen the resilience of an 
organisation and decrease the susceptibility of communities to the effects of such 
incidents (Blaikie et al. 2003; Ritchie 2008). Emergency planning is defined by 
Alexander (2015, p.2) as “the process of preparing systematically for future 
contingencies, including major incidents and disasters.” The main purpose of the 
planning process is to develop and maintain up-to-date emergency operation plans 
(FEMA 2011). Although the end product of emergency planning is a document (Plan), 
emergency planning is more a process than an outcome, especially as the plan itself 
will need to be updated over time as circumstances change (Alexander 2015). 
Emergency planning is a continuous process and its plans are to some extent 
considered to be adaptable to different industries and situations such as planning for 
industrial sites, medical facilities, agriculture or tourism industry (Alexander 2002). 
However, sometime there is a gap between what happens and what was planned in a 
major disaster as a result of the poor planning and the incapability to differentiate crisis 
management from disaster or emergency planning (Quarantelli’s 1988, 
p.374). Thus, planning in emergency should be a plan for action not for situations 
meaning do not plan on what can happen, but plan for what actions can be taken 
(Drabek 1995; Piotrowski 2006). At its most essential, it must match urgent needs to 
available resources, and do so in a timely way that avoids delay.  
 
The plan is a shared document between participants and all stakeholders that identifies 
their roles and responsibilities (Alexander 2015, p.2) as well as documents “the 
required knowledge, skills, resources and abilities” (Edzén 2014, p.1978). It should 
also assign a clear role for every responder and ensure that all tasks are allocated to 
identify groups of participants (Alexander 2013b). Some goals of the plan are to keep 
public safety, to control damage, to protect vulnerabilities and to use available 
resources efficiently; basically, it is a framework for emergency response (Alexander 
2015). Alexander (2015) adds that a plan should be realistic, practical, and consider 
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the limitations and the capabilities of response. For example, it should not list 
resources that are not available and there is no chance to be provided within the critical 
time of the incident (Alexander 2015). He also adds that plan should be flexible and 
adjustable. He provided an example of that in Florence, Italy the emergency plan is 
only prepared for flooding as they faced a major flood in 1966. However, for 20 years 
during the lifetime of the plan, few floods occurred and more frequent occurring 
emergencies were air crashes and terrorism (Alexander 2015). A good emergency plan 
should direct responders and organisations to manage all the known and expected 
hazards as well as the unexpected ones. (Alexander 2015). The good structure of the 
plans should consider the ‘what ifs’, but in case the context changes it should be 
flexible. (O’Sullivan et al. 2013). Planning for emergencies is a difficult duty, and the 
difficulties increase considerably when the complexity and ambiguity of the 
emergency increases (Dowell 1995). 
 
There is a paradox, although there is a need for planning and a need for plans 
complexity makes planning difficult. This is because of the different stakeholders 
involved with conflicting interests (in terms of having different objectives, especially 
between the government and the private sector).  They may also have different 
priorities; therefore their handling of the situation may not be similar. In addition, there 
is the issue of asymmetric information, which results in none of the stakeholders 
having the full picture. For example, what stakeholder A knows, stakeholder B may 
not know and there is information that none of them know. In reality there is a need 
for a huge amount of rapid and current information and a need for people who are able 
to understand and react to that information in an effective way. Therefore, responses 
may be ineffective. Thus, complexity theory, whilst not offering a solution, may offer 
the opportunity to improve the effectiveness of emergency and disaster management 
approaches. The increasing complexity and uncertainty of an incident requires 
preparation for the unexpected from different stakeholders. These preparations include 
strategic planning and scenario planning. As some emergencies are predictable whilst 
others are not, their planning should be integrated with the strategic and 
scenario planning.  
2.7.1 Strategic Planning for Emergency  
Strategic planning dates to the 1950s and gained high popularity between the mid-
1960s to mid-1970s as it was considered the answer for any arising issues in business 
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organisations (Lisiński and Aruckij 2006). In the early 1980s there was a decline in 
the popularity of strategic planning (Lisiński and Aruckij 2006). However, it regained 
its popularity and reputation in the 1990s, which positively affected the relationship 
between formal planning and performance (Schwenk and Shrader 1993; Miller and 
Cardinal 1994). Steiner (1979, p.) defines strategic planning, as “a process of deciding 
in advance what kind of planning effort is to be undertaken, when it is to be done, who 
is going to do it, and what will be done with the results”. Strategic planning is the way 
by which an organisation sees its future and acquires the techniques and actions to 
achieve it, thus setting clear goals and objectives help the organisation to make 
managerial decisions based on priorities by following certain guidelines (Goodstein et 
al. 1986). Strategic planning commences with the organisation objectives, while 
planning explains how these objectives will be achieved through answering how, 
when, where and by whom (Harrison 1995). Strategic planning deals with the internal 
environment of the organisation (strengths and weakness) and with the external 
environment (opportunities and threats) to develop the progress of the organisation 
(Vargo and Seville 2011). Byars (1987) states that strategic planning is touted as 
following a proactive approach as leaders attempting to forecast and project the future 
while they are planning. Strategic planning is, in some studies, substituted by long-
term planning and vice versa. However, some authors argue that there is a clear 
distinction between them (Mc Cure 1986). First, long-term planning is simpler than 
strategic planning, which is “more involved and takes into account the environment 
and complex social parameters” (Sybouts 1992). Second, long-term planning is done 
by individuals or small groups, while strategic planning is done by a group of people 
(Sybouts 1992). Third, strategic planning is considered as being a helpful tool in 
setting out the mission of an organisation, whilst long-term planning is committed to 
follow the mission within the strategic planning process (Sybouts 1992). Finally, 
strategic planning is concerned about the future and long-term planning (Steiner 1979). 
“The more of an organization’s activities that are affected by a plan, the more strategic 
it is…strategic planning is broad in scope…planning at the corporate level is generally 
more strategic than planning at any organizational level below it (Ackoff 1970, p.5).” 
Two things indicate the strategic features of a plan; the long level of effectiveness and 
the complexity so; it is not easy to revise it or to add any changes (Harrison 1995, 
p.48). Strategic planning involves decisions that, according to Tribe (1997, p.3), are 
complex, integrated, long-term, proactive, and have an impact on the entire 
organisation. They involve key changes, magnificent project and are made by 
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managers and executives. Therefore, managing emergencies needs more strategic 
planning than long-term planning, as they are complex and require a proactive 
planning approach.  
 
Strategic planning and emergency management represent an important side to 
enhancing organisational learning through evaluating strategies and updating them 
(Pollard and Hotho 2006). Comparing small and medium enterprises to large 
organisations, the former tends not to follow a formal planning processes and if they 
do, it is not strategic and systematic like that in larger organisations (Berman et al. 
1997). This is because of their limited resources and experiences, as well as the cost 
of developing such a plan, especially for emergency management. In order to manage 
an emergency strategically; organisational leaders need to consider planning, the 
ability to make rapid decisions and the integration of emergency management and 
mitigation into the strategic management of the organisation by having strategic and 
tactical plans (Taneja et al. 2014). On the other hand, Smith (1992) declares that 
although emergency management and strategic management have shared ground, there 
is no clear study that shows the relations between them. However, Mitroff et al. (1992) 
argued that there should be an integration of emergency management with strategic 
management because they bear similar features, like a concentration of environmental 
relations, a complex group of stakeholders, the participation of the top managers, a 
concern for the entire organisation and consistent and developing processes. In 
1997 Preble suggested that the strategic management process involves an important 
part of emergency management and stated that top management should understand the 
strategic significance of emergency management. Similarly, Elliot (2006) states that 
there is parallelism between strategic and emergency management. Additionally, 
Pollard and Hotho (2006) state effective strategic management processes can cause 
organisations to minimise the likelihood of emergency occurrence as reduction is 
considered the most effective way of managing emergency. Pollard and Hotho (2006) 
mention that most organisations are emergency-prone than emergency-prepared, and 
the ability of an organisation to shift from being emergency-prone than emergency-
prepared concerns its ability to integrate emergency management with strategic 
management processes. Thus, integrating emergency planning with strategy processes 
will enhance the management’s ability to deal with future incidents (Pollard 
and Hotho 2006). However, what helps to list future incidents and set out potential 
solutions is the use of the scenario approach. Strategic planning enhances the 
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organisation confidence and reduces uncertainties, which is an important requirement 
in order to implement any strategy (Pollard and Hotho 2006). Thus, the strategic 
planning process should involve an important part that is scenario planning 
(Schoemaker 1993; Verity 2003; Van der Merwe et al. 2007; Herve 2011). According 
to Page et al. (2010) although scenario planning is realistic and complex, it offers great 
value when used in strategic planning and emergency management.  
2.7.2 Scenario Planning for Emergency  
Scenario planning is an organised method that encourages creative thinking regarding 
potentially complex and uncertain events (Perterson et al. 2003, p.359). Schoemaker 
(1997, p.45) describes scenario planning as “a disciplined method for imagining 
possible futures”. Scenario planning encourages managers to “think different” and 
simply imagine a situation in great detail, turning it into a sort of future narrative 
(Schwartz 1996; De Geus 1999; Smallman and Weir 1999; Brown and Starkey 2000). 
The roots of scenario planning started with the military and it was used as an analytical 
tool following the Second World War (Walker 1995). It was then applied to the 
business world from the early 1970s, when it was introduced in order to understand 
the impact of major situations like the 1973 oil crisis involving Royal Dutch/Shell 
(Wack 1985a; Wack 1985b Pollard and Hotho 2006; Gossling and Scott 2012). The 
important part of scenarios is the identification of future alternatives; what could be; 
rather than what will be, what has been and what works now (van der Heijden 1996; 
Raskin et al. 1998; Pollard and Hotho 2006). In addition, according to Perterson et al. 
(2003) and Dunker and Greig (2007), the idea of scenario planning and building is to 
describe future images by listing a variety of imaginable and uncertain futures in the 
system that encounter existing assumptions and expand views; instead of predicting or 
forecasting particular consequences. When there is a high level of uncertainty in a 
system, the use of scenario planning is valuable; as we live in a highly complex world 
(Perterson et al. 2003) and must deal with complex and ambiguous events (Wilson 
2000) like emergency incidents. Therefore, scenario planners aim to determine 
different methods to ensure that the systems can evolve (Perterson et al. 2003). Walters 
(1986) noted that scenario planning is like adaptive management, which means 
according to Perterson et al. (2003) an approach to manage uncertainties is by listing 
alternatives of how things might work and develop policies for these uncertainties. 
Organisations in order to adapt a proactive planning approach for an emergency should 
identify the helpful procedures that create potential scenarios and improve plans to 
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respond to these probabilities (Pollard and Hotho 2006). Walker adopted a definition 
for crisis management scenarios based on the general definition of Quade (1989) “A 
description of the conditions under which the crisis management system or crisis 
management policy to be designed, tested, or evaluated is assumed to 
perform” (1995,p.1). Walker divided crisis management scenarios into two parts; the 
context (describing the general background and the environmental framework) and the 
crisis (the specific description of a crisis). Steps for building scenarios is available in 
the methodology chapter. Furthermore, scenario planning improves a responders’ 
ability to make rapid and efficient responses to future incidents according 
to Perterson et al. (2003) and explore any gaps in the strategy and planning for any 
possibilities, thus linking external analysis at the strategy design phase with relevant 
emergency planning (Pollard and Hotho 2006). Moreover, Alexander (2000) 
recommends teaching emergency managers how to use scenarios as a foundation in 
designing disaster management plans. This is because scenarios help specify the nature 
of the disaster and the resources needed to deal with hazards and how they must be 
distributed, as well as testing the ability of responders when assessing 
them. Perterson et al. (2003) add that they improve the planner’s ability to cope with 
and take advantage of future change. For example, when sending responders to rescue 
people in helicopters, they may need to be aware of what kind of restrictions might 
hinder this operation like low cloud cover, strong winds or blockages of flight paths 
(Alexander 2000). This is because emergencies are very rare, and are probably never 
duplicated in the exact same way. Hence, there is no one who is used to dealing with 
specific incidents. Therefore, any disaster happening can be considered as the first 
occurrence and will be a new experience. 
 
The scenario planning method provides a general technique for the strategy process as 
it adds up new strategic opportunities for managerial respect and for emergency 
management development (Pollard and Hotho 2006). Several factors must be 
considered in order to implement scenario planning, which are team building, 
organisational culture (Wilson 2000), leadership and management commitment 
(Wack 1985b; Hanson 2003). In scenario planning, each scenario conveys the story of 
how the different factors might interact under certain circumstances, compared with 
contingency planning which focuses on one ambiguous case (Pollard 
and Hotho 2006). The involvement of different participants representing different 
organisations and stakeholders with different skills and backgrounds to collect, discuss 
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and analyse scenarios can enhance better and wider understanding of the issues as well 
as help in creating and evaluating the policies (Ney and Thompson 2000; Perterson et 
al. 2003). When assessing the available scenarios, it is better to tackle the main issues 
with the complexity of the world (Perterson et al. 2003) in order to reach a general 
understanding because the dynamic systems may have different views from the point 
of view of the key actors (Ney and Thompson 2000). Walker (1995) claims that there 
is no certain theory used to evaluate the sufficiency or quality of scenarios, however 
Schwarz (1996) mentioned in his literature four important criteria when constructing 
scenarios. First consistency, the described assumptions should not be self-
contradictory. Second, plausibility which differentiates a scenario (what might 
happen) from prediction (what will happen). Third, credibility, explaining any changes 
from the current situation or those occurred previously as well as the reason of 
occurrence. Finally, to have a valuable scenario, the form, the role and the content of 
a scenario should be relevant to the current problem. Smith (2004, p.356) states, “Any 
scenario has to be grounded in the realities of the organization but sufficiently 
challenging to expose gaps in the knowledge base of those managers in the various 
crisis teams”. The proper number of scenarios is three to four; because two scenarios 
usually do not help in broaden the thinking enough, whereas more than four may 
complicate users and bound their skills to investigate uncertainty (Wack 1985b, 
Schwartz 1991; van der Heijden 1996). It is better to name scenarios in order to be 
easy in communication and discussion (Perterson et al. 2003). Once scenarios are built, 
it is important to test them to discover any potential gap or problem (Perterson et al. 
2003) by simulation models to test their dynamics although, modelling has been 
criticised because people became passive rather than active according to Westley et al. 
(2002). Table 2-3 shows the aim of using scenarios in all phases of emergency 
management.  
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Table 2-3. Aim of Using Scenarios in each Phase of Emergency Management 
Mitigation Phase 
• To train emergency responders,  
• Evaluate the vulnerability of the environment and the community and 
restoration the effect of previous disaster and responses to enhance future 
preparedness.  
Preparedness Phase 
• Train responders as in the mitigation,  
• Identify the likelihood of hazard occurrence through building effects and 
responses conceptual models,  
• Identify the possible implementation of preparedness used equipment like 
the alarm and monitoring;  
• Design warning and evacuation system that activated in the response phase.   
Response Phase 
• Evaluate the efficiency of the emergency response plans and  
• Identify the required resources and the capability of the relief operations  
Recovery Phase 
• To mitigate future damage of emergency by evaluating their intensity and 
scope of impact  
• In this phase economic scenarios can be used to evaluate impact of 
emergency on the economy for example on the employment and the 
financial planning for rebuilding affected areas;  
• To evaluate the social situation if it will facilitate the reconstruction 
process.   
Source: Alexander (2000) 
 
Scenario planning helps an organisation pay close attention to the more precise matters 
and helps managers develop a comprehensive view of the future (Pollard and Hotho, 
2006). However, their capability in evaluating the cause of the emergency and to find 
the suitable solutions depends on the competency of the organisation in managing 
emergencies (Pollard and Hotho 2006). The integral advantage of scenario planning is 
still not well adapted in the business field due to the unfamiliarity with the best practice 
method of writing scenario cases (Pollard and Hotho 2006) that is why there are 
limited resources highlighting it. Table 2-4 is adapted and developed from Bradfield 
et al. (2005) and Page et al. (2010) and presents some examples of the scope and 
application of scenario planning. For the purpose of this study the tourism area is added 
to the table. This study in building scenarios is going to follow the building-block 
approach as it is considered one of the four main approaches applied in the UK for 
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disaster exercises; these are disaster response and adaptability; citizen participation 
and discussion-based debriefs according to Kim (2014). The building-block approach 
consists of three types: discussion-based, table-top and live exercises. The focus of this 
study will be on the discussion-based approach as it aims to create the situational 
awareness between the different stakeholders in integrating tourism with response 
planning; and the table-top exercises as it intends to develop scenarios. Live exercises 
are difficult to perform because it is not easy to coordinate, and it would need to be 
conducted by the emergency services at certain times. Table-top exercises are 
discussion-based exercises used to prepare emergency managers for response to large-
scale emergencies (Edzén 2014) as well as multi incidents. These exercises are used 
when there is a need for collaboration between organisations that specialise in 
responding to emergencies (police, fire, ambulance, etc.), private sector organisations, 
NGOs and others (Payne 1999). “The purpose is to provide training and practice in 
coordination arrangements and to teach participants how all the elements fit together, 
as well as to improve the plans, if necessary (Edzen 2014).”  
Table 2-4. Examples of the Scope and Application of Scenario Planning 
Users   Purpose  
Crisis 
management/ 
Emergency 
studies  
• To simulate future crisis/ emergency situations, to develop and 
test the suitability of systems and resources to respond to the 
situations, and to increase response preparedness; (e.g. testing the 
UK Pandemic)  
• Using scenarios to develop crisis managers: applications of 
scenario planning and scenario-based training (Moats et al. 2008).   
Scientific 
community  
• Use scenarios as a way of linking the degree of complexity of 
scientific models and theories. (e.g. climate change models and 
econometric models for economic development).  
• Using scenario planning as a tool for climate change adaption 
(Moore et al. 2013)  
Public policy-
makers  
• Using scenarios as medium to engage several agencies and 
stakeholders in policy decisions, to help policy application. An 
example in this area is the UK government’s ‘modernisation 
programme for local government’ described by Saunders (2002)  
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Professional 
Futurists 
Institutes   
•  Independent research and organizations working to spread ideas 
regarding critical trends that will form the future, and to promote 
future research methodologies; (e.g the Future Foundation)  
Educational 
institutes   
• Support the research and development of future studies and form 
an educational environment. (e.g. the Hawaii Research Centre for 
Future Studies, university of Hawaii and the Australian Foresight 
Institute, Southern Cross University)   
Businesses  • Use scenario planning as a long-term planning tool (e.g Shell); 
and;  
Tourism   • To understand uncertainty in tourism transportation in Scotland 
(2010) (VisitScotland),  
• Using scenario planning for sustainable tourism planning 
(Gossling and Scott 2012), and discussing the demographic change 
for skiing tourism in Austria (Steiger 2012)  
Source: Developed after Page et al. (2010) 
  
Responders and all stakeholders should be educated and trained to the level that they 
acknowledge the complex nature of emergencies and the complex system of 
emergency management.  Thinking complexity is helpful in building the capacity and 
the capability of emergency response systems and preparing stakeholders to face and 
deal with unexpected incidents.   Overall, complexity and complexity theory are not 
providing answers or solutions to a problem, but rather they are an explanatory 
framework. They provide a new way of thinking and they give a new perspective on 
seeing things. Whereas, strategic and scenario planning can be considered as tools to 
overcome the complexity of emergencies. For the strategic planning, plans are built on 
response rather than on particular goals. Scenario planning acts as a framework for 
developing resilience policies when dealing with unpredictable and uncertain incidents 
(Perterson et al. 2003). This is because when discussing or conducting drills, built on 
scenarios, involving different stakeholders, the objectives and priorities can be set 
clearly and the sources of information can be identified for all.  
2.8 Summary  
This chapter began by discussing complexity, complex systems and complexity 
theory in order to understand and have a better insight into the nature of emergencies. 
Then, it discussed planning and planning theory in order to establish the context for 
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planning for emergencies with focus on strategic and scenario planning. Although 
complexity and complexity theory do not provide solutions for problems, they do 
however enhance the way of thinking and give a new perspective on seeing through 
things.   It highlighted four phases of emergency management and the advantage of 
dividing them into phases to simplify the understanding of the process. However, the 
response phase when the emergency affects more than one sector, relevant 
stakeholders should be integrated in planning before the response itself. Thus, 
capabilities and the capacities will be easily identified before the emergency occurs. 
Regardless of the actions and activities mentioned in every phase, the availability of a 
well-organised emergency-response system helps to manage any emergencies 
effectively. In addition, the response phase is the determinate factor of the 
effectiveness of the country or an organisation because it shows to what extent the 
management of a certain incident is successful. Therefore, the next chapter moves to 
address emergency responses in tourism and how different response activities can be 
managed between tourism and emergency services.   
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: Emergency Response in Tourism  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the tourism system and critically evaluates its similarities with 
complex adaptive systems and the complex nature of emergencies affecting it. 
Additionally, it discusses the need to ensure that response strategies have a better 
integration between tourism and emergency services. It discusses emergency response 
components, including coordination, collaboration, cooperation, decision-making, 
leadership, resource allocation, communication and information sharing. Finally, it 
concludes by discussing the resilience of the emergency response system. 
3.2 Tourism as a Complex Adaptive System 
Many countries position the tourism industry as an important factor that contributes to 
socio-economic development (Pforr and Hosie 2007; Carlsen and Hughes 2008). 
However, the tourism industry features intangible, highly perishable, volatile services 
and products and complex networks (Pottorff and Neal 1994; Richter 1999; Evans et 
al. 2003; Laws and Prideaux 2005). It also depends on a wide range of external factors, 
as well as the effective integration and distribution of many businesses from different 
industries that together provide the tourist experience (Pottorff and Neal 1994; Evans et 
al.  2003; Henderson 2007). These features create an integrated and open system affected 
by external elements, making it vulnerable to emergencies (Ritchie 2009). Additionally, 
the dynamics of the tourism industry has dramatically increased (von Bergner and 
Lohmann 2014) due to the new adaptive structure (Pehlivanoǧlu 2011), rapid change in 
customer behaviours (Woodside et al. 2011), improvements and varieties in the 
transportation modes (Duval 2013). Moreover, the massive growth of the tourism 
industry in the past 50 years due to technological and transportation advancements, leads 
to strengthening the connections and complexity within the tourism system (Pforr and 
Hosie 2007; Baggio and Sainaghi 2016). Tourism as a system according to Leiper (1979, 
p.404) consists of five elements (1) the tourists; (2) the generating region; (3) the transit 
route, (4) the destination region and (5) the tourist industry, which mutually works in a 
larger physical, cultural, social, economic, political and technological environment. This 
system can be affected by natural and man-made hazards; (Figure 3-1) therefore, any 
change in one component of the tourism system will affect other elements (Henderson 
2007; Ritchie 2009) because its system is open and interrelated (Russell and Faulkner 
1999; Mill and Morrison 2006) and disasters have knock on effect. 
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Figure 3-1. Vulnerability of the Tourism System 
Source: Adapted from Leiper (1990) 
 
Tourism is considered to be an open system (Rittel and Webber 1973; Galloway and 
Mahayn 1977; Flood and Carsan 1988); it consists of several stakeholders and 
complex situations of dealing with potential and uncertain emergencies that may affect 
this system. Tourism is also considered to be a complex, adaptive system (see Farrell 
and Twining-Ward 2005; Miller and Twining-Ward 2005; Baggio2007; de Sausmarez 
2007; Baggio 2008; Schianetz and Kavanagh 2008; Stevenson et al. 2009; Baggio and 
Sainaghi 2011). For example, Baggio (2008, p.4) states, there are many features which 
are used to define the complex adaptive system applicable to the tourism industry as 
an economic activity like “Accidents of history, positive feedback, increasing returns, 
social multipliers, lock-in effects, non-linearities, path dependency, evolution, self-
organisation, emergence, outbreaks and catastrophes”. Baggio and Sainaghi (2016, 
p.24) noted that tourism destinations could also be perceived as a complex adaptive 
system that consist of many elements, like organisations and people that are 
represented by nodes and the different types of businesses (such as official, 
commercial and ownership) or personal relationships (i.e. family and friends,) that are 
represented by links and interact frequently with the external environment, and 
adapting both its interior structure and behaviour. Tourism evolves by responding to 
external and internal inputs (Baggio 2007) like emergencies, by applying different 
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strategies and frameworks for emergency management. It recovers from them by 
adapting to new marketing strategies and campaigns and new programs. For more 
clarification, Bertuglia and Vaio, (2005) and Lewin, (1999) explain that a destination 
and tourism system changes during its life; several intermediate structures emerge 
unexpectedly as a result of the complex system, which highlights the non-linear 
relationships. When the system aims to enhance the available resources and improving 
the system in order to face any internal or external influences, this is attributed as self-
organisation according to (Baggio and Sainaghi 2016). 
The tourism sector is not immune to any kind of emergencies as they may strike at any 
time and in any place (Ritchie 2004) and might be quick, unexpected and cause shocks 
(Strickland–Munro et al. 2010). More recently, the tourism sector has been 
experiencing different forms of emergencies (Consuegra et al. 2008). Faulkner (2001) 
noted that there was a dramatic increase in the number of natural and human induced 
disasters affecting the tourism industry. Additionally, being in an increasingly 
connected world means that emergencies are likely to occur with more regular 
frequency and affect a wider group of stakeholders. A list of external and internal 
threats that may affect the tourism industry according to Henderson (2007, p.5) are 
shown in Table 3-1. 
Table 3-1. External and Internal Threats that may Affect Tourism Industry. 
Domain  External Internal 
Economic 
Recession, Currency fluctuations, 
Taxation 
Raising costs, Falling revenues, 
Unprofitability  
Political Government policy, International relations, Instability, Terrorism  
Socio-cultural Unrest, Crime Staffing, Cultural conflicts 
Environmental  Natural phenomena, Natural disasters, Pollution, Health scars 
Overdevelopment, Environmental 
degradation 
Technological Computer systems failure, Mechanical failure, Fire Transport accidents  
Commercial  Regulations, Government intervention Competition, Labour disputes, Management decisions, Human error 
 Source: Henderson (2007, p. 5) 
 
One of the most obvious risks for the tourism industry is the distribution of many 
tourist facilities and activities in areas frequently affected by natural disasters (Tsai 
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and Chen 2010). For example, constructing resorts in coastal areas and building ski 
resorts in mountainous areas (Ritchie 2008; Becken and Hughey 2013). These 
locations, by their very nature, constitute a hazard for locals and tourists (Ritchie 
2008). Likewise, tourists are even more vulnerable to hazards than local people 
(Murphy and Bayley 1989) as they tend to have little knowledge of hazards and are 
not familiar with the resources there for their protection (Murphy and Bayley 1989; 
Drabek 1995; Burby and Wagner 1996; Whitehead et al. 2000; Bird et al. 2010) and 
their surroundings (WTO 1998; Buckle et al. 2001; Lamanna et al. 2012). 
Additionally, tourism depends heavily on the critical infrastructure available in the 
destination such as, airports, roads, ports and sewage systems (Becken and Hughey 
2013) and any disruption to these services will not only hamper responses to a disaster, 
they can compound the impact and, ultimately further damage the destination’s image 
(Huan et al. 2004). Furthermore, critical infrastructure can be expensive and require 
lengthy time periods to restore, for example airports (Bach et al. 2013). This will make 
it difficult for the tourism industry to recover quickly. In addition, the disruption to 
these services will also make the responses more challenging because the major routes 
in and out are damaged. Furthermore, tourism consists of many small to medium 
enterprises SMEs (e.g. hotels, bus operators, museums) (Becken and Hughey 2013) 
that may not have the resources, knowledge and experience needed to develop the 
emergency plan in order to reduce the impact of emergencies (Beeton 2001; Cioccio 
and Michael 2007; Wang and Ritchie 2012). These all make responses to emergencies 
more complex. A comprehensive understanding of the tourism system and the effects 
of emergencies is important, as understanding their complex nature is useful in order 
to enhance the response strategy. The next part discusses planning for tourism 
emergency management. 
3.3 Planning and Managing Emergencies in Tourism 
Since the tourism industry consists of many stakeholders, they should collaboratively 
plan for responses to and recoveries from emergencies. Collaborative planning for 
emergencies affecting tourism is vital because several incidents have shown that the 
tourism industry is not well prepared to deal with them (e.g. Hurricane Katrina, SARS, 
September 11, the Bali Bombing attacks, London bombings, Foot and Mouth in the 
UK, Tsunamis) (see Ritchie 2004; Gundel 2005; Pizam 2005). Planning for tourism 
emergencies according to UNWTO (1998) aims to avoid hazards from occurring and 
control its impact when they occur by relocating tourism infrastructure to more secure 
		63	
sites in order to minimise the probability of a hazard turning into a disaster. It is about 
being ready for un-experienced incidents, which means following or integrating a 
proactive approach that is more effective than being reactive or passive (Pforr and 
Hosie 2007). So, for example, the vulnerability of critical tourism infrastructure should 
be considered by emergency managers in all emergency management stages; 
mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. The first step in planning for 
emergencies in tourism is to constitute the planning team, which should involve key 
representatives from all stakeholder organisations (private and public sectors) as every 
member contributes with different knowledge and different skills to develop and 
implement the designed strategy to ensure its effectiveness (Faulkner 2001; 
Authoritative guide for Tourism Risk Management 2006). According to the 
Authoritative Guide for Tourism Risk Management (2006, p.62) committees should 
conduct regular meetings to discuss the following responsibilities: (1) development, 
creation, distribution and evaluation of tourism emergency management plans and 
measures; (2) distribution of emergency management tasks and responsibilities; (3) 
recognition of training essentials; (4) arrangement of training programs; (5) 
conducting exercises (mock emergencies), and its development, if required; (6) 
examination after exercises and activation of emergency plan; and (7) examination, 
assessment and modification of plans and techniques. Tourism emergencies plans 
should be updated regularly through training and regular testing of personnel 
(Authoritative Guide for Tourism Risk Management 2006) as staff might move on in 
their careers and their job functions and roles change over time (Pollard and Hotho 
2006). The key foundation of all emergency management planning is a sequence of 
‘what if’ questions for the planning team to tackle: “(1) What if so-and-so happened? 
(2) What does this mean to us as a destination or tourism operator? (3) What are the 
implications for our regional operations and for the attitudes and patters of travellers? 
(4) What must we do as a result of this to protect people and our businesses, and (5) to 
restore and maintain confidence in our operations and facilities? (Authoritative guide 
for Tourism Risk Management 2006, p.65)”. However, the planning process should 
not stop during the emergency response and recovery, as the plan could be developed 
for short-term for the following few hours of operation, which are called tactical plans 
and strategic plans, which are developed for the 24 to 48 hours following an emergency 
(Authoritative guide for Tourism Risk Management 2006). 
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Tourists organisations and hotels that have a written emergency management plan and 
follow the designated procedures, recover more quickly than those that do not (Barton 
1994; Durocher 1994; Sönmez et al. 1999; Faulkner 2001; Faulkner and Vikulov 2001; 
Hall et al. 2003; Israeli and Reichel 2003; Anderson 2006;) and those who have 
experienced such incidents before have taken measures to develop their current plans 
in order to minimise future threats. This is because according to Jiang and Ritchie 
(2017) that lack of experience results in poor planning. Hystad and Keller (2008) have 
studied the long-term effects of the massive forest fires in Canada and found that only 
28% of tourism businesses had executed recovery initiatives three years after that 
major incident. Correspondingly, Bird et al. (2010) found that within the hazard area 
of the active volcano Katla, Iceland, the stakeholders in a tourist destination were not 
very familiar with the emergency management procedures and early warning systems. 
They also found that the industry felt that providing related information to tourists 
would weaken their tourism industry. To compound matters further, they found in a 
tourist survey that tourists had little hazard information, although they did not mind 
receiving extra information on potential volcanic eruptions. So, tourism employees 
should be responsible for directing tourists to follow the warnings and emergency 
response procedures (Burby and Wagner 1996; Leonard et al. 2005; Johnston et al. 
2007; Leonard et al. 2008). A further example is of people in the Central Queensland 
region because they have not experienced a major cyclone in the past 40 years, they 
lack the knowledge, experience and knowhow of acquiring the required help should a 
major incident occur (Jiang and Ritchie 2017). Nonetheless, Consuegra et al (2008) 
indicate that the tourism industry has limited capacity to deal with such complex 
events. For example, before the occurrence of 9/11 and the Asian Tsunami 2004, the 
tourism industry was following a reactive approach in responding to disasters (Cioccio 
and Michael 2007; Pforr and Hosie 2007). Therefore, the impact of emergencies 
affecting the tourism industry arising either within or outside the tourism sector was 
out of the control of its managers and executives (Brookfield 1999; Sonnenberg and 
Wöhler 2004). Hystad and Keller (2007) discovered a number of barriers that may 
hinder tourism emergency planning including; a shortage of cash (68% of the sample), 
scarcity of knowledge on what emergency management plans should include (48%), 
incapability of making alterations and changes because of the small size of their 
businesses (23%) and a noticed “lack of cohesiveness in the tourism industry (14%).” 
Conversely, if the tourist destinations have clear guidelines detailing the appropriate 
actions to be taken before an emergency occurrence, it will help them cope with these 
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challenges (Tsai and Chen 2010). Besides the availability of such guidelines, if they 
are not activated, updated and integrated with emergency services,  they will be 
useless. To overcome these challenges Ritchie (2009) suggests integrating emergency 
management with strategic management because of the growing number of 
emergencies affecting the tourism system. The need for a comprehensive and 
integrated approach in emergency management in tourism systems for enterprises and 
destinations at local, regional, national, and international levels, and the need for 
organisations and destinations to shift from a reactive to a proactive approach. 
Emergency management as discussed in chapter two includes hazard mitigation; like 
moving people from flood areas, emergency preparedness like planning and training, 
emergency response activities like search and rescue and emergency recovery like 
restoration of basic services (Waugh and Streib 2006). Tourism emergency 
management according to Henderson (2007, p.13) involves planning for and managing 
tourism emergencies “in order to protect the interest of the industry, tourists and other 
stakeholders involved and contain any long-term damage”. For instance, the tourism 
industry is vulnerable to natural and human-induced hazards; handling them depends 
on taking advantage of “a systematic and strategic approach to disaster management” 
(Ritchie 2008). Therefore, there is a need for a strategic approach to emergency 
planning and management to ensure the frequent visits of travellers and to reduce the 
damaging impact of emergencies on destinations (Ali and Ali 2010) and enhancing the 
tourist destination image. Anything that has the direct possibility to affect the 
destination image negatively like an emergency or disaster or even adventure activities 
(where it works as a main drawcard for international visitors, as in the case of New 
Zealand) requires careful evaluation to ensure the maintenance of a positive image 
(e.g. see Page, et al 2006 for an example of how adventure tourism is used to promote 
a destination). In addition to that, the media can affect the destination image 
negatively, like the case of the Canberra bushfires in Australia in January 2003 where 
negative media coverage resulted in decreasing the number of visitors by 50%, thus 
affecting all tourism stakeholders (operators, accommodation providers, facilities and 
attractions) (Armstrong and Ritchie 2007). Consequently, a negative destination image 
created by the media resulted in the elevated risk perception of future travellers. As 
Calgaro (2010, p.29) points out, “people will not travel if they feel unsafe or associate 
negative images (often amplified and distorted by the media) with a particular 
destination”. In regard to the tourism industry, Ritchie (2009) justifies the need for 
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better integration between strategic and emergency management. Firstly, because of 
the growing number of emergencies around the world affecting the tourism system. 
Secondly, the need for a comprehensive and integrated approach to emergency 
management in tourism systems for enterprises and destinations at different levels, 
local, regional, national, transitional and international. Thirdly, there is a need for 
organisations and destinations to shift from a reactive (response or management) to a 
proactive approach (identification and reduction or planning). Taneja et al. (2014) 
emphasise that the strength of an organisation is inherent in its ability to strategically 
manage unforeseen emergency situations. For example, the London bombing on 7th 
July 2005 was managed strategically, resulting in making effective and strategic 
decisions during the emergency (Fors et al. 2006). Thus, managers and leaders have 
to be familiar with the strategic management of the emergency in order to gain a better 
understanding of emergencies (Taneja et al. 2014). Additionally, being flexible to 
change their management approaches, decisions, and procedures and they have to be 
socially responsible in managing any emergency situations (Rosenblatt 2002). The 
level and successful management of change can drastically affect the effective 
application of the preferred strategy (Alexander 1985). Both emergency management 
and strategic management encourage embracing an open-system perspective 
(Thompson 1967; Bowonder and Linstone 1987), for the former in order to identify 
any changes that may occur (Aguilar 1967) and to develop adaptive strategies that suit 
the organisational environment (Hofer and Schende 1978; Bourgeois 1980), and for 
the latter in order for a clear understanding of the dynamics of emergencies and for 
developing emergency management procedures (Bowonder and Linstone 1987). As 
discussed in chapter two, planners in the complex and open-system are dealing with 
wicked problems (e.g. emergencies) where the system consists of a huge number of 
elements, which interact dynamically. Strategic management has been integrated with 
the tourism crisis and disaster management model proposed by Ritchie (2004) (See 
Appendix 3). 
There are a number of models and frameworks that have been built to manage tourism 
emergencies and disasters. Faulkner (2001) states that several of these models (for 
example, Cassedy 1991; Drabek 1995) failed to provide a more effective and efficient 
structure for responding to tourism emergencies and disasters. Therefore, Faulkner 
(2001) developed a framework for tourism disaster management (See Appendix 4), 
which consists of six phases: pre-event, prodromal, emergency, intermediate, long-
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term (recovery) and resolution. This framework has been applied to some disasters 
that occurred in specific areas like the Katherine floods in Australia (Faulkner and 
Vikulov 2001) and the Galtuer avalanche in Austria (Peters and Pikkemaat 2005) that 
according to Prideaux (2004) who determined its ability to be utilised as a protective 
planning tool and as a guide for actual disaster management. Moreover, Peters and 
Pikkemaat (2005, p.17) declare that, “Faulkner’s (2001) scheme seems to be an 
appropriate framework for analysing complex emergency management steps in Alpine 
resorts”. When Henderson (2007) applied the framework to the Bali bombings in 
Indonesia of 2002, she commented that the event started at the emergency phase 
missing the two phases: pre-event and prodromal. This means when complex 
emergencies or disasters occur, they will not go through the systematic and linear 
phases of the framework. Prideaux (2003, 2004) and Miller and Ritchie (2003) agree 
that this framework cannot be applied to large scale and wide-scope disasters like the 
case of the foot and mouth outbreak in the UK. Another model is Ritchie’s (2004) 
strategic and holistic management framework that consists of three main phases: 
prevention and planning, implementation and resolution, evaluation and feedback. It 
has been applied by Armstrong (2008) to a case study of the Australia bush fires in 
2003 and consequently improved it to reflect the results. Although Armstrong (2008) 
incorporates material from Faulkner’s (2001) framework, she disregarded the 
emergency management issues, suggesting this is the responsibility of several 
organisations not just the tourism industry. Page et al. (2006) propose a crisis 
management framework for national Destination Management Organisations (DMOs) 
(See Appendix 5), which was organised to follow a scenario planning exercise in 
which they imagined the influences of a global flu pandemic on Scottish tourism. 
Although there are a number of frameworks and models for managing emergencies 
and disasters, many destinations still fail to respond to them effectively, whether it is 
because of their complex nature, or because of the linearity of these models and 
frameworks. So, planning emergency response to tourism emergencies is a critical 
issue to be investigated in order to handle emergencies effectively by involving all 
relevant stakeholders, as well as its resilience. This will be covered in the next part. 
3.4 Emergency Response System for Tourism 
Though managing tourism emergencies seems to be complex, it should also be 
recognised that they are unpredictable (Faulkner 2001) and their nature, as explained 
before, complex. This means if an emergency is not managed quickly, it may turn into 
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a disaster and one can lead to another. Therefore, Henderson and Ng state it is not the 
time to ask if an emergency case will happen or not, but it is the time to ask how to 
handle it (2004). Several incidents have shown the need for the tourism industry to be 
well prepared (e.g., Bird flu, Hurricane Katrina, SARS; September 11, 2001; Bali 
bomb attacks; London bombings; Foot and Mouth in the UK; Tsunamis; Global 
warming) (e.g., Gundel 2005; Pizam 2005; Ritchie 2004). Tourism as an industry is 
vulnerable to negative incidents leaving it under threat (Pforr and Hosie 2007). 
However, the ability and the capacity of the tourism sector to manage and handle such 
complex incidents or events are limited (Consuegra et al. 2008). For example, tourism 
organisations might have problems with cash flow, lack of knowledge, skills and 
expertise (Jiang and Ritchie 2017). Before the occurrence of 9/11 and the Asian 
Tsunami 2004, the tourism industry was following a reactive approach in responding 
to a disaster (Pforr and Hosie 2007). Therefore, the impact of an emergency affecting 
the tourism industry arising either within or outside the tourism sector was out of the 
control of its managers and executives (Brookfield 1999; Sonnenberg and Wöhler 
2004). Alexander (2009) emphasised the significance of emergency response planning 
due to the lack in well-trained staff, resources, and time; there is a need to make rapid 
decisions, the lack of the availability of information and there is a need to avoid the 
devastating impact and casualties of emergencies. “Emergency response is the process 
of gathering resources and acting upon the problems immediately after the incident 
happens.” (Shen and Shaw 2004, p.2110). The aim of the emergency responses system 
is to save lives and reduce the damage to the environment at minimum level (Pilemalm 
and Mojir 2016). However, according to Pilemalm and Mojir (2016) this system can 
face some challenges like limited and scattered resources that take time to reach the 
affected population or area. Thus, they suggest developing new strategies to organise 
the response system. In case of the tourism industry, an integrated response system is 
required because although the tourism industry is a victim of natural and man-made 
hazards, it remains often an ignored asset of emergency management agencies 
(UNWTO 2014). For example, Hystad and Keller (2008, p.159) mention the failure in 
managing forest fire disasters due to the lack of collaboration between tourism 
agencies and emergency response organisations. In the case of the SARS McKercher 
and Cohen (2004) emphasise there is a need for deep collaboration and coordination 
amongst tourism departments at the international level to achieve effective response 
to emergencies that cross the borders. Additionally, in the case of the Katherine Floods 
(1998), Faulkner and Vikulov (2001) noted that there was no destination general 
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emergency plan available before the floods, as well as no specific tourism plan, and 
there was little coordination between the tourism industry and emergency services. As 
a victim, the tourism industry should be involved in emergency management planning 
and should play a full role in case emergencies affect tourists (UNWTO 2014). All 
tourism stakeholders should work together to plan and develop simulations based on 
scenarios to train staff on emergency principles and practice (Ritchie 2008). There 
should be appropriate coordination between tourism and emergency management 
organisations (UNWTO 2014). In order to develop a more proactive approach in 
managing emergencies, the tourism industry should be integrated with emergency 
response planning. Integrating tourism with emergency services in the planning stage 
will result in strong resilience through building local capacity (McGee 2011). There 
are many techniques to be followed, such as nominating a tourism emergency 
spokesperson, annual stakeholder workshops, devoted webpages (Hystad and Keller 
2008), conduction of disaster drills (Bird et al. 2010), and continual revision of 
material (Faulkner 2001). In a study on emergency management in Greece, 
Nivolianitou and Synodinou (2011) found that specialised training would develop a 
collective capacity of emergency organisations and other participants, for example 
volunteer groups, by sharing specific knowledge. 
Kapucu and Garayev (2011) mentioned that the frequency and severity of natural and 
human-induced incidents, such as Hurricane Katrina and September 11, revealed the 
insufficiency of the traditional emergency management tools. This traditional 
approach is characterised by hierarchy-based policies (command and control) and 
centralisation (Perrow 1984; Aldunate et al. 2005; Bier 2006; Alexander et al. 2013).  
It should, however, be changed to a decentralised emergency response system (Kapucu 
and Garayev 2011). These incidents also showed the failure of the emergency response 
system due to insufficient organisational capacity and a lack of preparedness of 
responders (Kapucu and VanWart 2006) and a lack of leadership among all actors and 
an inability to support responses and coordinate aid (Waugh and Streib 2006). 
According to Waugh and Streib (2006, p.133) “Hurricane Katrina tested the limits of 
governmental and non-governmental capacities”. Thus, the successfulness of handling 
any incidents depends of the effectiveness of the emergency response system. 
According to Haddow et al (2013), an emergency response system is complex. Chen 
et al. (2007, p.212) and Uhr (2007) describe the complexity of an emergency response 
system involving responders from different organisations with different laws and 
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regulations, culture, knowledge, values, tools, information systems, objectives, goals 
and their dynamical interactions and maybe different languages. This heterogeneity 
often introduces barriers in communication, information sharing, decision-making and 
operations. These barriers may result in “a lack of mutual trust, respect” and 
familiarity, which are critical to collaboration except if they managed well (Pizam, 
1999; Chen et al. 2007, p.212). According Msanjila and Afsarmanesh, (2011) Trust 
amongst organisations is considered the main requirement for the dynamic creation of 
a collaborative network. Thus Rozakis (2007) suggests, for instance developing a 
common language and culture for emergency responses. This can be achieved through 
highly interdisciplinary training and education to ensure the ability of each manager 
and team leader as well as responders “to appreciate the perspectives and work of other 
participants and their role in the grand scheme of emergency response” (Alexander 
2013b, p.5). 
Johnson and Peppas (2003) agree that emergency severity is not similar in all countries 
and cultures. This reflects the importance of developing emergency response plans for 
a specific location and the involvement of local management and public office in 
making some amendments in it as needed. For example, the multicounty impacts of 
recent incidents, such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and the Indian 
Ocean tsunami highlight the importance of considering cultural differences in order to 
prepare better for and manage emergencies (Johnson and Peppas 2003). Recent 
research (e.g. Hofstede 2001; Liu and Mackinnon 2002; Schneider and Littrell 2003) 
indicates that people from different national cultures tend to have different styles of 
management (Laws et al. 2007) and culture has been considered a vital element that 
supports the successful application of emergency management (Adahl 2009). 
However, cultures rarely help management to clarify the basic causes for the 
occurrence of an emergency, but they still act ‘‘as a part of the background that has an 
impact on the emergency in question and maybe even more in terms of the different 
possible solutions’’ (Adahl 2009, p. 16). To meet the challenges of culture and use 
them as chances to make better interaction, which positively impact on the lives of 
local people and learning from interaction with others, it requires properly ‘‘designed 
training and personnel deployed in emergency management operations’’ (Adahl 2009, 
p.7). Thus, the importance of cultural awareness in emergency management is another 
point to be added here in this case due to the cultural differences. Adahl (2009) 
emphasised the integration of cultural awareness at all levels of emergency 
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management strategies from the strategic level to the tactical level. In fact, the more 
culturally aware emergency management professionals are, the more this will help 
them to establish clear communication and easier work with different and similar 
cultures (Adahl 2009, p.8). This is because cultural differences influence the 
communication and ability of organisations or destinations in handling emergencies or 
disasters at national, regional or local levels (Adahl 2009). Furthermore, Comfort et 
al. (2001) and Comfort (1994 1995) argue that response systems described as complex 
depend on the scale of the emergency, the involvement of multi-organisations in the 
response and the dynamic and consistent changes of the response system itself (self-
organisation). Comfort et al. (2001) explain that the involvement of many stakeholders 
in the response give rise to challenges that all require coordination and the taking of 
decisive decisions to facilitate coordination among all stakeholders. Comfort (1999) 
criticises the hierarchal level in organisations because they can hinder organisations 
from adapting to the dynamics of emergency (Comfort et al. 2001). According to 
Bergströn et al. (2016) the self-organisation phenomenon in the response system is 
viewed as an “emergent property” that proves the complexity of the system and that 
poses some challenges in the strategies of management. Kiel (1995) and Atkinson and 
Moffat (2005) advise organisations to apply management strategies because of the 
complexity of the emergency response systems. On the other hand, Waugh and Streib 
(2006, p.132) added that although response systems need particular organisation and 
planning, it is “spontaneous”. The structured and well-prepared plans do not often fit 
situations, so the emergency managers have to “innovate, adapt and improvise” 
(Waugh and Streib 2006, p.132). Therefore, an organisations’ management should 
consider response as a dynamic system, not a procedure and should support the 
organisation in being more resilient to any incident and improve its capacity to restore 
itself post emergency (Paraskevas 2006). 
There are many problems that may hinder the response operation in case of an 
emergency. Horan et al. (2006) attributed response system as time-dependent. 
According to Chen et al. (2007) regarding performance and reduction, delay may exist 
due to a lack of situational awareness and inability to understand the incident 
comprehensively and the time taken by responders to get ready to start their tasks. 
Organisations in order to respond to emergencies efficiently and effectively should 
adapt a well-organised and integrated emergency response system (Kanno and Furuta 
2006). “For example, in Japan, the emergency response is based on the Disaster 
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Measures Basic Law, except in the case of disasters caused by malicious acts (in this 
case the emergency response system is based on the Protection of Lives and Assets 
Bill enforced in 2004)” (Kanno and Furuta 2006, p.1). Waugh and Streib (2006) 
declared that some organisations have clear roles in dealing with hazards, while others 
lack relations with emergency management agencies. Thus, they see creating such 
linkage and maintaining relations with emergency agencies as necessary, especially 
when dealing with catastrophes; this is because strong relationships help in building 
trust and to achieve successful collaboration (Jiang and Ritchie 2017). For example, 
regular interaction like participation in planning and training or exercises can enhance 
the capacity (Waugh and Streib 2006) to minimise human response errors, enhance the 
response time to emergencies and to adjust the current strategy (Ritchie 2009). 
Although the integration of emergency management is not given a high consideration 
in some countries, it is important to integrate emergency management in the main 
government operations (Waugh and Streib 2006). This might refer to organisations 
that do not have resources to invest in risk reduction or emergency response 
capabilities or they might see it as unnecessary to do so (Waugh and Streib 2006). The 
tourism sector, for example consists of several small-to-medium-sized enterprises 
(Becken and Hughey 2013) that may lack resources and the money to invest in risk 
reduction. As major emergencies are not restricted to specific areas or organisational 
boundaries, but are often “transboundary” their effects reach many stakeholders and 
sectors (Hart et al. 2001; Perry 2007; Ansell et al. 2010; Odlund 2010). Although each 
organisation has its own strategies and procedures, they might need the help of others 
in times of emergency to achieve their goals (Hart et al. 1993; Boin 2004; Boin and 
Hart 2007; Uhr et al. 2008; Van et al. 2009). As well as in this case “there is no clear 
direction about who owns the crisis and who is in charge of responding to it” (Andrew 
et al. 2018, p. 243) because emergency management tasks are complex according to 
Xia et al. (2011). The successful accomplishment of all emergency tasks depends on 
better coordination, collaboration and knowledge sharing strategies among many 
responders and agencies across different levels and areas (Xia et al. 2011; Pramanik et 
al. 2015). This all will help in making decisive decisions, allocating needed resources 
and facilitating communication. 
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3.4.1 Stakeholders Coordination, Collaboration and Cooperation 
Coordination 
Coordination is a collective process when different stakeholders or organisations work 
together to manage the interdependency of different activities in a logical way to 
achieve a common goal (Malone and Crowston 1990; Impcoor doc 2000; Drabek and 
McEntire 2002; Comfort 2007). Some studies refer to coordination as the sharing of 
information and resources, in addition to the interactions among all organisations (see, 
for example, Impcoor doc 2000; Corbacioglu and Kapucu 2006). “Coordination means 
more than providing information about what is happening…[It] means that all 
stakeholders are informed about and allowed to participate in the process (Phillips 
2009, p.64)”. In the area of disaster research, specifically the disaster response 
management a discussion was directed on coordination in the studies of Quarantelli 
(1988), Dynes (1990), Drabek (2007) and Dynes and Aguirre (2008). Bergströn et al. 
(2016) argue that it might not be easy to understand other terms used related to the 
management. For example, according to Drabek and McEntire (2003) the word 
coordination (coordination model) is substituted with command and control in 
(bureaucratic models). Many studies highlighted coordination in the context of 
disasters to evaluate how organisations work together (Drabek 1985; Tierney 1985; 
May 1985; Morris et al. 2007; Ammann 2008; Keast and Mandell 2012). Bergströn et 
al. (2016, p.125) suggest that the main aspect of emergency response management in 
the critical phase of an emergency is to “achieve direction and coordination among 
available resources in order to meet a range of needs”. They clarify this by stating that 
this approach focuses more on identifying the needs rather than looking at the details 
on how to respond. Hence, the effective response is built on identifying the required 
needs and the ability to fulfil them. For example, during the international response to 
the Haitian earthquake coordinated by the European Union, French and German field 
hospitals were in charge of treating injuries and providing the basic health care to the 
locals (Alexander et al. 2013). However, it was difficult for the field hospitals to 
support each other due to the different procedures and equipment used (Alexander et 
al. 2013). Additionally, Ekman and Uhr (2015) emphasise the need for direction and 
coordination during an emergency, in order to use the available capabilities. According 
to Bergströn et al. (2016), without direction, all capabilities will be useless and without 
coordination they will be lost and not helpful when required. Direction and 
coordination are the internal effects required for the emergency response system at all 
levels to fulfil individual, societal and environmental needs (Bergströn et al. 2016). 
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Due to the lack of inter-organisational coordination emergency responses resulted in 
delays, costs, inefficiencies and ineffective solutions (Kettl 2003; Comfort 2007), so 
better coordination was suggested by Martin et al. (2016). Raju and Becker (2013) 
mentioned what facilitates coordination is the sharing of information among all 
involved organisations. Additionally, coordination depends on sharing of resources as 
well as the organisational hierarchy and the level at which organisations operate 
(Moore et al. 2003; Stephenson, 2005). For example, in the USA the incident 
command system was established to coordinate fire operations that require the 
involvement of several stakeholders or responders (Waugh and Streib 2006). 
Coordination can be improved by following strict rules and through the operation of 
stricter authority (Hood 1998; Kettl 2003). Although coordination across different 
areas is difficult (Comfort et al. 2001), it requires simplifying complex problems into 
manageable parts (Kettl 2003). For example, when dealing with a large-scale disaster 
or multi-incidents, the involvement of many agencies might be challenging if they are 
not coordinated effectively (Kapucu and Garayev 2011). For example, Mozambique, 
which is a poor country, in 2000, was affected by a massive flood resulting from heavy 
rain left behind 800 fatalities in addition to massive damage to properties. Therefore, 
after the disaster, the Mozambique National Contingency Plan added a new 
coordinated network consisting of communities, districts and provinces in addition to 
local, national and international agencies who were all involved in emergency training 
programs in order to minimise future incidents (Ireni Saban 2014). According to 
Morakabati et al. (2016) the more participants in the emergency, the more improved 
capability in regards to communication and coordination. Thus, decentralisation of the 
emergency response system can be achieved by having a flexible structure, by focusing 
on creating networks for coordination, collaboration and partnerships especially in 
emergency situations (Kapucu and Garayev 2011). 
Collaboration 
According to Kamensky et al. (2004, p.8) “collaboration occurs when people from 
different organizations produce something together through joint effort, resources, and 
decision-making, and share ownership of the final product or service”. The most 
important aspects of collaborations are the end product and effectiveness (Kapucu and 
Garayev 2011). “Collaboration is more than simply sharing and exchanging 
information. Collaboration requires agencies to assess the situation together, share 
ideas on how to overcome the problem and initiate practical responses together.” 
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(Impcoor doc 2000, p.10). Therefore, organisations have to show their willingness and 
ability to collaborate (Kapucu 2006b) by sharing information and understanding 
other’s situations, what constrains them and what facilitate their collaboration 
(Comfort 2007). Eide et al. (2012) found that emergency agencies sometimes lack a 
good understanding of their own and other agencies tasks, needs, plans and strategies 
that negatively effect on the collaboration. Due to the magnitude of the impact of a 
disaster, collaboration may be required because the needed resources are spread across 
different locations and responsibilities are not well defined, so it is not possible to be 
managed by one organisation (Waugh and Streib 2006). Dispersion generates 
obstacles to collaboration across sites, which are linked with the coordination 
difficulties involved in discrete collaboration and with strong local relations and 
sparseness of connections cross-site (Boh et al. 2007). This demonstrates the inherent 
complexity in collaboration and the need to invest in establishing and developing 
relationships locally and internationally (O’Sullivan et al. 2013). Waugh and Streib 
(2006) mention that too much control can have negative effects on collaboration or 
can hinder collaboration, while cultural understanding and using public language can 
facilitate it (Waugh and Streib 2006). Collaboration is highly required in the face of a 
devastating disaster affecting masses of people (e.g. cruise ship incidents) and its 
management requires the involvement of many sectors, organisations and stakeholders 
to handle the incident successfully (Kapucu and Garayev 2011). In large-scale 
incidents or in the case of multi-incidents where the situation is complex (Mendonça 
et al. 2007: Salas et al. 2008) collaboration is vital within and between emergency 
response agencies and other related stakeholders (Eide et al. 2012). One of the benefits 
of stakeholder collaboration is resource-sharing (Zhang et al. 2008; Sowa 2009; Nyaga 
et al. 2010) which is related to tourism disaster management (Jiang and Ritchie 2017); 
this is because tourism consists of SMEs with limited resources (Beeton 2001). Thus, 
when responding to tourism disaster, inter-organisational collaboration is required 
(Orchiston and Higham 2016) to mitigate their effect because tourism is “a complex 
mix” of several stakeholders (Racherla and Hu 2009). However, Eide et al. (2012) 
state that such collaboration might not be easy not because of the complexity of the 
situation, but because of the differences of the people involved and the agencies that 
bear different skills, measures, information and capabilities. For example, the 
management of the terror attack in Norway on June 22, 2011 because of the 
involvement of different agencies (fire, police, and health) they were unable to 
communicate and coordinate their efforts effectively (NOU 2012). This might be 
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because all of these agencies have never worked together before, never met to discuss 
emergency response plans, nor coordinate strategies and identify the capabilities of 
each other. In addition, in a case where multi-incidents occur simultaneously, at one 
location or in different locations, dealing with two complex and dynamic emergencies 
they all require collaboration like the case of the designed scenarios of this study (see 
Appendix 6). Thus, in these cases the collaboration is inevitable for different 
organisations to enhance the effectiveness of the response by ensuring the arrival of 
the needed resources and to reduce the number of causalities (Kapucu and Garayev 
2011). During emergency responses in large-scale or multi incidents, efficient 
collaboration depends on well-defined roles and tasks of all involved responders, 
distributing relevant information, and general understanding of the current situation at 
hand (Eide et al. 2012). 
Collaboration and sharing information are adaptive management that enhances 
organisational learning and encourages modification and creativeness (Waugh and 
Streib 2006). Collaboration can contribute to minimising the risk when responding to 
emergency situations in cases when the local capabilities are not qualified to handle 
the whole situation solely (Waugh 2003). In addition, a lack of experienced and 
qualified emergency personnel, as happened in the Wenchuan earthquake, when the 
air force parachuted 2,482 tons of relief supplies into affected areas, although they 
could help but because of the inexperience of the Chinese army in disaster aid; the 
relief supplies were damaged. Therefore a collaborative work of different parties, 
especially in large-scale disasters is recommended (Miao et al. 2013). Eide et al. (2012, 
p.3) in their study identified three challenge categories which might occur in 
collaboration “1) communicating within and across agencies, 2) establishing and 
maintaining share situation awareness, and 3) understanding organisational structure.” 
The first category might occur due to technical problems in communication and lack 
of radio capacity, lack of knowledge on how to use rescue channels for example and 
lack of a common language across agencies (Eide et al. 2012). For example, Eide et 
al. found in their study that the Norwegian emergency agencies, in addition to the use 
of different terms, they also gave different meaning to the same terminologies. The 
second category stated by the participants in the Eide et al. (2012) study was that there 
is no common platform used to share information among all involved agencies. They 
mentioned, for example that the current means of sharing information is only verbal 
face-to face communication, without the use of any audio-visual tools. Another barrier 
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added in the second category is that they lack information about the current resources 
and how to manage them. Moreover, information overload, listing information on 
priority, and getting the right information when required were considered as barriers 
by the participants in the study of Eide et al. (2012). The third category also assigned 
certain barriers by the participants in the study of Eide et al. (2012) like during an 
emergency, emergency agencies lack knowledge about their own role as well as 
others’ roles. An example to illustrate that is the incident commander worked more 
with the police officers than the leader for all involved agencies, this in turn affected 
coordination negatively. Another barrier added to the organisational understanding 
that the needs during an emergency are misunderstood by the involved agencies, and 
each agency works alone (Eide et al. 2012). The last barrier added to this category is 
the lack of corresponding planning and general strategies across organisations (Eide 
et al. 2012). All these barriers will not occur if there is collaboration between all 
stakeholders because collaboration is a long-term relationship between organisations 
to solve specific problems (Cigler 2001; Keast and Mandell 2012). It also bears a high 
degree of complexity than coordination, cooperation and communication (Huxham 
and Vangen 2005). Overall what facilitates collaboration and enhances the 
management of an emergency is the cooperation (Pramanik et al. 2015, p.242). 
Cooperation 
Martin et al. (2016) define cooperation literally to mean ‘co’ ‘operate’ which means 
to work together with others. So, meaning similar organisations working together to 
achieve one goal following similar strategies (Martin et al. 2016). The prominent aim 
of working together in times of an emergency or working collectively to achieve a 
common goal is to avoid duplication of roles and responsibilities (Kapucu 2006a). 
Organisations may co-operate informally for the short-term and it can be a voluntary 
option, they are not obligated to work with other organisations especially those with 
low levels of risk (Najam 2000; Cigler 2001; Brown and Keast 2003; Odlund 2010). 
However, collaboration can be seen as a long-term relationship (Cigler 2001; Keast 
and Mandell 2012). Regarding organisations that integrated horizontally (Keast et al. 
2007), their cooperation is limited and there is no common work (Martin et al. 2016). 
In the case of an emergency, cooperation is vital in avoiding duplication of roles and 
responsibilities and in achieving the common goal (Kapucu 2006a). For example, in 
this case when different military organisations involved in a response, the nature of 
the work might result in some duplication of roles e.g. if they all carry out search and 
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rescue or sheltering. However, previous studies on social networks revealed that 
having information or background about other stakeholder organisations can enhance 
cooperation (Uhr and Johansson 2007; Uhr et al. 2008). “Therefore, improving the 
knowledge of the resources and capabilities of emergency management organizations 
and establishing long-term cooperation agreements among them seem to be viable 
measures to increase the ability of organizations responding to emergencies to assume 
new structures and roles.” (Pramanik et al. 2015, p.242). Furthermore, it often entails 
organisation to perform new tasks or roles under new structure (Dynes 1970a, 1970b; 
Dynes and Aguirre 1979; Dynes and Quarantell 1988; Dynes and Drabek 1994; 
Drabek and McEntire 2003; Boin and McConnell 2007). However, this might create 
organisational stress or pressure that leads to problem in coordination and 
collaboration because organisations are used to their usual structure and work (Dynes 
1970a, 1970b, 1994; Dynes et al. 1972; Dynes et al. 1976, 1979; Britton 1988; Drabek 
et al. 2003). This organisational stress might hinder organisations from adapting to 
new changes, therefore encouraging emergency management professionals who 
should be supported to adapt to new responsibilities and duties (Pramanik et al. 2015). 
Pramanik et al. (2015) found that increasing the willingness of emergency managers 
to cooperate with other organisations in the future and their familiarity with the 
capabilities etc. of other organisations will enhance organisational adaptation. 
Therefore, inter-and intra-organisational tools are required to highlight the available 
capacity and to deal with incident at hand (Kapucu and Garayev 2011). Any problem 
or deficiency in the capacity can be detected through the application of some 
techniques related to emergency management like decision-making (Kapucu and 
Garayev 2011). 
3.4.2 Decision-making, Leadership and Resource Allocation 
Decision-making 
Collaborative decision-making can be defined as the “combination and utilization of 
resources and management tools by several entities to achieve a common goal” 
(Kapucu and Garayev 2011, p.366). Due to the complexity, ambiguity and urgency of 
emergency management (Comfort 1999; Danielsson and Ohlsson 1999; Aldunate et 
al. 2005; Moynihan 2008) it is important for responders to have “fast thought, smooth 
and effective decision-making process” (Kapucu and Garayev 2011). Huque (1998) 
notes that the available policies and decision-making structures that direct an 
organisation’s activities in normal times may not work in disaster situations, which 
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according to Faulkner (2001) determines the degree to which emergency services and 
other organisations to be prepared for disasters. For example, the organisational 
structure and a series of rules are necessary for internal coordination in normal times, 
while in times of emergency, because of the stress, they may be unresponsive 
(Faulkner 2001). Therefore, emergency response systems should be supported to 
achieve their purpose (Paraskevas 2006). Factors affecting decision-making are 
complexity, uncertainty, time pressure, stress, risk and previous experience (Kapucu 
and Garayev 2011). In essence, complexity may be an undesirable aspect of 
emergencies, but it needs to be understood, explained and considered in the decision-
making processes, if we are to derive effective emergency management responses 
(Coskun and Ozecylan 2011). Complexity can affect decision-making because of the 
nature of an emergency and the involvement of many responders (Carley and Lin 
1997; Bigley and Roberts 2001; Sellnow et al. 2002). When the available or the 
required information about the case is limited, it causes uncertainty (Janis and Mann 
1977; Therrien 1995; Cosgrave 1996; Johnston et al. 1997). Chaotic situations need 
immediate decisions under time pressure; this affects the decision-making (Lin and Su 
1998; Danielsson and Ohlsson 1999; Buchanan and O’Connell 2006; Flueler 2006). 
Taking decision on critical incident is a risk (Janis and Mann 1977; Bier et al.1999; 
Buchanan and O’Connell 2006) as suggested by previous experience regarding the 
case at hand (Flin et al. 1996; Carley and Lin 1997; Flin 2001; Moynihan 2008). There 
are tools and methods that can be used to improve and enable decision-making in 
emergency situations like training (Inzana et al. 1996; Lin and Su 1998; Crichton et 
al. 2000), decision-support systems (Wallace and De Balogh 1985; Lindell et al. 2007) 
and simulation (Preston and Cottam 1997; Paton 2003). These methods and tools are 
used to enhance the organisation’s capacity and develop the responder’s skills and 
minimise the possibility of the above-mentioned factors that negatively affect 
decision-making (Kapucu and Garayev 2011). However, it is not an easy job for 
organisations when it comes to addressing both decision-making and collaboration in 
emergency management (Kapucu and Garayev 2011). In case a decision has to be 
made by specific organisations, it should have a comprehensive mechanism to enhance 
and help the decision-making process through different managerial, organisational and 
behavioural changes and regulations (Raiffa et al. 2002). During emergencies, 
collaborative decision-making depends on communication for “transfer, receipt, and 
integration of knowledge across participants” (Weber and Khademian 2008, p.334). 
Collaborative decision-making also depends on the quality of information received, 
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which if not managed correctly will have negative impacts (Kapucu and Garayev 
2011). 
Moreover, the Cynefin framework is also used for decision-making in times of 
response to different incidents, as they require different responses; this framework is 
designed by D.J. Snowden (1999). The framework is divided into five domains that 
are simple and complicated described as order (Tame Problems); and complex and 
chaotic domains (Wicked Problems) that are unordered, and the fifth domain is the 
disorder, which is in the middle (See Figure 3-2) (Snowden 2002; Fodness 2017). 
Table 3-2 explains the characteristics and the problem-solving approaches of each 
domain. 
 
 
Figure 3-2. Cynefin Framework 
Source: Snowden (2002) 
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Table 3-2. The Cynefin Framework Domain’s Characteristics and Approaches 
Context  Characteristics Approach  
SIMPLE 
The right answer is self-
evident and undisputed; 
everyone understands what 
to do. 
● Repeating patterns and 
consistent events 
● Clear cause-and-effect 
relationships evident to 
everyone; right answer 
exists 
● Known knowns  
● Sense, categorize, 
respond 
● Ensure proper processes 
are in place 
● Use best practices 
COMPLICATED 
Multiple right answers exist; 
not everyone agrees on the 
“best” answer. 
● Expert diagnosis 
required 
● Cause-and-effect not 
apparent; more than one 
right answer 
● Known unknowns  
● Sense, analyse, respond 
● Use subject matter 
experts 
● Compare alternatives  
COMPLEX 
No clear right answer exists. 
● Flux and 
unpredictability 
● Many competing ideas 
about cause-and-effect; 
no “right” answer (s) 
● Unknown unknowns  
● Probe, sense, respond 
● Allow patterns to 
emerge 
● Stop looking for a right 
answer; things can only 
be made “better” or 
“worse” 
 
CHAOTIC 
No time to look for answers, 
but must respond to crisis 
● High turbulence 
● No time to look for 
cause and effect or 
“right” answers 
● Unknowable  
● Act, sense, respond\take 
immediate action to re-
establish order; sort later 
● Look for what works 
rather than right answers 
DISORDER 
Lack of awareness and no 
clarity about the real 
situation 
 
● The first priority is to 
move to a known 
domain 
● It is serious to 
understand conflict 
among decision makers 
considering the similar 
situation (Kurtz and 
Snowden 2003) 
● Gather more info on 
what you know or 
identify what you don’t 
know 
● Get enough info to move 
to a more defined 
domain 
Source: Developed after Fodness (2017) 
The more the organisation information gets, the higher the possibility of taking high-
quality and low-risk decisions (Kapucu and Garayev 2011). So, in the case of the 
management of large-scale incidents and the involvement of many responders “a 
unified command is created” that focuses on sharing information and coordinating 
responses, but however participation in making the decision is limited (Waugh and 
Streib 2006). Making decisions is limited to individuals in case a quick decision is 
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needed, due to the cultural effect or if all have agreed on who will make the decision. 
(Waugh and Streib 2006). As a result, several authors have highlighted that decision-
making is influenced by national culture (e.g. Fan and Zigang 2004; Heales et al. 
2004). Culture, according to Heales et al. (2004) has a prominent impact on making 
decisions. Schramm-Nielsen (2001) stated that people follow different ways in making 
decisions based on their cultural background. “The organizational structure and culture 
in the context of collaborative decision-making in emergencies are important because 
of the agency actors’ habits and preferences while performing their duties. Certain 
organizations tend to be more flexible, for example, while others tend to be more rigid 
in terms of their structure, command and control, and management.” (Kapucu and 
Garayev 2011, p.370). To arrive at a consensus-based decision the “knowledge, 
experience, and information received from others”, should all be linked to create a 
general understanding about the current case at hand, so managers can easily make a 
consensus-based decision (Kapucu and Garayev 2011, p.373). However, when it is not 
possible to make consensus-decisions due to a time limit, quick-thinking leadership is 
required to make an effective decision (Heath 1995). 
Leadership 
Gary Yukl (2006, p.8) defines leadership as “the process of influencing others to 
understand and agree about what needs to be done and how to do it, and the process of 
facilitating individual and collective efforts to accomplish shared objectives”. Peter 
Northouse (2010, p.3) defines leadership as “a process whereby an individual 
influence a group of individuals to achieve a common goal”. Many researchers have 
addressed the issue of leadership when handling emergencies (Cassedy 1991; Turner 
1994; Faulkner 2001). Leadership and emergency management are interrelated 
according to Boin and Hart (2003) as one of the main responsibilities of the leadership 
is to mitigate hazards and control the damage of an emergency (Laws et al. 2007). 
Smits and Ezzat (2003) explain that in the pre-emergency stage the leadership’s 
perception focuses on procedures to mitigate hazards as much as possible. While 
during emergencies, leaders must show their strong personal skills (King 2002; Ucelli 
2002) by following the effectively prepared plans and procedures and continuously 
observing the organisation’s response and reacting in an effective manner (Brenneman 
2000). Leadership is one of the most important elements of a response because it 
represents the organisation, destination or country (Ritchie 2009) and it is important 
in building stakeholder collaboration (Gunton and Day 2003). Consequently, a certain 
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style of leadership that is formed by a specific national culture is more preferred in 
that national culture (D’Annmunzio-Green 2002). Leadership is required in times of 
emergency at the organisational, sectorial, industrial or country level (depending on 
the scale of the disaster) to guide and direct responders during the response and 
communication with the media (Ritchie 2009). For example, the inappropriate 
leadership strategies employed during Hurricane Katrina resulted in a poor response 
and a lack of situational awareness because of poor communication, this consequently 
created problems with command and control (Waugh and Streib 2006). What 
influences leadership in emergency management and in emergency response is the 
national culture (Pinsdorf 1991; Heales et al. 2004; Zagorsek et al. 2004; Chandler 
2005; Ritchie 2009) as the action of leaders and their behaviour are different based on 
their culture (Scheider and Littrell 2003). However, in some developing countries, 
culture has no effect on emergency management (Elsubbaugh et al. 2004). Ritchie 
(2009) highlights what might affect the leadership like the culture while he mentioned 
that the nature of decision-making and the decentralisation of leadership can create 
effective leaders. Normally, in the emergency response plans people follow their local 
ideas and practices to guide their response (Prentice and Miller 1999) so the emergency 
is managed differently based on the culture of the responders (Laws et al. 2007); this 
emergency response issue has been recognised by some authors (e.g. Elsubbaugh et 
al. 2004; Chandler 2005). For example, in some developing countries senior managers 
are careful to minimise the effect of the personal culture and inspire the effect of a 
cooperative culture among managers and responders (Elsubbaugh et al. 2004). 
Furthermore, to explain how leadership is influenced by national culture Laws et al. 
(2007, p.148) have adopted Hofested’s cultural dimension of power distance. They 
mentioned, for example that in the high-power distance culture, commanding 
leadership is preferred while in the low power distance culture counselling leadership 
is ideal. Overall effective leadership is required especially during the response to 
allocate the required resources effectively, especially when they are scattered or 
limited. 
Resource allocation 
Smith (1995) mentioned two aims of providing disaster aid. First, to bring relief 
immediately after the disaster by providing medical supplies, clothing and emergency 
shelter for victims. Second, to recover and reconstruct the destruction of the 
emergency impact; it can, however take years for the affected area to recover. 
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Although some organisations rarely provide resources for catastrophes before they 
occur, quick resources are required when incidents do occur (Ritchie 2009). 
Depending on the scale of the incident the higher the effect, the more the required 
resources (Heath 1995). Therefore, emergency services should work with other 
governmental agencies like tourism to assess the likely impact of an emergency and to 
be able to identify the required resources and distribute them effectively before 
implementing pre-prepared strategies (Ritchie 2009). According to Ritchie (2009, 
p.145) the distribution of resources needs coordination in the organisations between 
stakeholders, both within and outside the tourism industry and emergency services 
organisations. This is because managing an emergency in tourism destinations 
necessitates adequate resources (Laws et al. 2007). Thus, managers have to be 
involved in the planning process and in the time of response according to Bland (1995) 
to identify the required resources in time of emergency. Ekman and Uhr (2015) added 
that activities in an uncertain environment are subject to changes to make the possible 
distribution and allocation of the available resources. Due to the complex and 
unpredictable nature of emergencies Bergströn et al. (2016) argue that directions 
cannot be identified in detail and the exact resources required cannot be predicted, nor 
what collaboration might appear. Pramanik et al. (2015) mentioned for example that 
emergency responders in some situations are obligated to deal with workers and 
resources from organisations other than their own, although responders prefer using 
their own. “Thus, the more prepared the emergency management professionals are to 
work with or to utilize resources and personnel belonging to other organisations, the 
more easily a group of organisations can adapt to new organisational structure” 
(Pramanik et al. 2015, p.236). The emergency resource management in the immediate 
response to an emergency needs well-organised coordination so that the available 
materials (e.g., food, water, and medical materials) can be delivered to the disturbed 
areas (Sheu 2007). However, it is not an easy task to accomplish due to damaged 
infrastructure and inadequate transportation capacity (Holguin-Veras et al. 2007). This 
is because critical infrastructure itself is vulnerable when it is dependent on the input 
of other infrastructure, for example the functioning of transport and communication 
are dependent on electricity supply networks (Bach et al. 2013). During the Wenchuan 
earthquake in China, 2008, the road network was destroyed, thus it was difficult to 
deliver the relief resources to affected areas as well as to provide access to the many 
people from all over the country to help the affected areas. This caused chaos and a 
delay in response, which resulted in difficulties in coordinating the emergency 
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response process (Maio et al. 2013). Another problem according to Maio et al. (2013) 
are the imbalances between supply and demand and mismatch of relief materials like 
in the case of the Thailand tsunami in 2004. They received many contributions of 
clothing (containing winter clothes) that were not suitable for the first emergency relief 
aid as according to Christopher and Tatham (2011) the main needs in an affected area 
are safe drinking water, food and medication. During the response, emergency 
responders should create an operational management triage to communicate with all 
stakeholders effectively and to have more control on the incident (Heath 1995). 
Responders are using similar classifications to those used in emergency medical triage 
(Highest priority, high priority, low priority and the dead) in order to allocate resources 
as required (Grant et al. 1989; Ritchie 2009). Therefore, the deployment of the required 
resources will start with the higher priorities while any lack in resources deployment 
will slow the response (Ritchie 2009). Some countries beside their own resources need 
external help with the response or recovery (Ritchie 2009). For example, after the 
tsunami, in addition to financial and materials aid, Thailand asked for overseas 
expertise to help provide their skills and knowledge to aid recovery (Gurtner 2006). 
Therefore, sophisticated emergency management strategies cannot be applied at the 
organisational level if the required resources are not available (Laws et al. 2007). Lack 
of communication, slow response and a lack of resource distribution may delay the 
response to an emergency affecting a destination (Ritchie 2009). Overall, through 
effective communication between all involved stakeholders, resources can be 
distributed successfully. 
3.4.3 Communication and Information Sharing 	
Communication 
Communication is an important collective action in transfering specific messages 
between organisations or within the same organisation (Kapucu 2006a, 2006b). Salas 
et al. (2005, p.567) define communication as “the exchange of information between 
two or more individuals irrespective of the medium”. The complex nature of 
emergencies and their devastating impact make communication more important 
(Nowell and Steelman 2014), thus any failure can harm the emergency response 
system (Comfort et al. 2004). Organisations recognise that having strong, resilient and 
widespread tools of communication will boost their “connectivity” and enhance their 
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accessibility by others (Aldunate et al. 2005). Regardless of the type of communication 
technologies used to transmit a message, Celik and Corbacioglu (2010) found that the 
well-used information and communication technologies have a positive effect on 
emergency responses and make coordination smooth among all organisations. 
Consequently, failure in communication can hinder coordination (Nowell and 
Steelman 2014). Therefore, organisations should build a common operating picture by 
collecting and sharing information in a useable way during and after a disaster to 
achieve effective communication (Kapucu 2006a; Comfort 2007). Some problems in 
communication are the use of different languages, different terminologies across 
emergency agencies, as well as this; the knowledge and the tools of the agencies 
involved may hinder the response (Allinson 1994; Heath 1995; Alexander 2000; Eide 
et al. 2012). This is because the involved organisations did not work together before 
the emergency (Ritichie 2009), like the example noted by Heath (1995) in responding 
to the Kobe earthquake where the emergency organisations rarely worked together. 
Moreover, lack of communication can slow the emergency response and this in turn 
affects a destination (Ritchie 2009). Furthermore, the destruction in communication 
networks causes delays in the response operation as the information from the affected 
area and the communication between the relief workers and different relief agencies is 
required (Maio et al. 2013). For example, Holguin-Veras et al. (2007) mention the case 
of Hurricane Katherina in 2005 where around 50% of the radio stations and 44% of 
the television stations were not working. Another point to be discussed in 
communication is the cross-cultural communication. This is a communication between 
people from different cultures, this might result in miscommunication if the receiver 
misinterprets or misevaluates the sender’s intended message (Adler 1991). 
Miscommunication occurs because we use our culture as a standard of measurement, 
which becomes a self-reference criterion and because there is no identical culture to 
our own, we see other cultures as inferior (Adler 1991). Thus, effective communication 
is vital in order to share information with all involved stakeholders as well as the 
public. 
Information sharing 
Information sharing between different associations “was defined to mean exchanging 
or otherwise giving other executive agencies access to program information” (Dawes 
1996, p.382). Consequently, information transfer is the basis for inter-organisational 
collaboration and is essential for increasing the efficiency and performance of 
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organisations (Mishra et al. 2011; Yang and Maxwell 2011). Information sharing is a 
challenging process (Kożuch and Sienkiewicz-Małyjurek 2015). What makes 
information exchange difficult are the differences in personnel background as well as 
their expertise (Xia et al. 2011). The complexity of the response system emphasises 
the need for effective and continual information sharing. However, the information 
shared depends on the type of the incident and there may be different sources of the 
information (Kożuch and Sienkiewicz-Małyjurek 2015). Previous research proves that 
“teams fail to share information when they most need to do so” (Mesmer-Magnus and 
DeChurch 2009, p.544). Sharing information is mainly determined by viewpoints such 
as: organisational and managerial viewpoint (organisational boundaries; different 
origins, values and cultures; lack of experience and resource, trust, leadership, etc.); 
technological viewpoint (heterogonous hardware, software and information systems, 
information security, etc.); political and policy viewpoint (legislations and policies, 
information as power and authority, etc.) (Yang and Maxwell 2011, p.169). According 
to Helsloot (2005) and Kelman (2006) limitations in sharing-information impact 
negatively on the decision-making process and the efficiency of the taken actions in 
dealing with emergency situations. While Kożuch and Sienkiewicz-Małyjurek (2015) 
state that in some situations organisations are obligated to share information with 
others to identify the possible procedures to be followed and the required resources to 
handle the incident at hand. For example, each emergency rescue unit is assigned a 
commander with a leading role who, in case of threat, has to share information with 
commanders of all the involved organisations (Kożuch and Sienkiewicz-Małyjurek 
2015). Information sharing tends to be a process characterised by the following 
features in Table 3-3 (Kożuch and Sienkiewicz-Małyjurek 2015, p.725). 
Table 3-3. Features of Information 
Features of 
Information  Explanation 
Consistency information sharing proceeds across the whole process of operations management 
Multi-
dimensionality 
information sharing proceeds at various levels of complex systems between 
other and the same entities, and in each case, it may refer to different 
information 
Multi-
directionality 
information sharing occurs between multiple entities, and it regards 
numerous issues 
Asymmetry information sharing occurs in an unparalleled way; relations between some 
entities are stronger and between others weaker; superiority is given to the 
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information which is necessary at the given moment and between entities 
which need this information 
Variability information sharing in complex systems does not occur conventionally, but differently in each case, depending on the needs 
Source: Kożuch and Sienkiewicz-Małyjurek (2015, p.725). 
In the complex system among multi-stakeholders and non-linear interactions, the 
sharing of information is attributed to be “multi-dimensional, asymmetrical and 
dynamic” and is directed by “situational circumstances, as well as organisational, 
technical, and social determinants” Kożuch and Sienkiewicz-Małyjurek (2015, p.727). 
“It also follows from the role played by the specific entity in the system. Therefore, 
information sharing in complex systems proves to be dispersed and decentralized” 
(Kożuch and Sienkiewicz-Małyjurek 2015, p. 727). Information sharing in the 
complex system is considered to be a basic or fundamental requirement for decision-
making, directing the responders, distributing resources where appropriate, allocating 
financial aid, as well as collaboration and coordination of procedures are also 
fundamental (Kożuch and Sienkiewicz-Małyjurek 2015). For example, Eide et al. 
(2013) found in their study that the most important information responders want to 
communicate is about the incident itself and about the resources. They suggested 
increasing the awareness to identify the most important information required. For 
example, those related to resources management (personnel and equipment) and those 
related to situational awareness (Eide et al. 2013). Situational awareness about existing 
resources and possible solutions adopts adaptive responses to ambiguous events, and 
“these outputs are influenced by how people and organizations use information” 
(O’Sullivan et al. 2013, p.242). Nowadays, due to the sudden outbreak of many 
incidents around the world, even in the well-prepared countries with advanced and 
high quantities of the required resource, it is the matter of the response system and 
how resilient it is. So, the next part discusses the resilience of the emergency response 
system. 
3.5 Towards Emergency Response Resilience 
Holling (1973, p.4) was the first to refer to resilience as a “measure of the persistence 
of systems and their ability to absorb change and disturbance and still maintain the 
same relationship between populations or state variables”. The word resilience has 
been used extensively in the academic publications of different disciplines in the last 
decade according to Meerow and Newell (2015). While Castleden (2011) mentioned 
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major attention has been paid in recent years to considering the importance of 
resilience. There are many definitions of resilience according to Comfort (1999, p.21) 
it is “the capacity to adopt the existing resources and skills to new situations and 
operating conditions”. In terms of emergency and disaster management; resilience as 
defined by UNISDR (2009) is “The ability of a system, community or society exposed 
to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard 
in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of 
its essential basic structures and functions”. Atiken and Leggat, explain it as “the 
ability of a community to bounce back following a disaster” (2012, p.151). Zhou et al. 
(2009) indicate that resilience is gradually used as method to gain a better insight into 
the dynamics of natural disaster systems. Meerow and Newell (2015) found that 
resilience is closely connected to the complex system theory and in their review 
highlighted that dynamic resilience dominates in studies related to complexity. 
However, Pendall et al. (2010) mention that in studies related to engineering, disaster 
management and economics still follow the equilibrium model of resilience. 
Resilience can be interpreted as a system of systems (Bristow et al. 2012) and a 
complex adaptive system (Allen et al. 2005). Disasters and resilience are ‘wicked 
problems’ (Rittel and Webber 1973, p.162); as their featured explained in chapter two; 
according to Gall (2013, p.24) “there is no absolute problem formulation and for which 
it is difficult to identify a singular root cause or prescribe unambiguous solutions”. 
Jung and Song (2015) mention the characteristics of resilience systems in the disaster 
perspective are: minimising the probability of risk, defending the risk when it occurs 
and the ability to recover after occurrence. Though, the rapid occurrence of an 
earthquakes or hurricanes require immediate response, so in this context the 
evacuation plan is an indicator of resilience (Cutter et al. 2008). In the slow occurrence 
of events, such as the rise of the sea level or a drought, context resilience is by 
developing and applying suitable solutions. Cutter et al. (2008) taking by an 
organisation, which demonstrate its level of resilience. Organisational resilience is the 
ability of an organisation to take decisions and actions in emergency situations as well 
as supporting the community to cope with emergencies when they occur and to recover 
from them in a specific time frame without massive destruction or loss because of the 
distributed resources and shared information (Jung and Song 2015). Therefore, they 
found that when there are high levels of resilience, there could be well-enhanced 
mitigation, response and recovery. Furthermore, resilience is explained as a system 
response, including time of recovery and degree of risk reduction (Gall 2013, p.16). 
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Emergency response systems are considered to be a way of achieving organisational 
resilience and require an organisation to be prepared in order to respond to, and recover 
from any unpredictable event (Hollnagel et al. 2006). Cutter et al. (2008) mention that 
there are two qualities of resilience: inherent (functioning well before an emergency 
occurs) and adaptive (response flexibly in time of disaster) and they are applicable to 
infrastructure, institutions, organisations, social systems and economic systems. For 
example, according to Djalante et al. (2012) many techniques help build resilience in 
Indonesia like guiding policies and frameworks, and the involvement of different 
stakeholders, while there were some obstacles like the lack of capacity and skill for 
disaster risk reduction at the local level, a lack of well-organised learning and a lack 
of responsibility carried by the government in having disaster risk reduction in general 
development programs. However, training and practices including discussions among 
different stakeholders are needed to build organisational capacity and resilience 
(O’Brien 2006, 2008). Bruneau et al. (2003) and Andrew et al. (2014) suggest four 
dimensions for measuring organisational resilience: robustness (continued capacity to 
maintain overall performance), redundancy (keeping spare resources), flexibility 
(plans, information and resources to solve problem and reduce risk) and rapidity (quick 
response). Furthermore, Miao et al. (2013) attributed robustness and redundancy as 
hard resilience, while flexibility and rapidity as soft resilience. Regardless of being 
natural or human-induced disasters, some disasters may overwhelm the capability of 
a single organisation to respond due to a lack of resources and the required swift 
reaction (Jung and Song 2015). For example, in Korea in 2004 a National Emergency 
Management Agency was formed to handle any type of disaster (June et al. 2014; 
Yoon 2014). Its structure is assigned a three-tier system for efficient integration that 
results in an effective response to natural and human-induced disasters (Jung and Song 
2014). However, the damages occurred depend on the extent to which the affected 
people are vulnerable to hazards, the location of the area, and the ability of the affected 
community to be resilient (Berkes 2007). Jung and Song (2015) mention an example 
of the southern economic region in South Korea that has been vulnerable to typhoons. 
According to the Korean Metrological Administration (2013) three typhoons impacted 
the same area in the duration from June to October. Although they have considered a 
network of social capital for response, finally they believed in enhancing resilience 
(Jung and Song 2015). 
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The consequences of any specific incident are affected by the build-up of resilience 
both pre and post occurrence of emergencies and emergency management demands 
multilevel governance systems that can improve the capability to survive with 
vagueness and shock by organising various resources of resilience (Adger et al. 2005). 
This viewpoint was acknowledged and developed by Berkes (2007) who mentioned 
that vulnerability also exists in resilience of affected system and lists four factors help 
in building resilience: (1) ability to live with modification and ambiguity, (2) fostering 
diversity for more opportunities and decreasing hazards, (3) rising the rang of 
experience for learning and answering problems, and (4) generating opportunities for 
self-organisation. Referring to Berkes’ thinking, three studies have been published in 
the journal of “Nature Hazards”. The first study applied to a case study by Frommer 
(2011) suggested that resilience to climate change could be acquired by supporting 
assets of resistance, revival and innovation. The second study conducted by Boon et 
al. (2012) where they investigated the concept of resilience and claimed that resilience 
can be considered as a type of characteristic or a process. While Sun et al. (2012) found 
that resilience can evolve from short-term alteration to long-term adaptations through 
their investigation of the resilience of farmers in paddy field of southern China to 
agriculture drought. Maio et al. (2013) recommended studying the resource issues 
required in the management of the emergency as there is a gap between emergency 
management study and resource management research. One way to bridge this gap is 
resilience thinking. By understanding the idea that according to Jackson (2009) a 
collective work done by many stakeholders (Scalingi 2009) is a support to the system 
and bringing flexibility to cope with the damage. Comprehensively, emergency 
resource management involves several components and procedures that cover the 
activities and systems functioned in transporting responders (experienced NGOs, well-
trained public organisations and volunteers), resources (food, water, clothes etc.) to 
help victims (Van Wassenhove 2006; Boin et al. 2010). To manage the required 
resources during the response, Maio et al. (2013) suggest making a list of the required 
resources for victims, mapping the affected area, allocating financial resources, buying 
the needed resources that are not available and delivering them to the affected areas. 
Meanwhile, the maintenance of the supporting emergency infrastructure must be 
considered a cautious process because emergencies may interrupt the available plan in 
surprising ways (Clarke 1999). For instance, the well-structured dam system in New 
Orleans could not be sustained in the flooding following Hurricane Kathrina (Maio et 
al. 2013). This indicates the lack of resilience of emergency resources management 
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systems intended to minimise the threat of the hazard (Comfort et al. 2010). 
Mechanisms should be flexible and adaptive in responding to any emerging events 
(Maio et al. 2013). 
Emergency planning can help in times of emergencies by strengthening the resilience 
of an organisation and decreasing the susceptibility of communities to the impact of 
such disasters (Blaikie et al. 2003; Ritchie 2008). Disaster resilience tends to be more 
proactive and positive as a result of community actions towards natural hazards 
reduction (Cutter et al. 2008). Many factors may determine community resilience and 
the degree of community dependency and the extent to which a community is more 
resilient than its counterparts. This depends on the type of emergency and its frequency 
(Atiken and Leggat 2012, p.151). As noted in the Sendai Framework (2015-2030), 
Risk Reduction focuses its priorities on investing in disaster risk reduction for 
resilience. According to the Canadian Emergency Management Framework (2011) the 
capacity of resilience is built through a process of empowering locals, responders, 
organisations, communities, governments, systems and the society to share the 
responsibility in preventing hazards from evolving into disasters. For the purpose of 
this study, empowering the tourism industry is inherent in the public-private-
partnership (PPP) because as mentioned earlier the tourism industry lacks resources, 
skills, money and expertise. Both the Hyogo Framework for Action (2005-2015) and 
the Sendi Framework for Risk Reduction (2015-2030) highlight the need to establish 
partnerships between the public and private sector in order to reduce current and future 
risks and to enhance emergency and disaster resilience (Bajracharya and Hastings 
2012; Hochrainer-Stigler and Lorant1 2017). Public-private partnerships (PPP) 
according to Auzzir et al. (2014) is how governments engage private sector to provide 
the government infrastructure and services to increase quality and to provide good 
value for money. Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) in the area of emergency and 
disaster management “can be used as a strategic approach to overcome or at least to 
minimise the negative impacts of disasters in developing countries” Auzzir et al. 
(2014, p.808). In terms of tourism emergency management, this study defines PPP as 
long-term collaboration between the public and private sector from the risk reduction 
to the recovery stage of any potential incident. This collaboration includes providing 
tangible and intangible resources (e.g. accommodation or transportation for tourists, 
information, skills, training, destination marketing, etc.) for each phase depending on 
the requirements of the potential/affected group and the capabilities of the private 
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actor. Abu-Bakr (2012) classified the role of partnerships in emergency management 
and resilience building as either strategic (focus on mitigation and preparedness 
actions) or responsive (focus on response and recovery actions). For example, the 
strategic PPP can reduce a tourist’s vulnerability or increase awareness and knowledge 
of local emergency procedures. While the responsive PPP exemplified in providing 
affected tourists accommodation, facilitating a tourist's repatriation or organising FAM 
trips to brand destination after a disaster. However, to achieve successful collaborative 
work in response and recovery, involved actors need to establish and maintain 
relationships during the mitigation and preparedness (Jenkins et al. 2015; Simo and 
Bies 2007). For example, Matsushima City in Japan lacks its own fire department; 
consequently, in meeting building fire codes as well as annual disaster drills, thus 
many hotels in Matsushima are working with the fire department of neighbouring 
Shiogama City (Nguyen et al. 2017). Furthermore, the Matsushima Tourism 
Association has developed its own disaster emergency plans independent of 
Matsushima Town Office that could be used by local hotels (Nguyen et al. 2017). All 
the above-mentioned activities, during a response, must be coordinated between 
different agencies and stakeholders. In the case of emergencies affecting the tourist 
destination; the tourism sector should be involved in the response to such incidents 
and to the planning for the response. In this case the tourism industry is a victim and 
should participate in the emergency response planning process to enhance its 
resilience. Understanding the potential threats that may affect the tourism industry and 
how to respond to them is an important task and it can be done by reviewing different 
cases around the world in order to investigate the effect of these influencers and how 
the response was undertaken. As the specific focus of this study is developing the 
concept of integrating tourism with emergency response planning in the cruise ship 
industry, the next chapter investigates the three case studies of Costa Concordia, Mv 
Sewol Korean ferry and Norman Atlantic. 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter highlighted the tourism system and critically evaluated its similarities 
with complex adaptive systems and the complex nature of emergencies affecting it to 
enhance the response strategy. The chapter then moved on to explain planning for 
tourism emergencies, with a specific focus on the response and its related strategies 
such as coordination, collaboration, cooperation, leadership, decision-making, 
resource allocation, communication and decision making. All these strategies are 
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highlighted to develop a more integrated emergency response between tourism and 
emergency services. Finally, it emphasised the importance of having resilient 
emergency response systems. 
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: Case Studies 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter starts with a general overview of the cruise-ship industry and the 
development of the market. Then it mentions the possible hazards that might occur in 
cruising and the possible measures needed to handle them. Due to the large number 
travelling on cruise-ships, mass casualty management is also covered in this chapter. 
It examines the cases of Costa Concordia, Mv Sewol Korean Ferry and Norman 
Atlantic to evaluate the specific challenges presented by the cruise-ship industry when 
undertaking emergency responses. There are many incidents happening in the 
maritime environment every day. However, these specific cases have been selected as 
they are the most recent cases related to the tourism industry and passenger cruises 
and they reveal the gap in crew training and emergency responses in the case of an 
emergency. 
4.2 General Overview of Cruise Ship Industry 
The birth of the cruise-ship industry dates to the middle of the 19th century (Qiu et al. 
2014) due to advancements in science and technology, contributing to improving “the 
design, power supply, accommodation and catering facilities of a passenger ship (Lois 
et al. 2004, p.93).” These improvements enhanced the efficiency of the ship and gave 
it the possibility to compete with land-based holidays, including resorts (Lois et al. 
2004). The latest statistics shows that the number of cruise tourists will increase to 36 
million by 2025 (Vidmar and Perkovic 2015). Now, cruise ships are seen to be a kind 
of tourism destination, not only a type of transportation (Wild and Dearing 2000). They 
are also considered to be developing a highly advanced tourism product including 
facilities, entertainment, accommodation and leisure (Qiu et al. 2014) as they offer an 
all-inclusive holiday (Lois et al. 2004). The generic cruise passenger ship is made up 
of a group of systems that are technical, engineering, operational and environmental 
that interact during the transportation phase (Lois et al. 2004), which presents the 
dynamic interaction between different elements as in the complex system. The main 
level of the cruise-ship function consists of the “generic hotel function” and “generic 
ship function” in Figure 4-1 (Lois et al. 2004). The hotel functions consist of the 
categories shown Table 4-1 in and the ship functions consist of categories shown in 
Table 4-2. 
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Figure 4-1. Generic Cruise Ship Functions 
Source: Lois et al. (2004) 
Table 4-1. Hotel Facilities 
Facilities 
Passenger Crew Service Task related Entertainment Others  
Passenger 
cabins 
Public spaces 
Stairways 
and halls 
Outdoor 
spaces 
Crew cabins 
Common 
spaces 
Service 
Stairs and 
corridors 
Passenger 
service 
Catering 
facility 
Hotel 
services 
Car decks 
Tender boats 
Stern marina 
Special 
attractions 
Casino 
Swimming 
pools 
Cabaret shows 
Game room 
Disco 
Shore-
excursion 
office 
Shops 
Beauty 
saloon 
Internet 
Self-service 
launderettes 
Medical 
centre 
Photo shop 
Sport club  
Source: Lois et al. (2004) 
 
HOTEL 
FUNCTIONS
SHIP 
FUNCTIONS
Passengers Facilities
Crew Facilities 
Service Facilities
Task Related Facilities
Entertainment Facilities
Other Facilities 
Comfort System
Machinery & Propulsion
Tanks, Voids
Outdoor Deck 
Safety System
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Table 4-2. Ship Facilities 
Facilities 
Comfort system Machinery Tanks, voids Outdoor decks Safety systems  
Air conditioning 
Water and 
sewage 
Stores 
Engine room 
Fuel and 
lubricated oil 
Water and 
sewage 
Ballast and voids  
Mooring 
Crew 
Life boat 
Life raft 
Sprinkler system 
Detectors and 
alarms 
Low level 
lighting 
Life jackets 
Source: Lois et al. (2004) 
Ensuring the safety and security of passengers and crew is the highest priority of 
cruise-ship organisations (FSA 2008). Cruise lines are required to follow the 
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) safety standards, as well as the different 
local, national and international rules and requirements for safety operations and 
construction (Vidmar et al. 2013). There are different types of operational incidents 
shown in Table 4-3 that might happen during the phases of a cruise, both at sea and 
in ports listed by G.P.Wild (2014, p.8) for CLIA. These incidents include fire, 
technical breakdown such as engine failure, stranding or grounding, passenger 
missing overboard and not recovered, storm and rogue wave damage, 
collision/allusion and sinking. According to Wild (2014, p.8) the operational 
incidents are classified into significant and minor incidents. According to Vidmar et 
al. (2013) the incidents reported for cruise ships from 1990 to 2004 show that “other” 
(44%) are the highest reason for these incidents. This includes hull and machinery 
related accidents, however there have been low fatalities over the years. Other 
incidents affecting cruise ships include “grounding and fire/explosion” (Vidmar et al. 
2013). However, according to the On Course Magazine (2015) the most common 
cause of cruise-ships accidents is running aground, followed by collisions. Table 4-4 
lists examples of the worst cruise-ship disasters. When operating cruises, there are 
general rules that apply to passenger cruise-ships according to Lois et al (2004): (1) 
30 years is the average lifetime, (2) 330 days of functioning per year, (3) 24 working 
hours per day and (4) frequency of the average maintenance is once a year. 
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Table 4-3. List of Hazardous Events During Operation Phases. 
Operation phases  Possible hazardous events  
Passenger 
embarkation 
● Passenger and crew injuries while alongside 
● Passenger violence 
● Fire/explosion in terminal 
● Noise 
● Overloaded gangway/ collapse 
● Injuries to unattended children 
Getting underway 
(arrival and 
departure) 
● Lifting injuries while loading wheelchairs 
● Fall in water/man overboard 
● Collision with another vessel 
● Loss of control (ice, wind, restricted visibility) 
● Slips, fall at gangway 
● Fire during fueling 
Cruise 
● Injuries due to machinery failure 
● High speed collision, grounding 
● Situational management (loss of awareness, distraction, 
multiple events) 
● Electric shock 
● Exposure to elements 
● Medical emergency evacuation 
● Vessel fire 
● Engine failure 
● Noise due to conflicting group  
Docking 
● Squish injury 
● Dock fire 
● Contact with unknown/hidden objects 
● Complacency (hard docking) 
Disembarkation  
● Sewage spills 
● Injuries due to overloaded gangway 
● Slips and falls while disembarkation 
● Careless attendance to handicapped passengers  
Outside events 
(accident on ship 
neighbour) 
● Spills at neighbouring cargo terminal 
● Gas or chemical release at neighbouring cargo terminal 
● Fire or explosion at neighbouring cargo terminal  
Source: Vidmar et al. (2013) 
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Table 4-4. The Worst Cruise Ship Incidents 
Cruise  Incident Source 
The Eastern Star 
ship 
Sunk on June 2015 on China’s Yangtze River 
with 458 people on board 
(Sky News  
2015) 
Costa Concordia 
Toppled on its side in 2012 resulted in 32 
passenger deaths and 64 injured out of 4200 
passengers, 
(Cline 2013) 
Carnival Triumph Stuck by engine fires in 2011 (Cline 2013) 
Sea bourn Spirits Attacked by speedboats pirates in 2005 (Cline 2013) 
Celebrity Mercury 
A virus widespread caused vomiting and other 
stomach ills for more than 400 passengers out of 
2600 in 2010 
(Cline 2013) 
RMS Titanic Sank in 1912 with more than 1500 passengers and crew died out of 2200  (Cline 2013) 
Source: Sky News (2015) and Cline (2013) 
4.3 Planning and Managing Cruise Ship Emergencies 
Although marine technology has achieved scientific and technical developments that 
assist in improving the level of safety in the shipping industry and related activities, 
accidents still happen and public patience of the effects of severe incidents remains 
low (De Rademaeker et al. 2014). Vanem et al. (2006) and Vidmar and Perkovic 
(2015). This indicates that the probability of accidents occurring in modern cruise-
liners is very rare, but if they do happen, it is a huge incident as cruise-ships carry 
several thousands of people. Ensuring the safety and security of passengers and crew 
is the highest priority of the cruise (FSA 2008). The Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) 
is a method for risk assessment established by IMO to improve the safety of ships, 
cruisers and crews and the environment. The FSA follow five steps: hazard 
identification (what might go wrong?), risk factor evaluation (how bad and how 
likely?), risk control options (can matters be improved?), cost benefit assessment (what 
would it cost and how much better would it be?) and decision-making 
recommendations (what actions should be taken?). The following Figure 4-2 shows 
these five steps (FSA 2008). 
		100	
 
Figure 4-2. Steps of Formal Safety Assessment 
Source: FSA (2008) 
 
The benefits of applying FSA are listed briefly as follows (IMO, IMO/MSC circular 
829, 1997 cited in Louis et al. 2004): 
● A dependable controlling system that includes all safety aspects. 
● Cost efficiency, in order to achieve the maximum benefits from safety investments. 
● A proactive approach helps in considering hazards before they progress into an 
accident. 
● Confidence that is required in the intensity of the risk. 
● A logical foundation to report new risks arising as a result of changing technology. 
The framework of FSA is a rational and systematic process of evaluating risks and 
estimating the costs and benefits of different options for risks reduction (Peachey 
1999). The following part briefly explains each step in the FSA framework. 
FSA Cruise Ships – ANNEX III: Cost efficiency analysis, Recommendations 
Annex III, page 3 
2 FSA Methodology 
Figure 1: The five steps of Formal Safety Assessment (from IACS FSA training course).  
 
Figure 1 shows the five main steps of the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) approach, detailing what 
each step is comprised of and how the va ious steps are interrelated. This report is mainly related to 
the FSA steps 3, 4 and 5 but it is an iterative process to assess the risk reduction effect of identified 
risk control options. The total risk, defined as the combination of frequency and severity summed up 
over all identified accident scenarios may be controlled by a number of well-known or newly 
identified risk control options. Finally, the objective of the cost efficiency assessment step is to 
identify and rank the risk control options in order to determine the most cost efficient ones, i.e. those 
that provide most risk reduction in relation to cost. In order to compare single risk control measures or 
combinations of measures (risk control options) in a systematic and structured way, the risk models 
developed in Annex II (in accordance to step 2 of FSA) are used for re-evaluation of the total risk after 
implementation of risk control measures. 
The following subsections are based on the IMO FSA Guidelines (/1/). 
2.1 Risk Control options 
The purpose of Step 3 in Figure 1 is according to /1/ to propose effective and practical RCOs 
comprising the following four principal stages: 
1. Focusing on risk areas needing control; 
2. Identifying potential risk control measures (RCMs); 
3. Evaluating the effectiveness of the RCMs in reducing risk by re-evaluating Step 2 (Figure 1) ; 
and 
4. Grouping RCMs into practical regulatory options. 
The purpose of focusing on risk areas is to screen the output of Step 2 (Figure 1) so that the effort is 
focused on the areas most needing risk control. The main aspects to making this assessment are to 
		101	
4.3.1 Hazard Identification 
The aim of the first step, hazard identification, is to derive a list of all potential hazards 
and accident scenarios as well as their causes and outcomes (Wang 2001; Lois et al. 
2004). When identifying hazards “brainstorming” is a supportive technique 
incorporating qualified personnel and experts (Wang 2001), in addition to Hazard and 
Operability Studies (HAZOP) and failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
according to Kuo (1998). The aim of hazard identification is also to plan and minimise 
the level of hazards and protect both the cruise and port from any likely hazards 
(Vidmar and Perkovic 2015). According to MSA (1993, p.10) an accident is defined 
as “a status of the vessel, at the stage where it becomes a reportable incident which has 
the potential to progress to loss of life, major environmental damage and/or loss of the 
vessel”. The categorisation of accidents includes: (1) contact or collision; (2) 
explosion; (3) external hazard; (4) fire; (5) flooding; (6) grounding or stranding; (7) 
hazardous substances; (8) loss of hull integrity; (9) machinery failure; and (10) loading 
and unloading related failure. Lois et al (2004) agreed in order to facilitate the step of 
hazard identification; a development of a flow chart of all operations is required. To 
develop a flow chart, it is necessary to list all functions and activities being executed 
(Peachey 1999). Figure 4-3 shows the five phases of the cruise-ship operation 
according to Lois et al (2004). Each operational phase of the cruise ship includes the 
following activities listed in Table 4-5 by Lois et al. (2004). 
Table 4-5. Activities 
Passenger Embarkation 
 
● Arrival of passengers at the base port.  
● Checking of passenger tickets.  
● Open-up an account for their expenses on-board the ship.  
● Passengers are given their cabin keys and any other necessary information. 
● Obligatory photograph opportunity. 
Getting Underway  
 
● The staff on the gangway welcome passengers. 
● Cruise staff direct passengers to their cabins. 
● Luggage is sent on for delivery to the cruiser’s accommodation. 
● Passengers are given safety information and a life jacket drill. 
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Cruise 
● While the ship sails, the passengers are free to visit all the public areas of the ship. It is 
necessary to make sure that they are aware of the daily program and follow the safety 
instructions of the ship. 
Docking  
● Passengers who choose a shore excursion are required to disembark first. 
● Luggage will have been packed the night before the final disembarkation. 
● During the packing process, the cruisers will have been asked to place tags on their 
luggage indicating the time and method of the onward journey. 
● Passengers are required to wait in the public areas until the port authorities allow them 
to disembark. 
● Passengers are also required to settle their accounts before disembarkation. 
Disembarkation 
● Passengers with the longest daytime journey are disembarked first and those whose 
onward journey requires a night flight or stay disembark last. 
● Passengers will collect their luggage in the port’s terminal. 
● Ship staff is usually present at the main doors to say goodbye, and porters and 
assistants are provided quayside, where necessary. 
● Transport to the airport or package hotel will be provided for all those not making 
independent arrangements. 
Source: Lois et al. (2004) 
 
 
Figure 4-3. Operation Schedule 
Source: Lois et al. (2004) 
 
4.3.2 Risk Assessment 
The second step is risk assessment, aiming to evaluate risk and its elements that affect 
the level of safety (Wang 2001) based on priority (Lois et al. 2004). Different criteria 
! Passengers are given safety information and a
life jacket drill.
(c) Cruise:
While the ship sails, the passengers are free to
visit all the public areas of the ship. It is necessary
to make sure that they are aware of the daily
programme and follow the safety instructions of the
ship.
(d) Docking:
! Passengers who choose a shore excursion are
required to disembark first.
! Luggage will have been packed the night before
the final disembarkation.
! During the packing process, the cruiser will have
been asked to place tags on their luggage indi-
cating the time and method of the onward
journey.
! Passengers are required to wait in the public
areas until the port authorities allow them to
disembark.
! Passengers are also required to settle their
accounts before disembarkation.
(e) Disembarkation:
! Passengers with the longest daytime journey are
disembarked first and those whose onward
journey requires a night flight or stay are
disembarked last.
! Passengers will collect their luggage in the port’s
terminal.
! Ship staff is usually present at the main doors to
say goodbye, and porters and assistance are
provided quayside, where necessary.
! Transport to the airport or package hotel will be
provided for all those not making independent
arrangements.
Table 6 describes the potential hazards identified with
regard to the above operation. Once the hazards are
identified with respect to each of the categories shown in
Table 6 , it is essential to carry out a ‘‘Probability
Assignment’’ (Passenger Vessel Association, 1997) in
order to rate the likelihood or frequency of that hazard
occurring. After the examination of the frequency of
each hazard occurring, it is also essential to carry out a
‘‘Consequence Assignment’’ (Passenger Vessel Associa-
tion, 1997) in order to rate the impact of that hazard
occurring. Five scales are used for the ‘‘Probability and
Consequence Assignments’’ and are shown in Tables 7
and 8 .
In Table 7, Rating 1 represents ‘‘remote’’, which
means that the hazard might occur once in a lifetime of
all passenger ships. Rating 2 represents ‘‘occasional’’
meaning that the hazard might occur every 5 years, and
Rating 3 represents ‘‘likely’’, which means that the
hazard might occur every season. Ratings 4 and 5
represent ‘‘probable’’ and ‘‘frequent’’, which mean that
the hazard might occur monthly and weekly or daily,
respectively.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Getting 
Underway
Cruise, 
Sailing 
Docking
Passenger 
Embarkation 
Passenger  
Disembarkation
Fig. 7. Operation schedule.
Table 6
Potential hazards identified
Casualties Description
Personnel Crew injury involving machinery
Crew injury while alongside or getting underway
Man overboard
Medical emergency
Passenger injury during embarkation and
disembarkation
Passenger violence
Slips and falls while underway
Material—ship Galley fire
Fire/explosion on board
Collision/grounding due to human error
Collision/grounding due to mechanical/
navigational failure
Engine room/machinery space fire
Collision due to other ship’s fault
Flooding and/or sinking due to hull failure
Material—shore Fire in terminal
Explosion in terminal
Structural damage to terminal
Environmental
impacts
Exhaust emissions
Noise
Oil pollution due to vessel accident
Pollution due to oil discharge
P. Lois et al. / Tourism Management 25 (2004) 93–109100
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can be used to address risk by the maritime sector: “unacceptable, tolerable and 
broadly acceptable risk” (Vidmar and Perkovic 2015, p. 191). Risk assessment 
investigates how hazardous states progress and interact to cause major incidents 
(Wang 2001). It includes contemplation of the different elements (like training design, 
communication, and maintenance), which affect the level of risk (Lois et al. 2004). In 
this step it is necessary to use the “influence diagram” (Risk Contribution Tree Figure 
4-4) in order to tackle how the regulatory, commercial, technical, political, social 
environments impact on each accident category (Wang and Foinikis 2001). The 
influence diagram is a combination of “fault tree analysis” and “event tree analysis” 
(Marine Safety Agency 1993). According to Tzifas (1997) “Fault Tree Modelling” 
looks at the combination of events and failures that can lead to an unintentional event, 
while “Event Tree Modelling” is a means of investigating the possibility of an 
escalation of such an unintended event in order to establish all potential consequences 
and their severity according to Peacey (1999) and Tzifas (1997). An influence diagram 
can be used to deal with the escalation of an incident and reduction aspects like the 
evaluation of people (Wang 2001). Each influence diagram is essential in outlining the 
“best” and “worst” cases for each element impacting on specific accidents (Wang and 
Foinikis 2001). 
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Figure 4-4. Risk Contribution Tree 
Source: Lois et al. (2004) 
4.3.3 Risk Control Options 
A risk control option is the third step, which aims at suggesting effective and practical 
risk control measures (Wang 2001) to reduce the risk estimated in the second step 
(Lois et al. 2004). Therefore, the high-risk zones can be identified easily (Wang 2001) 
and a list of countermeasures can be used to lessen the impact of the potential risk 
(Lois et al. 2004). These countermeasures according to Lois et al. (2004) will be related 
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Spread of fire Y
Explosion Y N
Loss of vessel   Y N 
Loss of life Y N
Missed voyage Y   N
Environmental impact Y  N 
          N   
EVENT TREE ANALYSIS
Accident Category Consequences
FIRE
Accident Category Level 
Underlying 
Casual
Influences
Accident sub-category level 
Bridge Engine
Room
Galley Passenger 
Cabins 
Crew 
Cabins 
Direct Causes
FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
Smoking 
Heat, Flame
Terrorism
Bomb
Threat 
Machinery 
Failure
Fire in 
Terminal
Fig. 8. Risk contribution tree.
Cause                           Incident                           Accident                     Consequence 
Intervene to 
remove the 
CAUSE. 
Intervene before the
INCIDENT. 
Intervene before the 
ACCIDENT. 
Intervene before the
CONSEQUENCE.
Fig. 9. Causal chain.
P. Lois et al. / Tourism Management 25 (2004) 93–109102
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to population, procedures or equipment solutions as shown in Table 4-6. Generally, 
risk control measures have certain features according to Wang (2001) that are: 
● Those relating to the main type of risk reduction like mitigating measures. 
● Those relating to the type of action required, for example, engineering or 
procedural. 
● Those relating to the confidence that can be placed in the measures (e.g. active, 
passive or single). 
Table 4-6. Potential Countermeasures 
Intervention to 
remove cause  
Interventions 
before the Incident  
Interventions 
before the accident 
Intervention before 
the consequence 
Proper equipment 
Training 
Detailed procedures 
Preventative 
maintenance  
Enhanced surveys 
Communication 
equipment 
Alarms 
Remote sensors 
Check-off lists for 
routine evolutions  
Drills to respond to 
common incidents 
Special procedures 
for higher risk 
evolutions (vessel 
traffic and bad 
weather) 
Response plans 
Emergency drills 
Lifesaving 
equipment 
Emergency 
instructions 
Crew training  
Source: Lois et al. (2004) 
4.3.4 Cost Benefits Assessment 
The purpose of the fourth step, cost benefits assessment is determining benefits 
because of reduced risks and costs related with the application of each risk control 
options for comparisons (Wang 2002). To achieve effective cost benefits assessments, 
it is required to set a base case, as a standard for comparison (Wang 2001). A base case 
is the reference for the analysis reflecting the current setting and what really happens 
rather than what is assumed to happen (Wang 2001). Cost and benefit options can be 
estimated and then the cost of the unit risk reduction can be taken by dividing the net 
value of costs and benefits (Wang 2001). 
4.3.5 Decision-making 
The last step aims at making decisions and providing recommendations for safety 
enhancement (Wang 2001; Wang 2002). The information produced can be used to 
support in the selection of cost-effective and reasonable changes and to select the best 
risk control option (Wang 2001: Wang 2002). All these steps are considered for risk 
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reduction and in case an emergency happens on a cruise due to the large number of 
passengers, there should be an effective response to manage the mass casualties. 
4.4 Mass Casualty Management 
This part highlights mass casualty management because of the large number of tourists 
traveling on cruise ships. Thomas (no date, p. 2) defines a mass casualty incident as 
“an incident that has produced more casualties than a customary response assignment 
can handle”. Examples of complex incidents, which produced a number on a scale that 
could be described as mass casualties, are included in Table 4-7. “Mass-casualty 
management has a particularly strong sense of imperative, derived from both the 
urgent need to save lives and the principle that improvements in efficiency help save 
more lives during the critical phases of an emergency.” (Alexander 2013b, p.7-8) 
Table 4-7. Incidents and the Number of Casualties 
Incident  Date  Location Fatalities Injured  
Terrorist attack on the World Trade 
Centre 2001 New York 2993 8700 
Bomb in a nightclub 2002 Bali 202 300 
Multiple bombing attacks to a transport 
system 2004 Madrid 191 1900 
Tsunami 2004 S.E Asia 200,000+ Unknown 
Multiple bombing attacks to a transport 
system 2005 London 52 650 
Marauding Terrorist with Fire Arms 2008 India 166 293 
Marauding Terrorist with Fire Arms and 
bombing 2011 Norway 85 176 
Earthquake and Tsunami 2011 Japan  15,853 6023 
Marauding Terrorist with Fire Arms 2013 
Nairobi, 
Kenya 
671 175 
Source: Resilience Partnership; Mass Casualty Framework (2015, p.5) 
Although a mass casualty affects a large number of people, it can be managed within 
the available resources of the affected organisation or health facility while a disaster 
requires external aids (Atiken and Leggat 2012). The integrated response system of an 
emergency to the mass casualty is illustrated in Figure 4-5 and explained briefly in 
the following points by BU-UNWTO-Report (2014). 
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Figure 4-5. The Integrated Response System of Emergency to the Mass Casualty 
Source: BU-UNWTO- Report (2014) 
 
● In time of major incidents different organisations need to be involved. Police and 
other emergency services will set up cordons for operations in order to ensure the 
effectiveness of the collaborative work. 
● The first cordon is Inner Cordon representing the operational level that includes 
Police, Fire and Rescue, Medical Services and another specialist response. 
● The second is Outer Cordon representing the tactical level, which enables the 
emergency services to coordinate other activities like medical triage and 
ambulance loading for hospitalisation. This area provides evacuation assembly, 
body holding area and vehicle holding area. In this area there is controlled access. 
The tactical control in this area is controlling the activities carried out within the 
Inner and Outer cordons. 
● If the major incident requires governmental support, a strategic headquarter 
element can be established. This strategic coordinating committee will be 
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responsible for supporting the tactical controls with guidance and any extra 
resources and coordinating the requirements of different agencies for any wider 
response and recovery. 
Overall, managing mass casualties required all those integrated elements to save 
people’s lives. Although each organisation or responder (Health, police, fire) is 
familiar with their work, regular training (based on scenario) gathering them all will 
help enhance the system. The following three case studies present the emergency 
response to different incidents, in different countries with different languages and 
cultures. 
4.5 The Case of Costa Concordia 
The Costa Concordia was a cruise ship owned and operated by Costa Cruises, a 
subsidiary of the Anglo-American Corporation, Carnival, which is the largest 
international cruise-line with a high market share (Alexander 2012). The wreck of the 
cruise liner Costa Concordia offshore by the island of Giglio, Italy on the 13 January 
2012 is considered the most significant (Knightley 2012) and expensive shipwreck in 
Maritime history with costs exceeding US$1 billion, although there were only 32 
fatalities out of a passenger list of 4,252 (Alexander 2012). This incident reduced the 
demand for cruise ships for the most dominant companies; Carnival lost 14.1% of its 
business and the Royal Caribbean 6.9% (Howard and Stephenson 2013). 
The cruise had a planned seven-day trip from Civitavecchia to Savona and five other 
ports in the Mediterranean Sea, but the scheduled route was changed to pass near 
Giglio Island, which caused the ship to capsize after hitting hidden rocks (Raspini et 
al. 2014) as shown in Map 4.1 and Figure 4-6. Additionally, the table in Appendix 7 
lists a timeline of events associated with the wreck of the Costa Concordia. Captain 
Francesco Schettino of Costa Concordia was blamed for the incident of Costa 
Concordia because he took the ship near to the shore and then left the ship with 
passengers and crew still on board (Gallaher 2015). 
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Map 4-1.The standard route to be followed by the Costa Concordia and the 
planned route, which led to the accident. 
Source: Di Lieto (2012, p.2) 
 
 
 
Figure 4-6. The Wreck of Costa Concordia 
Source: BBC News (2016) 
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The sinking of the Costa Concordia proved that accidents can even occur in ships that 
are constructed with new and state-of-the-art technology (Schroder-Hinrichs et al. 
2012). The new technology plays a role in preventing the accidents from occurring 
like the “Track Control” which automatically steers the ship along the designated route 
from the departure port to the destination, although Costa Concordia had this feature, 
the Captain did not use it (ON COURSE Magazine 2015). There are many complex 
interacting factors involved in an accident that are seen as indirect rather than direct, 
according to Schroder-Hinrichs et al. (2012). However, Ghirix (2010) and Schroder-
Hinrichs et al. (2011) mention there is little attention paid to investigating the complex 
factors that hinder shipping operations, thus resulting in the lack of availability of 
technical and administrative solutions for any emerging problems. On the other hand, 
Di Lieto (2012) states that the sinking of the Costa Concordia was because of an 
organisational accident and according to Reason (1997) unusual occurring events, but 
when they occur it is catastrophic within complex organisations, like a product of 
technological innovation and “it applies to technological, highly hazardous and well-
defended systems” (Di Lieto 2012, p.3). It involves many factors and a large number 
of people operating at different levels of the organisation (Di Lieto 2012); this 
represents the interacting components in the open and complex system. Further 
explanation by Di Lieto (2012, p.3) suggests that the accidents which may affect an 
individual can result in affecting “uninvolved populations, assets and the 
environment” as explained in the previous chapter the complexity of an emergency 
and how one incident leads to several. The inherent situations in the accident of Costa 
Concordia according to Di Lieto (2012, p.4) are “sub-standard design of bridge 
equipment, unworkable or missing procedures, shortfalls in training, and language 
differences” that often appear in complex systems. If the plan is sufficient, but the 
actions taken to respond are not as planned, errors are considered unintentional 
(Rasmussen 1986). The causes of the Costa Concordia incident according to 
Alexander (2012, p.17-18) are listed in Table 4-8. 
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Table 4-8. The Causes of Costa Concordia Incident 
Risk management 
● Insufficient risk management by the company 
● Insufficient company policies, monitoring and application about ‘salutes’ 
● Tendency to underestimate the consequence of directional risk-taking by the captain 
and senior officers 
● Insufficient risk management for close approaches to coasts 
Planning, training and exercising 
● Failure to plan for emergencies sufficiently 
● Failure to train and exercise staff sufficiently 
● Failure to observe IMO guidelines on staff training for evacuation 
● Failure to conduct an exercise with passengers before departure 
● Extreme dependence on non-qualified entertainment and hospitality staff to direct 
evacuation 
Crisis management 
● General normalcy bias when confronted by alarming information 
● In the interests of presenting a reassuring picture of the situation, the passengers were 
given wrong information 
● Lack of timeliness in applying emergency procedures 
● Improper priorities, actions and information in communication 
● Captain’s failure to command operations, and early leaving of the ship. 
Source: Alexander (2012, p.17-18) 
After this incident international organisations and governments started an evaluation 
of regulations and laws leading to new cruise-ship Acts (www.awpagesociety 2013; 
Alexander 2012). Within a month of the catastrophe, the U.S.-based Cruise Lines 
International Association (CLIA), the Great Britain-based European Cruise Council 
(ECC), and Bas-based Passenger Shipping Association agreed a new policy that 
requires all cruise ships to run mandatory muster and safety trainings before departure 
(www.awpagesociety 2013; Alexander 2012). For example, the evacuation system of 
Costa Concordia had never been tested (Bjorkman 2014). Where around 600 
passengers who embarked from Rome did not participate in any evacuation exercises 
before the incident (www.awpagesociety 2013). Furthermore, there was a problem of 
communication between the staff leading the evacuation and passengers through the 
lack of a common or understandable language, as not all passengers spoke Italian or 
English (Alexander 2012). Nthia (2015) concludes that what happened in Costa 
Concordia and other cruise-ship incidents demonstrate the relationship between 
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language and cultural issues and their influence on effective communication. He 
mentions that effective communication between crewmembers themselves and with 
the passengers should be maintained at all time as it can enhance safety and security. 
Anstey et al. (2015) indicate that “It is estimated that 80% of SOLAS vessels have 
multinational crews, with one third of maritime accidents having cultural and/or 
linguistic attributions, significantly on the Scandinavian Star (1990), the Costa 
Concordia (2012) and the CMA CGM Florida and Chou Shan (2013), reports critical 
of crews’ language proficiencies.” Furthermore, Captain Bhargava, (2013, p.1) after 
the wreck of Costa Concordia states, “With a multinational ship crew comes 
differences in language, lifestyles, religion and culture. It is therefore not difficult to 
imagine that interpersonal conflicts due to above differences can create innumerable 
problems on board. Such conflicts are also one of the main reasons for stress among 
seafarers on ships.” The previous regulation only required the muster and safety 
trainings to be run within 24 hours of passenger embarkation (www.awpagesociety 
2013 and Alexander 2012). Additionally, the CLIA and ECC approved three new 
regulations that required more life jackets on-board, restricted access to the bridge by 
non-officers and required a bridge updating and approval process for all passage 
planning (Alexander 2012; www.awpagesociety 2013). Alexander (2012) claims 
giving passengers wrong information could easily lead to inevitable deaths and 
injuries. Essentially, the impreciseness of the messages and the inadequacy of 
evacuation processes revealed a tacit realisation that staff who may have been 
inefficiently trained in evacuation techniques and passengers who had had no exercise, 
together with the uncertainty of the situation, would not result in an organised, 
competent transfer to the lifeboats (Alexander 2012, p.14). To support the emergency 
response, this incident contributes to building complex and unique scenarios (Raspini 
et al. 2014). 
4.6 Case study of MV Sewol Korean Ferry 
One of the biggest tragedies in modern Korean history is the capsizing of the Sewol 
Ferry in 16 April 2014, near the southern island of Jindo (Lee et al. 2016; Felden 2015) 
(See Figure 4-7). It was carrying 475 people including around 300 high school 
students going on a field trip, only 172 were rescued including 75 students (Lee et al. 
2016; the Guardian 2015; Anderson 2014). In addition to the passengers, the ferry was 
overloaded with cargo and many unrequired passenger recorders (Ramage 2015; The 
Guardian 2015). These were considered the main factors behind the disaster in addition 
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to the “poor securing of cargo, and lower than recommended ballast” (Safety and 
Shipping Review 2015, p.16) and to “lax safety standards and regulatory failings in 
South Korea” (The guardian 2015, p.1). 
 
 
Figure 4-7. The Accident of MV Sewol Korean Ferry 
Source: Song (2016) 
 
The ferry disaster investigators of the Sewol ferry declared that their slow response 
had the effect of increasing the number of deaths (Ramage 2015) (See Figure 4-8 
Shows the timeline of the incident). It was claimed that the coast guard emergency 
postponed early rescue efforts by asking for coordinates when they received a call 
from an on-board student’s mobile phone (Ramage 2015). In addition, the vessel 
traffic controllers are blamed for their inability to locate the ferry after it was drifting 
from its designated route towards another dangerous way (Ramage 2015). As it is clear 
from Figure 4-8. that the first helicopter rescue arrived when the ship had already 
capsized. In addition, commenting on the Sewol, Global Head of Marine Ris 
Consulting, AGCS, Captain Rahul Khanna adds: “The swift rulings and stringent 
sentences passed on the crew, the manager, the owner, the sates officials and the 
stevedores and a very strong message to substandard operators in that part of the world 
that when you are involved with passenger vessels, substandard operations will not be 
tolerated. Nobody should be spread for abdicating their responsibilities, especially 
when it comes to safety” (Safety and Shipping Review 2015, p.16). During the disaster 
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the captain was accused of abandoning the passengers and said he did not know that 
his action would create this massive disaster with many deaths and the crewmembers 
also were accused for their reaction of escaping the sinking ship while the passengers 
are still on-board (Anderson 2014). Many surviving students said that they did not 
remember receiving an order to evacuate, but instead were asked to stay on the sinking 
ferry. The students took things into their own hands and helped each other leave the 
ship. However, the captain said that he did announce an evacuation order for 
passengers, but he suspended it because rescuers were on their way and he was 
concerned for passenger safety in the cold water (Anderson 2014). 
 
Figure 4-8. The Timeline of the Accident 
Source: Song (2016) 
 
This disaster was a turning point leading to the Korean national disaster response and 
recovery system being reviewed and changed (Lee et al. 2016). According to Anderson 
(2014) after this incident the South Korean politicians acknowledged new plans to 
transfer the responsibilities of the coastguard to other government agencies because 
they were criticised for their slow response. Also, a new Department of Homeland 
Security was established instead of the coastguard. In addition to this, they introduced 
and circulated new safety regulations. Shin et al. (2015) in their study of establishing 
an effective fire prevention and response system, in order to improve disaster response 
systems, did run many activities for a duration of seven months including; first, fire 
safety training on using fire extinguishers and how to evacuate in case of a fire; second, 
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fire evacuation scenarios and simulations were carried out for each department of 
Seoul National University Hospital; third creating a task force for fire safety 
management; fourth forming a support team well trained for evacuating patients who 
need cautious care; fifth, establishing an electronic medical record classifying patients 
A, B and C in order to easily categorise and locate patients according to the evacuation 
priority; and finally, drafting, handing out and posting required information in many 
places and guidance of important things to remember regarding evacuations in case of 
a fire. On the other side, based on 36 interviews done by Lee et al. (2015 cited in ISTSS 
2015, p.8) with emergency responders including (psychologists, psychiatrists, social 
workers and nurses) who were involved in the immediate response to the Sewol Ferry 
incident in order to investigate how the current emergency mental health service 
system actually worked and what could be enhanced; found that “there is a strong need 
for specialized training regarding disaster mental health as they felt a lack of self-
efficacy to deal with disastrous situations”. IFSMA (2015) recommends introducing a 
systematic mental-health screening because these kinds of “incidents can cause 
incredible damage to human life. Secondly, role conflicts among different agencies 
during the emergency intervention process were reported. Due to the lack of a 
consensus on who the controller was, there was much role confusion among service 
providers as well as inefficient sharing of their resources. Positive aspects were also 
reported such as increased awareness of disaster related interventions and developing 
a community-based emergency response system during non-disaster periods” (Lee et 
al. 2015 cited in ISTSS 2015, p.8). 
4.7 Case study of Norman Atlantic 
In difficult sea conditions the Italian Owned ferry, Norman Atlantic faced a fire, which 
had broken out on one of the car decks of the ferry, on 28 December 2014 in Greek 
Territorial waters, when sailing from Greece to Italy (See Figure 4-9). This resulted 
in the deaths of 11 people and injuring hundreds (Ramage 2015; Vario et al. 2015; 
Safety, Shipping Review 2015; Gallaher 2015). However, many victims died because 
they jumped in the sea where the water was cold and according to information from 
the Italian investigators and the medical examiner, those who jumped in the sea may 
have been attacked by sharks (Skordas 2015). Italy declared that around 447 
passengers and crew were carried out by helicopters to the nearest boats while facing 
strong winds (Ramage 2015). In addition to the passengers, the ship was carrying 
around 128 trucks among 200 vehicles (Gallaher 2015, p.3). It seems that the vessel 
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was overloaded with trucks and cars as Ramage (2015) mentions that it is common in 
the car-ferry system that most ferries exceed the limits and carry more than their full 
capacity with around 20% extra weight on every trip. It was believed that the fire broke 
out in one of the trucks and it overwhelmed the ship, as 477 persons on board outside 
were faced with black smoke (Gallaher 2015; Zikakou 2015). 
 
 
Figure 4-9. Distress Position and Ship Abandonment 
Source: M/V Norman Atlantic Final Investigation Report (2014) 
 
According to Wang et al. (2004) fire hazard in cruise ship result from fuel leakages, 
electrical cables malfunction, engine room troubles or catering and is considered as 
the worst scenario in the shipping industry because of the high number of fatalities and 
destructive damage to the environment. When a fire breaks out on a cruise ship, 
passengers are highly exposed to many hazardous gases and materials like carbon 
dioxide, methane, chlorofluorocarbons, aerosols, nitrogen oxides, sulphur oxides, 
carbon monoxide, in addition to the sight invisibility because of the smoke (Vairo et 
al. 2015). “Passengers reported that the deck with lifeboats were hot enough to cause 
shoes to melt. Eventually flames would reach the lifeboats destroying them” (Gallaher 
2015, p.3). 
The search and rescue operation in this incident was not easy because of the bad 
weather conditions with low temperatures, rough sea waves and strong winds 
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according to Skordas (2015). Ramage (2015) found the difficulty in counting the 
number of rescued, dead and missing people because there were many immigrants who 
boarded illegally. These immigrants escaped from the war in Syria, Afghanistan and 
Iraq and sneaked into the vessel and sometimes paid the truck drivers money in order 
to hide in their trucks (Zikakou 2015). Makris (2015) mentions one of the faults in this 
incident was that the captain had activated the alarm only for the crew only in order to 
investigate the ferry whilst ignoring the central alarm system. According to Italian 
newspapers that Captain Argilio Giacomazzi state “crews did not follow his orders in 
lowering the lifeboats and admitted that the car deck held too many vehicles, contrary 
to manufacturers specifications” (Ramage 2015, p.7). Some passengers who escaped 
before the Italian assault ship came to the rescue reported that some crewmembers 
were the first to have left the ferry after the fire on a lifeboat “amid suspicion that this 
incident is quickly appearing to be one of corporate manslaughter and corporate 
negligence” (Ramage 2015, p.5). Makris (2015) highlights the recommendations of 
the union representatives in the press conference that was conducted in Athens, the 
need to re-evaluate the investigation safety standards to protect human lives at sea and 
learning from the past experience of this incident and other accidents. Additionally, 
there should be a focus on the communication between captain, crew, passengers, 
responsible authorities and relative of the victims as according to Zikakou (2015) the 
daughter of a missing passenger mentioned the difficulty in communicating with the 
Italian authorities because of the language. The case of the Norman Atlantic left behind 
unanswered questions for more consideration by the maritime community including: 
(1) “the effectiveness of port security measures, (2) the challenges of mass evacuation 
under sever conditions and (3) the ongoing criminalization of the shipmaster 
immediately after the incident” (IFSMA 2015, p.6). According to Dr. Sven Gerhard, 
Global Product leader Hull and Marine Liabilities, AGCS “what we have seen from 
the Sewol, and what we have so far heard from the Norman Atlantic, is that, in many 
cases, construction of the vessel is not always the only weak point. Levels of crew 
experience, training and emergency preparedness can also often be inadequate, and 
this can be crucial, particularly on these types of vessels” (Safety and Shipping Review 
2015, p.16). 
4.8 Summary 
This chapter began with a general overview of the cruise-ship industry and the 
development of the market. It discussed planning and managing incidents that might 
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occur during cruising. It highlighted the case studies of Costa Concordia, MV Sewol 
Korea Ferry and Norman Atlantic and what was wrong with the responses to those 
incidents. It found that advanced and collaborative planning between different 
stakeholders, intensive training for staff on how to deal with such incidents and 
conducting exercises, such as evacuation drills pre-departure could all have helped by 
improving the response times. Besides the cruise construction, which is considered a 
cause in the accident, other things to consider are the levels of crew experience, 
training and emergency preparedness measures. The next chapter will highlight the 
specific topic of this study: the case study of Oman to tackle the emergency response 
system in order to evaluate its capabilities when dealing with different incidents. 
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: Case Study of Oman 
5.1 Introduction 
The importance of the tourism industry to Oman is in increasing the GDP and 
providing employment opportunities. The first objective of this chapter is to provide a 
general overview about the sultanate of Oman in terms of location and population. The 
chapter then provides information about the tourism industry and the cruise ship 
specifically in Oman. Finally, it highlights the emergency management system in 
Oman. 
5.2 Overview of Oman and the Tourism Industry 
Oman is one of the oldest independent states in the Gulf area founded in 1650 (FCO 
2006). The strategic location of the Sultanate of Oman has determined its political and 
economic development (Ministry of Information 2009). It is located in the south-
eastern edge of the Arabian Peninsula, covering an area of 309,500 square kilometres 
(see Map 5-1) (Ministry of Information 2012). It shares borders in the southwest with 
the Republic of Yemen, in the west with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and in the north 
with the United Arab Emirates (Ministry of Information 2011). Its coastline extends 
for 3,165 kilometres from the Arabian Sea and the entrance to the Indian Ocean in the 
far southwest to the Sea of Oman and Musandam, where at the entrance to the Gulf, it 
oversees the strategic Strait of Hormuz (Ministry of Information 2009). There are 
many small islands that are scattered in the Sea of Oman and in the Strait of Hormuz, 
including Salamah, as well as Masirah and the Hallaniyat Islands, in addition to other 
small islands in the Arabian Sea (Ministry of Information 2012). The total population 
in Oman according to the National Centre for statistics and Information (2018) is 
around 4,671,230 people including 2,570,772 Omanis (55%) and 2,100,458 
expatriates (45%). This population is distributed in 11 Governorates that each has its 
own characteristic administrative, geographical and economic weight and consists of 
several Wilayats (districts), there are a total of 61 Wilayats in Oman (Ministry of 
Information 2012). 
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Map 5-1.  Map of Oman 
Source: http://geology.com/world/oman-satellite-image.shtml 
 
The outstanding and diverse nature in the geographical features of different regions in 
Oman among wadis, mountains, beaches, lagoons and deserts make it a tourist 
destination that attracts many tourists annually (Ministry of Information 2012). 
According to Mintel (2013) it is known as one of the most attractive and fastest-
growing tourist destinations. In addition to these elements, there are other factors that 
could attract the international tourism market, such as; friendly and hospitable people, 
rich culture, and long history (Pearson International limited 2002 cited in Al-Azri and 
Morrison 2006) as well as the safety and the security of the country. According to the 
Travel and Tourism Competitiveness Index 2017 Oman ranked number 4 in safety and 
security out of 136 countries around the world. The first initiative taken by the Omani 
Government towards opening the country to international tourists dated back to 1980, 
when His Majesty Sultan Qaboos stated; “It has long been our intention that our 
economy should be also diversified that our dependence on the one source – oil- is 
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reduced. To do this, we must exploit our country resources and our industrial potential 
to be full” (Oman 1991, p. 78-79 cited in Winkler 2007). The country’s main sources 
of incomes were agriculture, fishing, camel and goats herding and handcrafts, until the 
discovery of the oil (Umar 2016). Due to the downturn in the oil prices in 2015 the 
country had a deficit of $8.57 billion, forcing the government to raise corporate taxes, 
increase fuel prices and visa fees (Umar 2016). Thus, the government is diversifying 
the sources of the economy instead of depending on oil through five economic sectors: 
tourism, logistics, manufacturing, mining and fisheries (Umar 2016). Therefore, the 
Omani Authorities in order to diversify the source of national income with other than 
the oil took slow, but, careful steps to exploit the natural and man-made resources to 
develop tourism in the country and establish a good reputation as a tourist destination 
worldwide (Winkler 2007). To attract the international visitors and investors, the visa 
procedures were facilitated in late 1980s according to Feighery (2012). Recently, in 
order to facilitate the tourist’s visit to Oman and the neighbouring Gulf countries are 
adopting a new visa system to produce a joint visa that allow tourists to obtain visa 
entry to Oman and other Gulf countries (Umar 2016). Moreover, in 1995 the Omani 
government adapted a long-term socio-economic development plan called “Oman 
2020” which highlights the tourism development as a major aim (Winkler 2007) with 
an intention of reaching 5% of the tourism sector contribution in the national economy 
by the year 2020 according to Times of Oman (2015). Adding to that, a Ministry of 
Tourism was established in 2004 to manage all tourism activities (Ministry of 
Information 2009), which in turn developed a comprehensive plan for the tourism 
sector in Oman called “priority Action Plan” (Feighery 2012). One of the Ministry of 
Tourism plans is to attract more than five million international visitors annually by 
2040 and increase the industry contribution to 6% (Umar 2016; Thompson 2016) by 
improving the tourism infrastructure all around the country, adding more projects in 
the field and increasing hotel rooms (PART 2016). In addition to this, completing the 
airport and transport network around the country, such as Muscat and Salalah 
International Airports increasing the capacity of Port of Sultan Qaboos in Muscat to 
receive more cruise ships, and the new opening of the Oman Convention Centre in the 
capital Muscat for business travellers (PART 2016). According to the Minister of 
Tourism the Omani strategy for tourism is aiming to increase the tourism contribution 
to the GDP as sources of income and reduce the dependency on oil as a major source 
of national income (TimesofOman.com 2015). Thus, the Ministry of Tourism is 
developing many tourist projects in different governorates in the country 
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(TimesofOman.com 2015). He added that the strategy of tourism development is based 
on two purposes; the first is enhancing tourist facilities and the second is enhancing 
tourist experiences in order for them to stay longer (TimesofOman.com 2015). Today, 
the Omani government is gaining benefits of the tourism industry as it is clear from 
the total contribution of the tourism industry to GDP in 2014 was R.O 724.5 million, 
or 2.2% and it is aiming to reach 6% of GDP by 2040 (The reality of Omani Tourism 
(NCSI 2016). The total number of inbound visitors to Oman were 1.1 million in 2005, 
1.5 million in 2010 and 3.2 million in 2016 (NCSI 2017) (see Figure 5-1). The total 
number of visitors in 2016 increased by 16.2% to 3,042,695 from 2,618,618 in 2015 
and the expenditure has increased likewise from 227.3 in 2013 to 250.9 in 2014 and to 
288.2 in 2015 (NCSI 2015; Ministry of Tourism 2017). In terms of the purpose of 
travel, visiting friends and relatives ranked top with 41.9%, followed by 33.5% for 
leisure and recreation and 17.7% for business (NCSI 2017) (see Figure 5-1). 
According to the National Centre for Statistics and Information (NCSI), (2017) the 
percentage of leisure and recreation has dropped after it was 47% in 2010. This might 
due to the recent incidents occurring in the Middle Eastern area such as the many 
terrorism attacks in different Arab countries (e.g. Syria, Tunisia). These visitors are 
coming from different origins as Figure 5-2 shows. 
 
Figure 5-1. Number of Inbound Visitors and Purpose of Visit 2016 
Source: NCSI (2017, p.26) 
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Figure 5-2. Number of Inbound Visitors by Nationality Group 2016 
Source: NCSI (2017, p.30) 
 
Moreover, the total inbound tourism expenditure in 2016 was 319.0 million, a 10.3 
surge from 289.2 million in 2015. The expenditures were distributed as following 37.3 
% on accommodation services, 25.9% on air transport service, 14.9% on food and 
beverage and 11.1% on shopping for percentage and expenditures distributed in OMR 
(NCSI 2017). The total tourism production in 2016 was 1.20 billion (OMR) of which 
319.0 million (26.5%) was from inbound tourism and the remaining 882.5 million 
(73.5%) originated from domestic tourism (NCSI 2017) see Figure 5-3. 
The total number of hotels in Oman in 2016 reached 340 hotels; 195 are one-star 
hotels, 77 are two-stars, 26 are three-stars, 27 are four-stars and 15 are five-star hotels.  
(NCSI 2017). Tourism contributes to the economy by creating jobs and according to 
the NCSI (2017) in 2016 the total number of employees working in hotel activities 
were 12,441 about 29.2% Omani and 70.8% non-Omani. This increase in the number 
of visitors might refer to the rapid development in the wider tourism industry recently 
(oxfordbusinessgroup.com 2017). It might also refer to the new strategy of tourism 
launched in 2016, regional geo-political factors and international trends in luxury 
tourism (oxfordbusinessgroup.com 2017). In addition, the strong reputation of the 
country as a safe destination was behind the increase in European tourists 
(oxfordbusinessgroup.com 2017). Another reason is the digital marketing campaign 
launched in late 2017 to reach different markets like Europe, China and India 
(oxfordbusinessgroup.com 2017). This campaign was acknowledged when the 
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Ministry of Tourism got the “Best Usage of Social Media” award at the Arab Travel 
Market Expo 2017 held in Dubai (oxfordbusinessgroup.com 2017). The country has 
been promoted as the best responsible tourism destination by constituting green lodges 
and heritage houses (oxfordbusinessgroup.com 2017). In addition to these 
achievements, the promotion strategy of the Ministry of Tourism including 
establishing representative offices in countries that supply the largest number of 
tourists like the UK, Australia, and Germany (Ministry of Information 2011). Overall, 
the rich natural and man-made resources attract tourists with different interests, so they 
are coming for different purposes like business, heritage, culture or cruises. 
Over the past few years cruise tourism has witnessed a steady growth making it one of 
the fastest growing sectors in terms of tourists visiting the country (Nair 2017, p.1). 
The Ministry of Tourism has been promoting the country to the cruise market because 
it sees that they are the gateway to discover the rich culture and the beauty of Oman 
(TimesofOman.com 2017). According to a managing director of one of the travel 
agencies in Oman, “Oman has a huge potential for cruise tourism because visitors see 
Oman as the safest place in the region” (TimesofOman.com 2017, p.1). According to 
him, many cruise tourists come back to visit the country for a longer stay after their 
short cruise holiday, thus this market should be treated as an important segment of the 
market tourism industry (TimesofOman.com 2016). Due to this, there were many 
promotional campaigns launched in order to promote Oman as cruise destination, for 
example the Ministry of Tourism has worked jointly with Tourism Directorates of 
Dubai and Abu Dhabi to promote and introduce the Gulf area for cruise lines under 
one umbrella called Cruise Arabia (Ministry of Tourism 2017). Furthermore, cruise 
industry will also contribute in creating more job opportunities for locals and small 
and medium enterprises (TimesofOman.com 2016a, 2016b). For example, many four-
wheel drives, taxis and busses are required to transport the tourists to different 
attractions in the country; in addition, multi-lingual tour guides are necessary 
(TimesofOman.com 2016a, 2016b). In 2014 there were 109 cruises anchored at Sultan 
Qaboos Port compared to 2015 were the number of cruises increased to 135 
representing a 23.8% increase (TimesofOman.com  2017). The number of cruisers has 
increased from 125,375 (2014) to 148,000 (2015) (Tourism Index Report 2015). 
Figure 5-3 shows the cruise tourists statistics from October 2015 to June 2016. The 
Figure shows the total number of cruise passengers who visited the country (215,266) 
and those who were planning to visit the country until June 2016 (165,000). It also 
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shows the number of current and to be made calls in all tourist ports of the country in 
Muscat Sultan Qaboos Port, Khasab Port and Salalah Port. The total number of vessels 
are also presented in the Figure 5-3 that are 129 visited and 99 to be visited. According 
to the National Centre for statistics and information in January 2017 around 46,000 
cruise ship visitors visited Oman, among them 88% were from Europe and out of that 
27% were Germens (TimesofOman.com 2017). Representative from the Ministry of 
Tourism declared the increase in the number of cruise ships in 2015-16 to 230 
international cruise lines from 187 in 2014-15 and 177 in 2013-14 (Yousuf 2017). 
According to a representative from the Ministry of Tourism the cruise tourist spending 
was $100 (ROM 38), therefore the increase in the number of cruise tourists will result 
in an economic surge (Yousuf 2017). 
 
Figure 5-3. Cruise Tourists (October 2015-June 2016) 
Source: http://timesofoman.com/article/77851 (2016) 
 
Many international cruises visited the country in 2017 like Seabourn Encore, AIDA 
stella, MV Minerva, Oceania Nautica, Azamara Journey, Seven Seas Voyager, Crystal 
Symphony, Celebrity Constellation, Mein Schff5 Costa Cruises, MSC Cruises, TUI 
Cruises, Carnival Cruises, the Royal Caribbean Cruises, Fred Olsen cruise and Anthem 
of Seas (TimesofOman.com 2016a; Nair 2017; TimesofOman.com 2017; Yousuf 
2017). Some cruises when visiting Oman, follow a round trip from Dubai, to Bahrain 
and to Oman (TimesofOman.com 2017). The three main ports receiving cruises ships 
in Oman are Sultan Qaboos Port, Khasab Port and Salalah Port (See Map 5-2 for the 
cruise routes and the location of each port). Sultan Qaboos Port is the main port for 
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cruise liners and it is located in Muttrah in the Capital of Muscat, in addition there are 
other two ports in Khasab (Musandam) and Salalah (Dhofar) in the South (Marhaba 
Oman 2015). According to The Telegraph the Sultan Qaboos Port was considered as 
one of the World’s most beautiful Ports in 2014 (Telegraph 2014). The Ministry of 
tourism has added many facilities and activities for the cruise ship visitors in the ports 
(Sultan Qaboos Port, Khasab Port and Salalah Port) to enjoy such as different water 
sport activities ranging from diving and surfing to traditional boating experiences 
(TimesofOman.com 2017). One of the challenges mentioned by one of the shipping 
agent director is that “liners are constructing larger ships, with larger lengths and hence 
ports will have to be modernized with longer berths and marine equipment to safely 
handle these ships” (TimesofOman.com 2017). The country is now developing the 
waterfront of Sultan Qaboos Port which will give a boost to the cruise ship business 
(TimesofOman.com 2016a). 
 
Map 5-2.  Ports Location and Cruise Route 
(Author 2018) 
 
All these efforts and resources are not separated from the effect of the internal and 
external (natural and human-induced) emergencies as well as this, tourism can be a 
…… Cruise Route
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source of threat to a country; therefore, there should be consideration and planning to 
protect the tourists, locals and resources. The position of Oman as a destination in the 
model of the area life cycle of Butler (1980) is in the development stage as shown in 
Figure 5-4. The reasons for placing Oman in the development stage are the tourism 
industry is becoming a vital source of income, the increasing number tourists, the 
establishment of many projects and the attraction of more investments. 
 
Figure 5-4. Positioning Oman in the Butler Model 
Source: Adapted After Butler (1980) 
 
This stage requires more safety and security procedures and increasing the awareness 
of disasters among the industry stakeholders, in order to maintain its market share and 
attract more investments. As clarified in chapter three, the tourism system consists of 
many components (Leiper 1979) and any disorder in one of them will affect the others 
(Henderson 2007; Ritchie 2009). If natural or human-induced hazards affect tourism, 
it will affect negatively the destination image according to Huan et al. (2004); 
therefore, affecting tourists’ perceptions may results in a negative economic impact 
(Paraskevas and Arendell 2007). Contrary to this, a positive image can contribute to a 
positive reputation in the long-term and thereby increase the popularity of the 
destination (Paraskevas and Arendell 2007). Paraskevas and Arendell (2007) declared 
that showing tourists the preparedness of the destination to any incident would have 
positive effect on its image, which results positively on the local economy; this model 
was used to examine the impact of crises on tourism destinations by Hitchock and 
Putra (2005) after the Bali bombing in 2002, and by Cohen (2008) to examine the 
Oman
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effect of the tsunami on Thailand. Similarly, Moss et al. (2003) have used the model 
for two terrorist acts; the Twin Towers in New York and the Madrid train bombing. 
The next section highlights the emergency management system in Oman, in order to 
tackle how emergencies in tourism are managed in the country. 
5.3 Emergency Management System in Oman 
Al Hajri (2011) indicates that Oman is vulnerable to both natural and human induced 
hazards. For example, the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters 
(CRED, cited in Al-Shaqsi 2010) highlighted some of the major natural and man-made 
disasters that have happened in Oman over the last 50 years; country-wide heavy rain 
and floods in 1977, floods in Salalah 2003, the Nizwa bus crash in 2004, Cyclone 
Gonu in 2007, and the collapse of a building in Muscat in 2008. As the country is 
witnessing rapid economic growth and most of the economic projects are located in 
the coastal areas, this makes the people who are working there vulnerable to all kinds 
of incidents, such as industrial incidents, major road accidents, and epidemics (Al Hajri 
2011). He added the country’s location exposes it to many types of natural risks, such 
as: cyclones, floods, tsunamis, earthquakes and heat waves (Al Hajri 2011). The 
Sultanate has been working to manage emergencies since the beginning of the modern 
Omani renaissances when his Majesty assumed control of country in 1970. According 
to NCCD (2016) in 1988 the responsibility of handling any emergency was managed 
by four governmental departments (the Royal Oman Police, Ministry of Social Affairs, 
Ministry of Health, and Ministry of Interior). These organisations constituted two 
national emergency management committees called “The National Committee for 
Emergencies” and “The National Committee for Natural Disasters”, they were later 
merged in 1999 into one committee to form the National Committee for Civil Defence 
(NCCD) which was only a small department, succeeding from the Civil Defence 
Directorate (CDD) of Royal Omani Police (ROP) (NCCD 2016). In the year 2002, the 
NCCD detached from the CDD and became a distinct entity under the ROP with an 
executive office to run its operations (NCCD 2016). Later in the year 2003 in order to 
make sure that the preparedness level in the country is at a good level, 8 specialised 
regional-level committees were formed under the NCCD in each region of the 
Sultanate (NCCD 2016). In the same year 2003, the ROP formed 7 specialised national 
emergency response teams; the media sector and public awareness, search and rescue, 
relief and shelter, emergency medical services, basic services sector, victims and 
missing persons affairs sector, and chemical response team (Al Shaqsi 2011). His 
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Majesty Sultan Qaboos ordered reforms in the NCCD after Gonu Cyclone in 2007 to 
become a more proactive entity rather than reactive and to equip it with the needed 
tools and equipment to enable it to do its roles to the fullest (NCCD 2016). It can be 
noticed that the development of the Omani emergency management system was 
subjected to the disasters that affected the country, which shows careful attention from 
the government to protect the people and the nation’s resources. In 2008 after the effect 
of the Guno Cyclone, the NCCD again reformed to be chaired by the Inspector General 
of Police and Customs and directed by deputy inspector general of police and customs 
and members from different governmental organisations in Figure 5-5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-5. Organisational Chart of NCCD 
(NCCD 2016) 
 
President: 
Inspector General of Police and 
Customs 
Executive Office  
Ministries: 
 1. Finance.	2. Education.	3. Information.	4. Regional	Municipalities	&	water	Recourses.	5. Social	Development	6. Health.	7. Transport	 &	Communication.	8. Interior.	9. Muscat	municipality	10. Dhofar	Municipality.	11. Trade	and	Industry.	12. Housing.	13. Oil	and	Gas.	14. Environment	&	Climate.	15. Agriculture	&	Fisheries.	16. Governorate	of	Muscat.		
Security & Military Organisations: 
 1. The	Sultan’s	Armed	Forces.	2. Joint	Security	Operations.	3. Public	Authority	 for	Civil	Defense	and	Ambulance.		
Civil society agencies 
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The latest structure of the NCCD enables it to carry out many tasks and responsibilities 
in all 11 Governorates around the country. The NCCD it is responsible for illustration 
of the key protocols and policies for governmental departments in a national 
emergency, designing of national disaster management plans, development, 
maintenance, supervision of the work of sub-committees in all Governorates, and 
gauging the role and participation of subcommittees in the Civil Defence response. 
However, Al Hajri (2011) and Al Shaqsi (2011) mention some challenges in the 
National Disaster management System in Oman. These are it is a reactive rather than 
proactive, there are some issues related to communication and coordination among the 
involved agencies, there is no national database that can be shared between different 
organisations, there is an overlap of some roles who is in charge of certain things, there 
is a limited involvement of the private sector and NGOs and the local community is 
not involved. Al Shaqsi (2011, p.12) states, “The response to emergencies in Oman 
follows a tiered system. The local level response is under-developed and field 
observations from recent natural disasters indicate that local authorities are unprepared 
to handle emergencies and therefore regional and national support is almost always 
needed.” The work of the system has been designed and explained by the Royal 
Decrees of his Majesty, the Civil Defence Law number 76/1991 (MLA 1991), and the 
State of Emergency Law number 75/2008 (MLA 2008) as they divided the incidents 
into minor and major, while the response is divided into four levels; Local “Bronze”, 
Regional “Silver”, National “gold”, and International “black” (Figure 5-6) (Al Shaqsi 
2011; NCCD 2016). The first two response levels of international and national are 
dealing with major incidents, while regional and local levels are responsible for 
dealing with minor incidents. In the highest-level, black lead by His Majesty, cases at 
international level are dealt with. While the gold level includes representatives like 
NCCD to deal with natural disasters and the Committee for Joint Security Operations 
(CJSO) to deal with security crisis. Both committees follow the National Security 
Council (NSC), which is responsible for supervising all authorities in all the phases of 
emergencies; risk reduction, readiness, response, and recovery. The local and regional 
response levels deal with minor emergencies by providing the local requirements and 
measuring hazards in coordination with local governors and other representatives from 
different authorities within the governorate like police and health, etc., and the NCCD. 
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Figure 5-6. The Omani Emergency Response System 
Source: Amended from NCCD (2016) 
 
The response process according to the NCCD (2016) is managed by seven sectors 
(Table 5-1) that were identified to manage different types of emergencies and to cope 
with any event at any stage. 
Table 5-1. Sectors of NCCD 
Sector Name  Tasks 
The Media and 
Public awareness 
Sector 
● Management of notifying conditions 
● Issue the warnings and guidance to reduce the effect of the 
condition 
● Increase the public awareness regarding the severity of the 
condition 
Search and Rescue 
Sector 
● Regulating and coordinating the search and rescue operations (in 
land, marine and air help) 
● Supporting the capabilities and potentials in this field 
Relief and Shelter 
Sector 
● Providing and managing shelter centre 
● Providing store and transport 
● Distributing required resources like water, food, clothes, medicine 
and others  
Medical Response 
and Public Health 
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● Providing the healthcare and treating the victims 
● Dealing with the affections, diseases and epidemics 
● Retaining the medical and treatment facilities  
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Basic Services 
Sector  
● Making sure the return of basic services and send them to the 
affected areas  
Hazardous 
Material Sector  
● Responding to an accident of dangerous substances (radiation, 
chemical and biological) 
Victims and 
Missing Persons 
Affairs Sector 
● Receiving the enquiries and notifications about the victims and 
missing persons 
● Providing the related information to deal with their relatives 
● Identifying the victims  
Source: NCCD (2016) 
As it is clear from the previous paragraphs about the emergency management system 
in Oman and the Executive office of NCCD roles and responsibilities that this system 
can be criticised for several reasons. First, the focus and the efforts of the executive 
office are directed towards the response phase, although managing an emergency 
passes through different phases of mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. It 
is more reactive than proactive, as it should be. The old structure is also criticised 
because it is not easy for the executive office with its response sectors in Table 5-1 to 
assign every single and potential hazard for each sector or organisation in the country 
and prepare a preparedness measure. So, participants should be involved from the 
earlier stages in each system. So, they should identify the potential hazards, they 
should prepare for it, respond in time of emergency and recover from it. The executive 
office can help them with consultation for the mitigation measures, revise their plans 
and help them to provide the identified resources for response. For example, the 
executive office cannot identify all the possible hazards that might affect the tourism 
industry, how to prepare for them and respond to them. The tourism sector is more 
familiar in identifying its potential hazards. Third, in the response sectors responders 
should not only be familiar with their roles, but should also know and understand the 
roles of others, which facilitate interaction (Alexander 2016). Fourth, these response 
sectors were constituted after Guno cyclone, so they have been selected based on what 
was needed to be done not based on previous identification of hazards or preparedness. 
Although this research has highlighted the need for the tourism industry to be fully 
engaged in the emergency system management, it can be seen from the structure of the 
NCCD that there is no seat for the Ministry of Tourism. This is in direct contrast to the 
country’s economic plan, which recognises how an important and promising sector 
like tourism should exist at every stage of emergency management or planning. 
Furthermore, the private sector that works under the tourism sector umbrella, like 
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hotels, tour operators, travel agencies, transport companies and cruise ships should 
also be part of the emergency systems. So, if they are not involved, they will remain 
unprepared and unaware of what might happen as well as depending on the executive 
office of the NCCD to handle any incident. Moreover, even the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs has no seat, which raises the question of how the country will react in the case 
of an incident that affects international tourists visiting the country and who will 
contact their embassies. Thus, the participation of these Ministries is important, 
especially in the planning stage. Overall the NCCD is the organisation responsible in 
Oman for handling the natural and human-induced hazards in cooperation with many 
agencies and authorities, whether affecting the country generally, or the tourism sector 
specifically. 
5.4 Summary 
This chapter highlighted the location of Oman, its population and the current situation 
of the emergency management systems and the tourism industry. Although the country 
is working towards developing tourism as a source of income and increasing the 
number of projects in order to attract more tourists, the Ministry of Tourism has no 
seat in the National Committee for Civil Defence with other Ministries. As tourism 
can be affected by different types of hazards, it can be a source of economic threat in 
the face of negative events. Thus, the system of managing emergencies was explained, 
specifically with respect to the tourism industry. Finally, the main authorities 
responsible for providing a well-protected maritime environment for cruise ships were 
outlined. 
  
		134	
: Research Approach 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains the methods that have been used. It starts with addressing the 
research aim and the related objectives, by identifying how each research question is 
addressed to achieve the research objectives. The research philosophy (interpretivism and 
subjectivism) is discussed together with the rationale for the selection of the appropriate 
methodology (qualitative and inductive). The chapter sets out the procedure used in 
designing the survey instrument and collecting the data using semi-structured interviews. 
The chapter also provides the sample selection and the data analysis strategies (thematic 
and content analysis). Finally, it emphasises the ethical considerations, highlights 
reliability and validity whilst identifying the limitations of the study. 
6.2 The Research Aim and Objectives 
The purpose of this study is to develop the concept of an integrated emergency 
response system for the tourism industry, using a building block scenario in the context 
of complexity. The objectives of this study are: 
● To critically review complexity in relation to emergency response planning; 
● To draw on the complex adaptive system similarities within the tourism industry; 
● To examine the specific challenges presented by the cruise-ship industry when 
undertaking emergency responses; 
● To evaluate the capability of the emergency response system of Oman when 
responding to emergency scenarios on or off shore; 
● To identify European cruise lines’ capabilities, requirements and challenges when 
responding to emergency scenarios near to, or alongside, a destination; 
● To develop the concept of an integrated emergency response system for the 
tourism industry. 
The first objective was addressed in chapter two by reviewing complexity, complexity 
theory and complex system to gain a broad insight into the nature of emergencies. In 
addition, it discussed planning and planning theory in order to establish the context for 
planning for emergencies with focus on strategic and scenario planning. Then, the 
chapter highlighted the four stages of emergency management with focus on the 
response phase. The third chapter fulfilled the second objective by explaining how the 
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tourism system works as a complex adaptive system. It also highlighted required 
components to ensure the effectiveness of the emergency response system and its 
resilience. The third objective was addressed in chapter four by discussing the cases 
of Costa Concordia, MV Sewol Korean Ferry and Norman Atlantic, to highlight the 
challenges faced by cruise ships when responding to emergencies. The identification 
of the local capabilities of the emergency response system in the fourth objective were 
fulfilled through the semi-structured interviews in Oman. The fifth objective, with 
respect to identifying capabilities, requirements and challenges for European cruise 
lines, was fulfilled through the online semi-structured interviews. The last objective 
was achieved through the research outcome by developing the concept of an integrated 
emergency response system for the tourism industry. 
6.3 Research Questions 
The main research question is How to develop the concept of an integrated 
emergency response system for the tourism industry? 
1. What are the emergency response system capabilities within Oman when 
responding to an emergency on or off shore? 
2. How can emergency management services assist the tourism industry in Oman? 
3. How can the Omani tourism sector assist and enhance emergency response 
capabilities? 
4. How can the Omani tourism sector be better integrated with emergency response 
planning? 
5. What capabilities and capacities do cruise ships have when responding to 
emergency scenarios near to, or alongside, a destination? 
6. What additional capabilities and capacities do cruise ships require from a 
destination’s emergency services and local authorities in the event of an emergency 
scenario? 
7. What are the potential deficits that might challenge cruise ships as a result of an 
analysis of their requirements within the given scenarios? 
6.4 Research Philosophy 
Research philosophy according to Wilson (2010) relates to the development of 
knowledge and contains assumptions as to how the researcher views the world. 
Saunder et al (2016, p.124) define research philosophy as “a system of beliefs and 
assumptions about the development of knowledge”. These assumptions might relate 
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to the human knowledge called epistemological assumptions or might relate to the 
realities the researcher encounters in their research, called the ontological assumptions, 
or relate to the values that influence the research process, called axiological 
assumptions (Saunder et al. 2016). The importance of getting familiar with all these 
assumptions, according to Crotty (1998) and Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008), is that 
they can enhance the understanding of research questions, methods used for data 
collection and how to report the findings. Since research methods are closely 
connected to research philosophy, they help researchers come up with new knowledge 
through research (Eriksson and Kovalainen 2008). In addition, understanding research 
philosophy helps researchers to identify the research design and strategy by identifying 
the required type of evidence and how it is to be collected and understood (Easterby-
Smith et al. 2002; Eriksson and Kovalainen 2008). This, in turn establishes a clear 
direction for the research in terms of how to progress from the research questions to 
the conclusions (Eriksson and Kovalainen 2008; Wilson 2010). Moreover, it enables 
the researcher to find and apply a research design even with the existing limitations in 
diverse fields or “knowledge structure”. Thus, any research must be outlined by 
philosophical perspectives (ontology and epistemology) and theoretical perspectives 
(methodology and methods) (Crotty 1998; Creswell 2008). 
Blaikie (1993) defines the root of ontology as “the science or study of being” and for 
the social sciences it includes “claims about what exists, what it looks like, what units 
make it up and how these units interact with each other”. According to Matthews and 
Ross (2010, p.24), ontology refers to “the way the social world and the social 
phenomena or entities that makes it up are viewed.” These questions of “how is that 
reality measured” and “what constitutes knowledge of that reality” lead to the 
explanation of epistemology (Flowers 2009). It is crucial for researchers to consider 
the epistemology because it provides a philosophical background for determining the 
type of knowledge that will be examined and how we can ensure they are acceptable 
and valid (Maynard 1994). Epistemology deals with the nature of the knowledge, its 
possibility, its extent and validity (Hamlyn 1995; O’Grman 2008), which means, how 
we consider our surroundings (Wilson 2010, p.9). Epistemology according to 
Matthews and Ross, (2010) when studying a social phenomenon is what can be 
considered as knowledge and what is the acceptable type of knowledge that helps the 
researcher to examine certain phenomena. Its main questions are what acceptable 
knowledge is, what is knowledge and what are the sources and limits of the knowledge 
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and how and what is possible to know (Chia 2002; Eriksson and Kovalainen 2008; 
Wilson 2010). Epistemology questions consider the research method (Chia 2002; 
Flowers 2009) and reflect on standards that generate the reliable and verifiable 
knowledge (Chia 2002). In this study for example complexity or the complex nature 
of emergency is ontology, it is something real inherent in their nature. While the used 
frameworks or strategies to respond to them are an epistemology. Therefore, the 
epistemology in this study is the complexity and planning theories, emergency 
management cycle and emergency response system. In addition to tourism emergency 
management and gaining knowledge on how those incidents affected the cruise-ship 
industry. When highlighting ontology and epistemology it is important to consider 
their different positions. 
There are two positions of the ontology and epistemology - objectivism and 
subjectivism. Objectivism means that the knowledge and reality already exist, thus, 
the relationship between the researcher and studied object is independent (Crotty 1998; 
Matthews and Ross 2010). It means there is no effect of the researcher (interpretation 
or experience) on the social world or social phenomena (Crotty 1998; Matthews and 
Ross 2010; Saunder et al. 2016). Another position of ontology and epistemology is 
subjective, where reality and knowledge are constructed because of the interaction 
between the researcher and the social world and social phenomena (Crotty 1998; 
Lewis-Beck et al. 2004; Matthews and Ross 2010). In this case, according to Saunder 
et al (2016) the researcher has to investigate the case in detail to get familiar with what 
is happening and how people experience realities. This study is guided by the 
subjectivism philosophical assumption where the researcher had an interaction with 
the participants through semi-structured interviews and focus-groups interviews. The 
analysed data helped to fill the gap in knowledge or to construct knowledge on how to 
develop the concept of an integrated emergency response system for the tourism 
industry. Table. 6-1 presents a clear explanation of those philosophical assumptions. 
For example, Illing and Piaget (1955) mentioned that children construct their own 
knowledge by experience rather than absorbing what educators teach them or tell them. 
Flowers (2009) suggests that ontology describes our view (claim or assumption) on 
the nature of the objective reality that exists or the subjective reality that we create in 
our mind. Hatch and Cunliffe (2006) mentioned two examples of that, relating the first 
example to daily life and the second example to the social science. The first example 
is linked to the work report by asking is it telling what is going on in reality or what 
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the writer thinks is going on or does it reflect the thinking of the writer. The second 
example asks whether different phenomena like culture, power or control really exist 
or are an illusion. How do people establish different realities, by experience 
(subjectivism) or do they exist independently of those who live it (objectivism) (Hatch 
and Cunliffe 2006). 
Table 6-1. Philosophical Assumptions 
Assumption 
type Questions Continua with two sets of extremes 
 Objectivism Subjectivism 
Ontology 
What is the nature of 
reality? Real  
Nominal/decided by 
convention  
What does the world 
look like?  External  Socially constructed  
For example: 
What are 
organisations like?  
One true reality 
(universalism) 
Multiple realities 
(relativism) 
What is like being in 
organization?  Granular (things) Flowing (Processes) 
What is it like being 
a manager or being 
managed?  
Order  Chaos  
Epistemology 
How can we know 
what we know?  
Adopt assumptions 
of natural scientist 
Adopt assumptions of 
the arts and humanities 
What is considered 
acceptable 
knowledge?  
Facts  Opinions  
What constitutes 
good-quality data?  Numbers  Narratives  
What kind of 
contribution to 
knowledge can be 
made?  
Observable 
phenomena 
Law-like 
generalisations 
Attributed meanings 
Individuals and contexts 
specifics  
Source: Saunder et al. (2016, p.129) 
The origin of knowledge and its development are called paradigm, this “refers to the 
progress of scientific practice based on people’s philosophies and assumptions about 
the world and the nature of knowledge; in this context, how research should be 
conducted” (Hussey and Hussey 1997, p. 47). The researcher is advised to remain 
within their research paradigm once it is identified (Kuhn 1971). Hussey and Hussey 
(1997) also claim that researchers need to know and understand the philosophical 
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orientations within the implemented paradigm for their research. This is because 
according to Harre’ (1987, p.3) a paradigm is considered to be “a combination of a 
metaphysical theory about the nature of the objects in a certain field of interest and a 
consequential method which is tailor-made to acquire knowledge of those objects.” 
There are two main philosophical paradigms in the social sciences: positivist and 
interpretivist. Matthews and Ross (2010) argue that positivism is an epistemological 
position that emphasises that knowledge of a social phenomenon is based on what can 
be perceived and noted rather than individual considerations. The positivist approach 
means collecting quantitative data, measuring the aspects of the social world and social 
phenomenon, tackling the relationship between different variables in the social world 
and analysing data statistically (Matthews and Ross 2010). Interpretivism is “an 
epistemological position that priorities people’s subjective interpretations and 
understandings of social phenomena and their own actions” (Matthews and Ross 2010, 
p.28). Interpretivism is the “systematic analysis of socially meaningful action through 
the direct detailed observation of people in natural settings in order to arrive at 
understandings and interpretations of how people create and maintain their social 
world” (Neuman 2006, p. 71). The interpretivist approach means collecting qualitative 
data, working with subjective meaning and interpreting it within a specific context and 
research should have “empathetic” understanding. Table. 6-2 shows the difference 
between the positivists and interpretivist paradigm. 
Table 6-2. The Differences between the Positivists and Interpretivist Paradigm. 
Positivist Paradigm  Interpretivist Paradigm  
Focus on facts  Focus on meaning (s) 
Look for causality and fundamental 
meaning  Try to understand what is happening 
Reduce Phenomena to simplest elements  Look at the totality of each situation 
Formulate hypothesis and test them Develop ideas through induction from the data 
Operationalize concepts so that they can be 
measured  
Use multiple methods to establish different 
views of phenomena  
Take large samples  Small samples investigated in depth over time  
Source: O’Gorman et al. (2014, p.61) 
The interpretivist paradigm is preferred by the qualitative researchers because they 
find that the participant’s words add more value to their subjective meanings rather 
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than statistical data (Lazar 2001). In the interpretive paradigm, the knowledge is 
generated through the interaction between the researcher and the social world (Burrel 
and Morgan 1979).Table. 6-3 summarises the differences between the positivist and 
interpretive paradigms in terms of nature of reality, type of knowledge, the role of the 
researcher and implications of findings.  
Table 6-3. The Difference between the Positivist and Interpretive Paradigms 
Source: Rubin and Rubin (2012, p.22-23) 
This study is guided by an interpretivism approach because it aims to fulfil the research 
objectives and construct new knowledge from the participants’ perspectives by using 
The Nature of Reality 
Positivist There is a single, uniform reality that researchers attempt to measure in a precise, objective, and neutral manner. 
Interpretive 
Constructionist 
(Naturalistic) 
Meanings and understandings are plural; individuals and groups see and 
interpret reality through their own lenses. Understanding is subjective. 
Types of Knowledge Sought 
Positivist 
The goal is to obtain theories that are (nearly) universal in their 
implications. Usually uses quantitative measures to show relationship 
between a small number of variables abstracted from context. Looking for 
general tendencies often ignores the particular. 
Interpretive 
Constructionist 
(Naturalistic) 
The goal is to describe particular events, processes, or culture from the 
perspective of the participants, usually using qualitative techniques. 
Specifies the conditions under which themes seem to hold. Interested in 
contending and overlapping versions of reality; many truths possible 
The Role of the Researcher 
Positivist Neutral-objective person with an authoritative voice in write-up. 
Interpretive 
Constructionist 
(Naturalistic) 
A respectful listener or observer of other peoples’ worlds who recognizes 
that his or her own slant affects what is learned; less authoritative in 
write-up than positivists, leaves more room for participants’ contending 
or overlapping views. 
Implications of Findings 
Positivist 
Data gathering is meant to move toward universal theories and prediction 
of behavior; information can be used in practice, but that is not the core 
purpose of research. 
Interpretive 
Constructionist 
(Naturalistic) 
Descriptions and analysis foster understanding of political, social, and 
cultural processes and practices; may be relevant to theory or may be the 
basis of proposed action. 
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qualitative tools like semi-structured interviews. The specific findings will not be 
generalised, but the intention of the researcher is to add new insights into the field of 
study. Therefore, interpretivism is essential in this study in order to get more 
information from interviewees regarding their views and perceptions for better 
understanding and interpretation of the studied phenomena. 
6.5 Research Methodology 
Crotty (1998, p.3) defines methodology as “the strategy, plan of action, processor 
design lying behind the choice and use of particular methods and linking the choice 
and use of methods to the desired outcomes”. LeCompte et al. (1993) on the other 
hand, state that the methodology clearly focuses on the research aims, questions, and 
information that is most appropriate for answering the questions and strategies that are 
most effective for obtaining the necessary information. Thus, the research question, 
the nature of data to be collected and analysed to answer the research questions 
determine the appropriate research approach or methodology (quantitative or 
qualitative) (Matthews and Ross 2010). The main distinction between them is that 
quantitative research is usually connected with numerical data (Wilson 2010; Saunder 
et al. 2016) whereas qualitative research is not, qualitative data might be words, 
images, video clips and other similar materials (Wilson 2010; Saunder et al. 2016). In 
addition, quantitative research design uses quantitative tools for data collection 
(questionnaires) and data analysis procedures (statistics or graphs) (Saunder et al. 
2016). While, qualitative research uses non-quantitative data collection methods (e.g. 
interviews or focus groups) and analysis methods (categorising data) to explore social 
relations and describe reality as practiced by participants (Saunder et al. 2016; John et 
al. 2014). Referring to what has been discussed earlier on research philosophy, the 
quantitative approach is grounded in the positivism paradigm while qualitative 
research is embedded in the interpretivism paradigm (Creswell 1994). This study is 
qualitative due to the nature of the research question: how to develop the concept of 
an integrated emergency response system for the tourism industry? 
According to Philips (1997) there are several and general shared disciplinary interests 
between disaster and qualitative research. First, qualitative research can be found in 
different areas that contribute to disaster and hazards research like education, political 
sciences, nursing, sociology, psychology, anthropology, social work, communication, 
family studies and health studies (Philips 1997). For example, this study covers the 
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emergency response to complex emergencies generally, and specifically highlights the 
cruise-ship sector of tourism. Second, there is an increase in the use of the qualitative 
research that results in contribution to knowledge, which results in the increased use 
of qualitative research in are of disaster (Philips 1997). For example, according to 
Philips (2014, p.17) the six most recent journals available between 2010 and 2012 
revealed that 71% (12 of 17) of all articles in the International Journal of Mass 
Emergencies and Disasters used qualitative methods to cover different topics like 
relocations, popular culture, coping strategies, policies, preparedness, social media, 
recovery, gender and domestic violence. Moreover, 70% (7 of 10) of all articles on 
Environmental Hazards showed qualitative studies on community engagement, 
undocumented workers, participatory risk assessment, recovery, risk intervention, and 
relocation. Additionally, 45.5% (15 of 33) of all articles on Disasters highlighted 
research on psychological health, evacuation, risk reduction, behavioural reactions, 
inequalities, children, social vulnerability, agriculture, ethnicity and social networks, 
immunisations, preparedness, social vulnerability, relocations and risk 
communication. Third, Philips (1997) added that both pieces of research (qualitative 
research and disaster qualitative research) share common history, for example the 
increased interest and writings corresponded to the establishment of many disasters 
centres that have established the use of qualitative research. For example, the first 
Disaster Research Centre founded in 1962 at The Ohio State University valued an area 
based qualitative research methodology (Philips 2014). Fourth, the complex nature of 
an emergency and its unexpected consequences are considered as challenges for 
communities, thus “qualitative disaster research can capture human behaviour at its 
most open, realistic moments” (Philips 1997, p.185). So, researchers who use 
observation methods came up with relevant data to disasters that is helpful in building 
theories of human behaviour during emergency events (Philips 1997). Fifth, the 
qualitative research has the possibility to identify new and relevant questions because 
it is grounded in people’s real experiences (Philips 1997). Similarly, to qualitative 
disaster research it has the possibility of identifying new questions because disaster 
researchers know that there are lessons learnt after each disaster (Philips 1997). For 
example, in this study through the interaction between the researcher and the 
participants, new lessons and questions have been identified as the participants did 
experience previous incidents (see analysis and conclusion chapters). Sixth, the 
thought of the qualitative research has more flexibility in the research design, which 
allows studies to raise and develop (Philips 2014). Doing so let researchers find out 
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and examine uncovered or unsolved issues that entail evidence-based solutions and 
explanations (Philips 2014). For example, qualitative studies highlighted different 
issues that came up with the establishment of citizen groups and volunteer 
organisations that try to tackle unfulfilled requirements (Stallings and Quarantelli 
1985; Neal 1990; Enarson and Morrow 1998). In this study the aim is to develop a 
theoretical model of integration leading to practical implication. 
Good qualitative research depends on abundant and deep information of research 
background (Geertz 1973) that helps provide context. For example, understanding 
when and where a disaster event will happen and its circumstances (Philips 1997). 
Accordingly, all this information helps the researcher when interpreting the data by 
linking and supporting what he has got to the available theory, as well as comparing 
them to their data that results in developing a detailed background for qualitative 
disaster research (Philips 1997). Similarly, in this study the researcher used rich data 
from the literature like the complexity theory in order to understand the nature of 
emergency as complex events and understand how tourism functions as a complex 
adaptive system. In addition to the literature of the planning and management of 
emergencies, the research also analysed the literature of emergency response systems 
and scenario planning and design; the latter helping to design the scenarios for this 
study (See Appendix 6). Qualitative research also allows people, who were involved 
directly in disasters, the chance to clarify their different standards, procedures, and 
roles (Olivers-Smith 1996). “As described by Sofaer (1999, p. 1105) they allow people 
to speak using their own expressions, rather than compliant to classifications and this 
imposed on them by others.” For example, in this study the participants who witnessed 
the cyclones of Guno (2007) and Phet (2010) spoke clearly about their role and 
experiences and what was wrong and what they learnt for the future (See chapter 7). 
There are two methodological approaches or styles of reasoning that are connected 
with research methods: inductive and deductive approaches (Wilson 2010; John et al. 
2014). The inductive approach is a theory-building process that operates from the 
specific to the general, starting with an observation of a specific variable to form a 
generalisation for other variables to fall under the same features, patterns or trends of 
the observed variable (Hyde 2000; John et al. 2014). On the other hand, a deductive 
approach applies a well-known theory, so it operates from the general to the specific, 
in this way a general set of suggestions linked to a specific case are narrowed down to 
a specific or single testable hypothesis (John et al. 2014; Hyde 2000). “Testing 
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hypotheses requires the application of relevant data, which may or may not confirm 
the original arguments in the theory” (John et al. 2014, p.10). The most prominent 
distinction between inductive and deductive approaches is that the former contributes 
to the theory and is associated with qualitative research (Wilson 2010, p.7) while the 
role of the deductive approach is developing a hypothesis and applying existing theory 
in order to test the hypothesis and is associated with quantitative research (Ghauri and 
Grohaug 2005, p.15; Wilson 2010, p.7). This study follows the inductive approach and 
begins with the general theory of complexity in order to understand the nature of 
emergencies as complex events. Then linking this theory to the planning theory 
comparing the degree of complexity and the different levels of planning, which is then 
opened to planning for emergency management in general, followed by an 
examination of the theory of planning for tourism emergency management in order to 
identify the gaps in integrating the tourism industry with emergency response 
planning. The relevant literature is critically reviewed to explore the fundamental 
aspects of such planning. The inductive approach was helpful to the study by building 
the general picture of emergency management in Oman, the emergency response 
system in general and in tourism specifically because there is very little literature 
written specifically about Oman. 
6.5.1 Case Study Approach  
A case study is an established research approach commonly used in the social sciences 
(Crowe et al. 2011). According to Baxter and Jack (2008) the aim of a case study 
approach is to enable researchers to deeply explore and understand the context of a 
certain phenomenon from different angles by using different data sources. The use of 
different methods in the case study approach depends on the context and research 
needs (Denscombe 2003). However, there is a debate whether a case study should be 
considered as a research method or research approach (Starman 2013). This 
misunderstanding of case studies, whether it is a type or a method of qualitative 
research (Gerrin 2004), results in them being ignored or confused with other types of 
social research (Thomas 2011). According to Mills et al. (2010) little research deals 
directly with case studies as a main approach, therefore there is a need for clear 
guidelines directing students and researchers as to how to design a case study and their 
use. Some authors view case studies as a qualitative research type (Sturman 1997; 
Verschuren 2003; Sagadin 2004; Stake 2005; Flyvbjerg 2006, 2011; Baxter and Jack 
2008; Simons 2009). While some view case studies as a qualitative research method 
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(Gerring 2004; George and Bennett 2005), others, such as Starman (2013) argue that 
case studies may be qualitative or quantitative approaches or a combination of both. 
Simons (2009) and Stake (2005) support this view by saying that a case study may 
include several methods and the focus is on the case to be studied. A similar view is 
held by Flyvbjerg (2011) who explains that the selection of a case study in a research 
project does not mean a selection of a method, but it is a selection what is to be studied 
or explored. Although some authors use the term case study to refer to a research 
method (e.g. Crotty 1998; Finn et al. 2000), Denscombe (1998) states that case studies 
are a research strategy. In this respect Hammersely (1992) states that the researcher 
has the option to choose how many cases to cover and provide the justifications for 
the selection. 
Gerring (2004) notes although there are several definitions of case studies, they cause 
confusion. To minimise this confusion Flyvbjerg (2011) emphasises the need for a 
general definition of case studies that contain less detailed descriptions. One of these 
general definitions is provided by Sturman (1997, p. 61) “a case study is a general term 
for the exploration of an individual, group or phenomenon”. The case study of this 
definition according to Mesec (1998) is a research process and he defines it in the 
context of social work as “a description and analysis of an individual matter or case 
… with the purpose to identify variables, structures, forms and orders of interaction 
between participants in the situation (theoretical purpose), or, in order to assess the 
performance of work or progress in development (practical purpose) (383)”. He adds 
that a case can fulfil both theoretical and practical purposes. Case studies are defined 
by Miles and Huberman (1994, p.25) as “a Phenomenon of some sort of occurring in 
a bounded context”. Robson (2002, p. 178) defines a case study as “a strategy for doing 
research which involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context using multiple sources of evidence”. Mathew 
(2010) mentions that the focus of a case study might be a person, an organisation, a 
situation or a country. The cases of this study concentrate on different incidents that 
occurred on cruise ships and ferries, such as collisions, sinking and fires. Overall, 
different aims are used to deliver or present specific cases to explain, describe or 
explore an incident or phenomena (Yin 2009), therefore specifying the type of the case 
study. 
Yin (2014) listed three types of case studies which refer to research types, namely: 
explanatory, exploratory and descriptive, stating that selecting the type of case study 
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depends on the research question to be answered, the extent the researcher will have 
over the studied events and whether the phenomena to be studied is contemporary or 
historical. He also identifies when to use each type. The aim of the exploratory case 
study is to collect information on a certain phenomenon to get a deep understanding, 
while the explanatory case aims to explain how events happened by tackling cause and 
effect relationships, while the descriptive case study describes a case within its context 
(Yin 1993; 2003; 2009). This study highlighted three exploratory case studies (Costa 
Concordia, Mv Sewol Korean Ferry and Norman Atlantic) to answer the research 
question: what the specific challenges are presented by the Cruise Ship industry when 
undertaking emergency responses. Thus, exploring such challenges was helpful for 
suggesting future integration between the destination Oman and the European Cruise 
lines by overcoming such challenges. Another case study provided in this study was a 
descriptive case study of the country Oman. The aim of this descriptive case study is 
to contextualise the Sultanate of Oman in order to get more knowledge and information 
on the tourism industry and its emergency management system. This information was 
helpful in fulfilling the fifth research objective. 
Regarding these different types of cases, this study provides multiple exploratory case 
studies to identify the specific challenges presented by the Cruise Ship industry when 
undertaking emergency responses. The aim of adopting multi-cases is to tackle 
different challenges that hindered cruise lines from responding effectively. Therefore, 
improving study findings and providing solutions and suggestions for future incidents. 
Highlighting or exploring such case studies in the context of complexity theory allows 
the researcher to understand the dynamics of the tourism system and the 
interdependence between the different stakeholders. For example, the function of 
cruise ships and their relationship with stakeholders in the destination and the 
interactions. Whilst also understanding the sensitivity of the tourism industry and how 
incidents affecting cruise ships have cascading effects on the entire market. Moreover, 
it demonstrates the features of the complex system like nonlinearity and how a minor 
incident or action may result in a major consequence like the case of Costa Concordia, 
due to a change of the route, which led to the collision. These case studies presented 
unexpected incidents happening, for example a cruise featuring very advanced 
technology like Costa Concordia, Case of Norman Atlantic fire and the sinking of Mv 
Sewol Ferry. These cases also showed the interaction during the response phase within 
the cruise ships and between the cruise ship and the destination, destination and the 
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emergency services. This was a point to investigate the interaction between different 
elements in a system and the flow of behaviour within and among the system. In 
addition, the adaptiveness of the complex system was identified through adapting new 
polices after such incidents in all cases. The overview of the cruise market at the 
beginning of chapter four showed how the cruise industry evolved over time and how 
the increase of passenger capacity in cruise ships and previous incidents encouraged 
the adoption of more emergency procedures, plans and training. So, the history of the 
system (cruise industry) helps to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the 
current behaviour. Presenting three different cases showed the self-organisation of 
each system and how each system configures itself to its surroundings, depending on 
the incident, country and culture. 
6.6 Research Design 
Research design is described as the logical and consistent steps carried out to link the 
research questions to the data collection and analysis phases rationally (O’Gorman et 
al. 2014). Brewerton and Millward (2001) explained that the research design process 
has three levels of decision-making. The first level identifies the type of evidence 
required by deciding whether the investigation will be qualitative or quantitative or 
both. The second level identifies the type of strategy adopted by considering the actual 
design of the study. The third level identifies the type of research method that will be 
used to collect data and analyse it; this will be discussed later. Therefore, identifying 
the type of strategy, this study is exploratory research, which aims to find out “what is 
happening; to seek new insights; to ask questions and to assess phenomena in a new 
light” (Robson 2002, p.59). Three principal methods are used when conducting 
exploratory research (Saunders et al. 2009, p.140): first, a search of the literature, 
which in this study was a review of the literature on complexity and complexity theory 
to understand the nature of emergencies as complex events. The study also reviewed 
the complex and complex adaptive systems to analyse their relevance to the emergency 
response system and drew on the similarities found in the tourism industry. The 
literature on planning and planning theory was critically reviewed to establish the 
context of tourism emergency planning and to tackle the relationship between planning 
and complexity. The study discusses the complexity of emergency response in having 
a better integration between tourism and emergency organisations as well as 
highlighting the reliance of the emergency response system. Second, undertaking 
interviews with experts in the field. This study used semi-structured interviews with 
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tourism stakeholders and emergency services representatives in Oman in order to 
identify the capability of the emergency response system. In addition, semi-structured 
interviews aimed to identify the roles and responsibilities of the involved stakeholders 
during certain incidents. Furthermore, online semi-structured interviews were also 
conducted in Europe to identify the requirements of cruise ships when responding to 
emergency scenarios near to, or alongside, a destination. Finally, focus group 
interviews were conducted to validate the findings of the research. Figure 6-1 shows 
the research approach of the study. It starts by identifying the research aim and ends 
with the data analysis tool that will be explained in the following.  
 
 
Figure 6-1. Research Approach of the Study 
(Author 2018) 
 
Research Aim
Developing Integrated Emergency 
Response 
Research Philosophy
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Research Methodology
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Reseach Design
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Thematic and Content Analysis 
		149	
Williams (1954, p.8-9) states that the Committee on Disaster Studies at the U.S 
National Research Council (NRC) gave high priority to exploratory research: “In a 
field so complex and so little understood, it is felt that exploratory studies should made 
in many different disasters, to define the major variables and discover the repetitive 
phenomena”. This study is exploratory in its approach. To direct the study semi-
structured interviews are used (see Method of Primary Data Collection) to fulfil the 
fourth objective. These were conducted in Oman with the tourism and emergency 
representatives and stakeholders. In order to fulfil the fifth objective, online semi-
structured interviews were used (see Method of Primary Data Collection). 
6.7 Data Collection and Analysis 
Type of Data 
There are two sources of information used for research purposes: primary and 
secondary (Adams et al. 2014). Primary data is the data collected by the researcher in 
order to answer the research questions and fulfil the research objectives by using 
different methods like interviews, surveys or focus groups etc. (Matthews and Ross 
2010). So, this data are not published. Secondary data includes information produced 
earlier by other researchers that is available in the form of databases, textbooks, 
journals, official documents, or archives (Matthews and Ross 2010; Saunder et al. 
2016). Secondary data is easy and quick to get, and they are more all-inclusive, 
reliable, and more valid than primary data (Bryman 2008; Adams et al. 2014). 
Furthermore, researchers have the opportunity to generate new or different theories, 
knowledge, interpretation or conclusion from secondary data based on criticism and 
highlighting conflict points (Bryman 2008; Bulmer et al. 2009). The sources of 
secondary data for this study were the Bournemouth University Library books, 
journals, inter-library loans, as well as web sites, and magazines. 
Method of Primary Data Collection 
According to Jennings (2001, p.34) “a method is constituted of the tools for data 
collection and analysis”. Mileti (1987, p.69) wrote in his review of research methods 
in the sociology of disasters “… from a methodological viewpoint, disaster research is 
hardly distinguishable from the general sociological enterprise.” According to 
Stallings there has been little research dedicated to the topic of research methods on 
the topic of disasters. Although practical studies of disasters have highlighted data 
collection and analysis, few of them have discussed the methods used (2002). Cisin 
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and Clark (1962, p.23) state that “strictly, we cannot speak of the methods of disaster 
research; there are no special methods unique to this field. Its methods are the methods 
of social research …”. The qualitative methods in disaster research are preferred 
because the researcher can get “thick description” (Geertz 1973) of specific issues or 
cases. Thick description refers to getting more detailed and rich data that describe, for 
example, the mitigation, preparedness, response or recovery measures or emergency 
management awareness as in the case of this study. An example is given by Norris et 
al. (2014) referring to a study in the early 1970s by Tony Oliver-Smith and Barbra 
Bode who individually, after the occurrence of an earthquake which hit Yungay, Peru 
and killed 70,000 and injured 140,000, provided detailed information of the affected 
community before, during and after the earthquake. This information was used as a 
basis for understanding certain elements of the psychosocial impact of the disaster on 
the survivors. Therefore, qualitative research methods, like interviews or focus groups, 
are used to gather data about social events or actions, phenomena or activities or 
behaviour or attitudes or experiences in order to gain a deep and clear understanding 
(Goodson and Phillimore 2004) as well as to get an in-depth opinion from participants 
(Dawson 2007). The widely used method in disaster research is interviews by its all-
different types, and by combining them with other methods this enables researchers to 
improve validity and the reliability of the data and findings and facilitate the 
development of new questions for further research (Philips 1997). For example, where 
there is theoretically little to know about the topic in question, then an exploratory 
design can be used for such aspects as preparedness for, or response to, specific 
incidents (Hystad and Keller 2006; Walters and Clulow 2014). While for modelling, 
analysis or assessment of risk or vulnerability follow quantitative approaches (Helbin 
et al. 2005; Hu et al. 2007). Table 6-4 presents an overview of the most common 
research methods applied in the area covered by this study that are tourism crisis and 
disaster planning and management, emergency response, scenario planning and crisis 
affecting the cruise ship industry. 
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Table 6-4. An Overview of the Most Common Research Methods Applied 
Topics area  Methods used  Authors in the field  
Tourism crisis and 
Disaster Planning 
and management/ 
Emergency 
Response  
Critical Review of previous 
studies, systematic review, 
interviews and survey, in-
depth interviews, focus 
groups, observation, Delphi 
scenario technique, Systematic 
observation  
Mair et al. 2016; Morakabati et 
al. 2016;Walters and Clulow 
2014; kim 2014; Becken and 
Hughey 2013; Beirman 2011; 
Becker  2007; Paraskevas 
2006;Evans and Elphick 2005; 
Ritchie 2004;Johnston and 
Tierney 2003. 
Scenario planning/ 
method 
Scenario-design workshop, 
review literature in the context 
of scenario planning, 
scenario-based training,  
Lundberg et al.2012; Page et 
al. 2010 ; Moats et el. 2008; 
Pollard and Hotho 2006; 
Alexander 2000. 
Crisis affecting 
Cruise Ship 
industry  
Questionnaire, interviews, 
content analysis, in depth case 
study, analysing quantitively 
time series and cross-sectional 
dimensions of past cruise 
incidents. 
Radic 2016; Mileski et al. 
2014.Brown et al. 2013.  
(Author 2018) 
 
In the context of this study, semi-structured interviews were used for collecting data. 
Semi-structured interviews are conversation style interviews and are associated with a 
qualitative methodology (Jennings 2005, p.100-101). Qualitative interviewing is 
considered more difficult than quantitative interviewing (that is more used in survey 
approaches) since it is requires communication and interaction with people (Jennings 
2005; Edwards and Holland 2013) as it requires specific skills different than the 
ordinary conversation and needs extensive practice (Rubin 1995, p.2). Interviews are 
a flexible research method (Breakwell 1995) because they can be used at any stage of 
the research process, starting from the initial phases to the validation of results 
collected by different methods (Brewerton and Millward 2001). In addition, interviews 
can be used collectively with other research methods (Brewerton and Millward 2001). 
However, interviews have high level of biases and weaknesses because it is not easy 
to achieve high levels of reliability and validity (Brewerton and Millward 2001). In 
order to answer the research questions and get the required data, there are different 
types of interviews: structured interviews, unstructured interviews and semi-structured 
interviews (Brewerton and Millward 2001). The first type-structured interviews have 
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a set of fixed questions in a specific order (Brewerton and Millward 2001; Saunders et 
al. 2016). Structures interviews do not allow the researcher to ask further questions or 
to probe the interviewee into further areas of interest and the interviewer may present 
the interviewee with a set of answers from which to choose (Brewerton and Millward 
2001; Matthews and Ross: 2010). Unstructured interviews are more open and give the 
researcher the ability to ask any or all of a given number of topics to answer the 
research questions, so questions are not in a predetermined order (Brewerton and 
Millward 2001; Saunders et al. 2016). In addition, participants are free to talk about 
the topic in their own way (Matthews and Ross 2010; Saunders et al. 2016). Semi-
structured interviews combine both a fixed list of questions under specific themes as 
well as the ability to probe in more depth areas of interest (Brewerton and Millward 
2001; Jennings 2005; Saunders et al. 2016). In addition, interviewees are able to 
explain their responses and to provide further information (Brewerton and Millward 
2001). What also differentiates structured from semi-structured and unstructured 
interviews is the extent to which the researcher can have control over the nature of the 
responses and the length of the answers allowed by the respondent (Denscombe 2003, 
p.167). Semi-structured interviews combine the flexibility of the unstructured 
interviews with the comparability of the structured interviews (Finn et al. 2000). Thus, 
certain topics can be examined, by asking similar questions, for gathering comparative 
data. At the same time, the researcher can change the order of topics to gather detailed 
and extra information (Gilbert 1993). In addition, the interviewees are allowed to 
develop their own ideas and to follow the thoughts, they believe to be associated with 
the researched issue (Denscombe 1998) and it usually tends to discover new thoughts, 
rather than check previous ideas (Denscombe 1998). The advantages of conducting 
semi-structured interviews are they are easily available for analysis, interviewees have 
more opportunities to explain their responses and they provide more accurate 
information when needed (Brewerton and Millward 2001). 
In this study, face-to face semi-structured interviews were conducted in Oman to 
achieve the fourth objective: to identify the local capabilities of the emergency 
response system in Oman when responding to emergency scenarios near to, or 
alongside, a destination. Additionally, to achieve the fifth objective by identifying the 
roles and responsibilities of stakeholders when undertaking emergency response 
planning and execution with respect to European cruise ship delivery in Oman. They 
were conducted in Oman because the researcher is from Oman, so it facilitates getting 
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access to information and to meeting people from the same country. Furthermore, the 
focus of the study is Oman, thus interviews should take place in Oman. The tourism 
industry in Oman has been given high importance in order to diversify the economy. 
Thus, the researcher sees there is a need for emergency management in the tourism 
industry and also due to the political situation in the Middle East. 
On the other hand, the online semi-structured interviews were conducted in Europe 
were to fulfil the fifth objective of the research: to identify the needs, requirements and 
challenges of the European cruise lines when responding to emergency scenarios near 
to, or alongside, a destination. Semi-structured interviews conducted in Europe were 
online using the Go To Meeting program that was provided by Bournemouth 
University. This type of interview according to Morgan and Symon (2004) is called 
electronic interviews that describe the interviews conducted in real-time 
(Synchronous) using Internet or an organisations intranet as well those conducted off-
line (asynchronous). According to Saunder et al. (2016), electronic interviews can be 
conducted via email, Internet messaging and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) or 
web conferencing. In this study the researcher used Go To Meeting program to conduct 
the interviews in Europe, which is similar to Skype. The interviews were conducted 
using voice rather than the video calls. Pre-interview, interviewees were sent a 
participant information sheet, the consent form and the designed scenarios. All 
interviews were automatically recorded in the ‘Go To Meeting’ program. The 
interviews lasted for one hour. It was easier to conduct them online given that the 
participants were in different geographical areas. 
Scenarios and Semi-Structured Interview Questions Design 
The study used the scenario approach (See Chapter two) in addition to the designed 
interview questions. There is list of steps according to Schoemaker (1993) when 
writing scenarios Table 6-5. The scenarios were designed by adopting the factorial 
designs method that was introduced by Karl Pearson in the early twentieth-century and 
developed later by other researchers interested in psychometric tests (Josephat and 
Ismail 2012). It is a method of investigating if a number of variables of significance 
are linearly related to a smaller number of unobservable or uncontrolled factors, and it 
involves at least two or more independent variables (Tryfos 1997). The aim of 
adopting this method in designing scenarios rather than writing them without specific 
factors was for several reasons. Identifying the capability of both sectors emergency 
and tourism under different cases. Identify the gap in the response phase that might be 
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in the coordination, communication, collaboration or resources. It helps also to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the emergency response system, when an organisation 
can work alone and when it needs support and from other organisations. 
Table 6-5. Steps for Building Scenario 
Steps for building scenario 
1. Describe the case, in terms of time frame, scope and decision variables. 
1. Identify the interested and affected stakeholders by these issues. 
2. Write a list of trends or predetermined factors that will influence the variables 
of interest and explain their affect. 
3. Identify key uncertainties that influence the variables of interest and explain 
why they matter and how they relate. 
4. Build two forced scenarios, one inclosing all known and related positive 
consequences, and one with the parallel negative consequences. Add selected 
trends to them.  
5. Evaluate internal consistency and plausibility of these scenarios. 
6. Exclude combinations that are not credible or impossible and build at least two 
new scenarios that highlight a wide range of results. Enhance them until they 
are internally consistent. 
7. Evaluate the enhanced scenarios in terms of how stakeholders would act in 
them. Refine the research process to support your scenario strongly. 
8. Re-examine the learning scenarios to ensure they are internally consistent and 
assess whether any aspects of them can be formalized by using quantitative 
model. 
9. Finally, re-evaluate the range of uncertainty of the variables of interest and 
review the previous steps to create decision scenarios to help the decision-
makers operate under uncertainty. 
Source: Schoemaker (1993, p.197) 
Trochim (2006) explains the two main terms used in factorial designs; “a factor is a 
major independent variable” in this study we have two factors: location and type of 
hazard and another term is the level, “which is a subdivision of a factor” and in this 
study the location is divided into on-shore and off-shore, while the type of hazard is 
divided into single and multi-hazard as explained in the Matrix shown in Table 6-6. 
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Table 6-6. Factorial Designs Scenario Matrix of Single –Multi Hazard Scenarios 
(Author 2018)  
 
According to Kothari (2004) factorial designs can be simple, when considering the 
effects of varying two factors on the dependent variable, and complex, if it investigates 
more than two factors. The advantage of using factorial designs is eliminating 
duplication from a set of interrelated variables (Josephat and Ismail 2012). 
Additionally, they provide very accurate equivalence and authorise many other 
evaluations of interest (Kothari 2004). Thus, “they are important in several economic 
and social phenomena where usually a large number of factors affect a particular 
problem” (Kothari 2004, p.47). It is not a matter of quantifying the equipment that has 
been bought, considering whether they are enough, or whether responders are well 
trained to respond, but it is whether the system as a whole will actually work 
effectively when called upon. The concepts of complexity have been used when 
designing scenarios to see how people are thinking of solving wicked problems and if 
they are prepared to do so. The focus of the scenarios is more on the problems rather 
than the solutions. The overall aim will be achieved by developing the concept of an 
integrated emergency response system for the tourism industry. 
The semi-structured interview questions’ design was based on previous studies, the 
UNWTO Report prepared by Bournemouth University (2014) and the RAND 
company study on evaluating the reliability of emergency response systems for large-
scale incident operations (Jackson et al. 2010). The design of the interview questions 
for the tourism stakeholders was different to the emergency stakeholders because the 
emergency sector’s work is related to emergency management directly. The questions 
for the tourism stakeholders were divided based on themes. The first theme was 
general, to constitute a clear picture of emergency planning, management importance 
On-Shore Off-Shore 
Single Hazard Scenario A Scenario B
Multi-Hazard Scenario C Scenario D
Type of Hazard
Location
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and awareness among the tourism industry. The following three were the themes: 
mitigation, preparedness and response in order to investigate the procedures taken and 
applied strategies in the mentioned phases of emergency management. The questions 
for the emergency services were also divided into themes in order to evaluate the 
emergency response system in Oman. These themes were capabilities (resources, 
required equipment and their location), structure and system (making the incident 
system operational at all levels and integrating it with the national response plan), 
people (training and exercise of responders and senior managers) and coordination 
(at different level of the country). 
Sampling 
The criteria used to define who and how many people were going to be involved in the 
research as participants, differentiates the qualitative research from the quantitative 
(Palikas 2014). Sampling in qualitative research is non-probability sampling because 
the aim of the research is to explore rather than test a hypothesis (Denscomb 2003; 
Ritchie et al. 2003). For the qualitative approach of semi-structured interviews, the 
most common used sampling method is purposive sampling (Denscomb 2010; 
Saunders et al. 2016). Purposive sampling according to Clark et al. (2002) is a non-
probability (or non-random) sampling technique where participants are chosen for a 
specific purpose. It enables researchers to gain more and deeper understanding of the 
selected case (Neuman 2006). The sample selected was purposive (Saunders et al. 
2016) because participants share specific features that enable them to give most 
valuable data (Brewerton and Millward 2001; Denscombe 2003; John et al. 2014). In 
this case interviewees were asked to answer on behalf of their organisation and not 
give their personal views. Purposive sampling was used to reach the participants and 
get their experiences, perspectives, views and their current situation in the area of 
managing emergency in tourism as well as their future capabilities. In order to generate 
sufficiently rich data, the researcher interviewed 18 participants from Oman and 5 
from Europe. The source of the sample frame of participants related to the emergency 
management services was the National Committee of Civil Defence and participants 
related to the tourism sector stakeholders was the Ministry of Tourism in Oman. The 
participants from Oman were selected from the tourism industry (four participants 
from the Ministry of Tourism, one participant Ministry of Transportations-the 
Directorate of Seaports, five participants from Travel and Shipping agent, one 
participant from the Port Services Corporation) and emergency services sector total of 
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five participant (Royal Oman Police: Public Authority for Civil Defence and 
Ambulance, Coast Guard, National Committee for Civil Defence and Royal Navy: 
Maritime Security Centre). 
According to the data of the Cruise Line International Association CLIA (2015) 
members there are around 62 Cruise line companies, 275 executive partners as 
suppliers and partners to the cruise lines, including ports and destinations, ship 
development, suppliers and business services. Thus, the researcher sent an email to 
CLIA asking for cruise-line contacts, but they apologised and declined to provide this 
information on the grounds of confidentiality. The researcher also participated in the 
Sea Trade conference and exhibition in Florida 2016 to make contact with the cruise-
line companies, but unfortunately most of those attendees were suppliers for cruise 
companies. In addition, the cruise companies’ representatives were fully booked for 
cruise business and with cruise destinations, so it was difficult to access them. Through 
personal contacts the researcher tried to contact people who are working on cruise lines 
in France, there were five of them known to the researcher, but none of them 
responded. The Executive Guide of Cruise Industry News, with more than 1000 
contacts was bought, but unfortunately most of the emails sent using this guide 
contacts were not delivered. It might be because people have changed their contact 
details, job positions or left the company. Out of a total of 48 managers of security, 
crisis and operations in Europe who were sent an email, 4 responses confirmed 
willingness to participate in the study and even one of those withdrew on the same day 
as the interview. So, three interviews were conducted with cruise line companies and 
two interviews with experts, who were ex-navy, whom their contacts were given by 
the researcher’s supervisors. 
Pilot Study 
A pilot study as described by Ghauri and Gronhaung (2005), is a small study taking 
place prior the actual research and according to Sampson (2004) is used informally. A 
pilot study according to Yin (2011) is crucial in order to ensure the study questions are 
understandable and respondents can participate in the study. Additionally, pilot studies 
are vital in facilitating the research direction and enhancing the quality of the study by 
specifying its weaknesses (Sampson 2004; Yin 2009). Moreover, Ball (1993) mentions 
that a pilot study can also be used to structure the research questions and collect general 
information and adapt a research approach (Fowler 1993; Hammersley 1993). 
Generally, as Sampson (2004) states, a pilot study can improve the study overall. 
		158	
In this study conducting a pilot study was considered important in order to evaluate 
the validity of the research methods and design. The pilot study was based on 8 semi-
structured interviews (enough to give confidence in the results, but not so many as to 
deplete the available population of participants) in Oman with different stakeholders 
representing the tourism sector: emergency services, port authorities and shipping 
agents. They were conducted to evaluate the method and data used and if the scenario 
will be more valuable in getting data than using normal questionnaires. With regards 
the interviews, the pilot study helps to make sure that participants understand the 
questions, make sure the structure of the questions are valid enough to collect the 
information, to explore the way that the information can be transferred for analysis 
and to see if there is a possibility of adding or omitting questions. The cruise lines 
interview was conducted with a manager from the Carnival Cruise line. Then the 
interview data coded and analysed to make sure the gap can be filled by the obtained 
data and to facilitate designing the intended model. 
Interview Process 
Before conducting the interviews, the researcher was provided with an official letter 
from Sultan Qaboos University (The Sponsor of the Study) to whomsoever it may 
concern to facilitate the process of data collection. In addition, interviewees were sent 
participant information sheets providing them details of the study (see Ethics). As the 
emergency organisations were included in the study (military personnel) it was not 
easy to conduct the interview without permission. The researcher was asked to provide 
another letter, in addition to the letter provided from her University. It was addressed 
to the Public Relation Department of the Royal Oman Police explaining the purpose 
of the research and to ensure the confidentiality and security of the given information. 
Then, the Public Relations Department sent a cover letter to the General of the Royal 
Oman Police in order to give the permission for the Public Authority for Civil Defence 
and Ambulance, Coast Guard and the National Committee for Civil Defence to 
participate in the study. So, understanding the military culture is important in order to 
understand the way of presenting the information and the type of questions asked as 
their work is closely connected to emergency management. So, their questions were 
different to those for the tourism participants. 
All interviews were conducted in English. They lasted between 45 minutes to one and 
a half hour depending on the answers of the participants and their time. The 
participants were informed about the aim of the study as well as the objective of 
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conducting the interviews. At the beginning of each interview, the interviewees were 
explained the four phases of emergency management and informed that the focus of 
the research is on the response phase. Then the four given scenarios were explained in 
order for participants to bear them in mind when answering the interview questions. 
The interviews covered different topic like the perception and the awareness of 
emergency management among tourism industry stakeholders and the three phases: 
mitigation, preparedness and response. Although the focus of the research is the 
response phase the previous two phases of mitigation and preparedness have been 
evaluated because they are activated in the response. The process of conducting the 
interviews was consistent as the questions were asked in the same order, in order to 
compare the answers of all interviewees. The interviewees were encouraged to express 
freely their perception regarding emergency management, the current situation in their 
organisations and what they are aiming for it to become in the future. All interviewees 
were assured about the confidentiality of their responses in order to encourage them to 
talk freely about the topic. As well as having been told that their participation in the 
study is voluntary and they have the right to withdraw any time without stating any 
reason. 
The interviews were recorded on a recorder; each of them took from 45 to one and a 
half hour. However, interviews with emergency services organisations were written 
because the researcher was not allowed to use the recorder due to their sensitive 
working environment, the culture and for security reasons. The interviews were 
conducted in English because most of the travel and shipping agents' participants were 
expatriates and they did not speak Arabic and English was not their first language; this 
was considered to avoid any misinterpretation of the questions. 
Transcribing 
In order to become familiar with the general perceptions and opinions of the 
participants, the researcher listened to the recorded interviews several times. 
Interviews were conducted in English, so the transcription and analysis were in 
English. The transcription took a lengthy time for the 18 interviews as they each lasted 
from 45 minutes to hour and half. Although transcription was time consuming with an 
hour taking 8 hours to transcribe, it was a very valuable part in the research. 
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Coding 
Alphabetical codes were applied to the data rather than numerical codes because 
according to Miles and Huberman (1994) they help to keep the researcher close. The 
transcribed interviews were coded as following. Participants representing Ministry of 
Tourism were coded by (T), those representing shipping agents and travel agents were 
coded by (A), participants from port authorities were coded by (P), all of them 
followed by a serial number referring to the sequence of the participants. For example, 
T1 or T2, A1 or A2 and P1 or P2. Whereas, Emergency services participants were 
coded by (E) followed by a serial number referring to the sequence of the participants, 
for example, E1 and E2 respectively. While the European cruise participants were 
coded by C1 to C5. Finally, the focus group participants for the validation of the 
findings were coded by FG1, FG2 and FG3. 
Data Analysis Methods 
Data analysis involves “working with data, organizing it, breaking it into manageable 
units, synthesizing it, searching for patterns, discovering what is important and what 
is to be learned, and deciding what you will tell others” (Bogdan and Biien 1982). In 
this study thematic and content analysis are used in order to analyse the semi-
structured interviews that have been conducted with tourism stakeholders and 
emergency services. Thematic analysis is “a process of segmentation, categorisation 
and relinking of aspects of the data prior to final interpretation” (Grbich 2007, p.16). 
Thematic analysis provides a flexible and accessible approach to analysing qualitative 
data (Braun and Clarke 2006) by searching for themes that occur across the data 
(Saunders et al. 2016). So, working with qualitative data requires interpretation and 
helps gain a better understanding of the given responses (Matthews and Ross 2010). It 
involves coding of the data to identify themes for the analysis to answer the research 
question (Saunders et al. 2016) and works by comparing the responses of all 
participants in order to describe the data; explore the meaning from the response; 
tackle the relationship between different types of data and; identify and explain the 
similarities and differences (Matthews and Ross 2010). The second analysis tool is 
content analysis that is used extensively in social research (Neuendorf 2002, p.) and 
dates back to the 18th century in Scandinavia (Rosengren 1981). Qualitative content 
analysis is used to analyse transcription data, for example interviews, that can be 
condensed to textual form and also can be used to analyse non-textual data like works 
of art (Brewerton and Millward 2001; Hsieh and Shannon 2005). It works by 
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categorising the qualitative data of text into different types of themes, which have 
similar features or meanings (Weber 1990) so it focuses on meaning rather than 
quantification (Brewerton and Millward 2001). Content analysis aims to “provide 
knowledge and understanding of the phenomenon under study” (Dowen-Wamboldt 
1992, p.314). It is defined as “a research method for the subjective interpretation of 
the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and 
identifying themes or patterns” (Hsieh and Shannon 2005). The current use of content 
analysis shows that there are three different approaches: conventional, directed or 
summative (Hsieh and Shannon 2005). Hsieh and Shannon (2005) list the criteria of 
differentiating between the three approaches that are: coding, its origin, and threats to 
reliability. In the conventional approach coding classifications are derived from the 
data, while in the directed approach a theory or previous findings are used to generate 
initial codes (Hsieh and Shannon 2005). The summative approach contains counting 
and comparisons of certain words, or content followed by the explanation text (Hsieh 
and Shannon 2005). According to Krippendorf (1980) two different techniques are 
used in content analyses: mechanical and interpretative. The former technique involves 
organising and dividing the data into themes; while the later involves determining what 
themes are meaningful and important regarding the asked questions (Krippendorf 
1980). The advantage of using content analysis is the ability to examine what is said 
(e.g. context) and not said (e.g. form) during interviews (Merton and Kedall 1949). 
The analysis of the interviews follows different steps. The first step was several 
readings of the transcribed interviews in order to get familiarised with the data. The 
second step was identifying the main themes that were generated from the data. The 
third step is making the data more condense from the large volume of information and 
selecting the main themes. All data collected from semi-structured interviews are 
organised in computer files. The qualitative data categorised into themes for analysis 
to identify concepts and issues (Grbick 2007) and to form common ideas (Creswell 
2003). 
The main principles of complexity theory are emergence, self-organisation, non-
linearity, adaptiveness and connectivity and the features of complex systems (listed in 
chapter two according to Cilliers 1998) were tackled when analysing the data. As each 
phase of emergency management has its own degree of complexity, the themes 
covered phases of mitigation, preparedness and response. The features of complex 
emergency were used to identify the current mitigation, preparedness and response 
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measures, roles, responsibilities and resources. This was helpful for suggesting future 
development to overcome the inherent complexity. Complexity theory was used as an 
explanatory framework on how organisations or stakeholders behave and why, when 
responding to the given scenarios. Thus, the importance of adapting the complexity 
theory is to correct the way the tourism and emergency organisation stakeholders view 
emergencies and to help them understand their complex nature. Also, to understand 
the dynamic interaction between different elements in a system like the tourism 
industry and the case of this study (cruise, tourism stakeholders, and emergency 
services). For example, lack of understanding the uncertainty and complexity of 
emergencies by the participants showed the lack of preventive and preparedness 
measures taken by the organisations. Additionally, it was helpful to evaluate the 
current situation of organisations in dealing with incidents and to develop and enhance 
their current plans and future thinking for future incidents. In addition, complexity 
theory was used to understand the behaviour of the complex systems elements in 
responding to tourism incidents, in particular cruise ship as in the given scenarios. 
Therefore, the gap in the response phase was easily identified. For example, it was 
found that the interaction between the stakeholders was not dynamic. Complexity 
theory helped to develop the concept of an integrated emergency response system and 
the most important elements/ strategies that should be applied in the system 
(communication, coordination, cooperation and collaboration). By integrating these 
concepts, the developed integrated emergency response system will be more 
collaborative. Therefore, resulting in an effective response.  Furthermore, complexity 
theory described how the involved stakeholders participated in change over time as a 
result of previous incidents. For example, what kind of changes the stakeholders have 
made after Guno cyclone in 2007 to face the 2010 cyclone. Finally, it helped to justify 
and understand why tourism is not prepared and not integrated with emergency 
services for the mentioned reasons in chapter 7.  
6.8 Ethics, Reliability, Validity and Limitations 
Ethics 
To proceed with the work of any research honestly and with integrity there is an ethical 
responsibility (Wilson 2010; John et al. 2014). Research ethics is defined as “the moral 
principles guiding the planning and conduct of research, the publication of outcomes 
and post-project care and/or disposal of records or materials” (Bournemouth 
University-code of ethics 2014). Rowley (2004, p.210) suggested, “Conducting 
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research ethically is concerned with respecting privacy and confidentiality and being 
transparent about the use research data.” Participants in the study were provided with 
a Participant Information Sheet containing a written description of the study, their 
participation in it, how it works, how the data is used and what will be expected of 
them. With respect to the semi-structured interview participants, they were fully 
informed about the purpose, methods and the intended possible use of the research. 
They signed a consent form that gave them sufficient information about the research, 
and they had sufficient time to understand the implications and to ask questions if they 
had any inquiries. Participants were informed that they have the right to participate, 
refuse or withdraw at any time. They also received a clear explanation as to why they 
have been asked to contribute and were informed in relation to the areas of questioning. 
The data is stored securely and backed up electronically in addition to the main storage. 
When the data is not required, all personal data will be securely destroyed. All results 
are considered anonymous. They will be published in a way to ensure the accessibility 
of the participants. A research ethics training course has been done successfully online 
and the ethics checklist has been submitted and successfully approved by the Ethics 
Committee. 
Reliability 
According to Yin (2003) reliability in qualitative research refers to whether the task of 
a study, like data collection techniques, can be repeated to obtain the same results. In 
another way, according to Denscombe (2003), if someone else carried out the research 
would he/she come up with the same results and draw the same conclusion? Likewise, 
Kvale (1989, p.79) stated, “reliability is a question of whether repeated investigations 
of the same phenomenon will give the same result. In another words, the extent to 
which results are consistent over time and an accurate representation of the total 
population under study is referred to as reliability and if the results of a study can be 
reproduced under similar methodology, then the research instrument is considered to 
be reliable “ (Joppe 2000 cited in Golafshani 2003, p.598). In this study, reliability has 
been considered by asking similar questions to the participants in different ways, 
listening to the recorded interviews several times, going through the various 
transcriptions of recorded interviews, and through precise analysis of the interview in 
order to understand the accurate meaning of the participants’ responses in order to 
come up with logical results. 
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Validity 
Validity is related to the findings and if they appear as they are meant to (Saunders et 
al. 2016) and is relevant to quantitative or qualitative data (Silverman 2001). Although 
validity is used to make sure the results or findings are accurate from the perspective 
of the researcher, the participants or the reader, some authors see its role as being minor 
in qualitative research while others see it as a strength (Creswell 2003). Validation 
interviews according to Adams et al. (2014) are conducted in order to validate the 
reliability of the interpretation of collected data. In this research the researcher has 
interviewed people who have not been interviewed so they are out-of sample 
interviews (Adams et al. 2014). Therefore, according to Adams et al. (2014, p.145) 
“feeding back findings to those who were not previously part of the study is a powerful 
way to ascertain the degree of generalizability to the results”. In this study different 
methods were used to confirm the validity, such as comparing the findings to the 
literature review to see how they fit with the existing body of knowledge. Another 
method is where focus groups have been conducted in order to validate the results of 
the conducted interviews. Focus group interviews are discussion-based and conducted 
to collect qualitative data (Millward 1995) on specific topics among participants in an 
open and tolerant environment and led by moderator (Hakim 2000; Saunders et al. 
2016). In focus groups, data is generated by multiple respondents (Brewerton and 
Millward 2001). “The aim of the focus group is to get closer to participants’ 
understanding and perspectives of certain issues” (Brewerton and Millward 2001:81). 
Another aim of the focus group interview relates to the ability to analyse how 
participants’ discussions constitute a shared meaning (Belzile and Oberg 2012). 
Contrasting focus groups to one-to one interview, participants have the ability “to 
explore and challenge the experiences and opinions of others and to reflect on their 
own” (Matthews and Ross 2010, p.236). The size of the focus group may vary 
depending on the nature of the topic (Saunders et al. 2016). The size of focus groups 
is clearly not a hard and fast rule as demonstrated by the literature, where Adams et al. 
(2014) states that the optimal size of focus group is between 8 to 12, which contrasts 
with Hakim (2000) who suggests that the optimal size is between 4-10 participants. 
A total of 24 people were interviewed in 3 focus groups in order to validate the results 
of the interviews conducted in Oman. This was done by grouping people according to 
their sector. The first group involved 8 participants from the tourism sector; the second 
group involved 8 participants from the emergency sector; the third group was mixed, 
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with 4 participants from each sector. Focus group interviews can be used as a main 
method to collect primary data or be supplementary to other methods (Brewerton and 
Millward 2001). John et al (2014) found that focus group interviews are a useful 
method for validating findings as they save time in addition helping the researcher 
evaluate if he/she has made the correct interpretation of the data. The focus group 
interviews were conducted in Oman during the time of the National Committee for 
Civil Defence (NCCD) organisation for Emergency and Crisis management in 
Tourism symposium. It was held in October 2017 at the venue of the Public Authority 
for Civil Defence for 5 days. Participants in the symposium were from different 
tourism and emergency sectors: The Royal Oman Police: Operations and Airport 
Security, The Public Authority for Civil Defence and Ambulance, The National 
Committee for Civil Defence, the Coast Guard, The Royal Armed Forces and the 
Royal Navy. Tourism sector participants were from Ministry of Tourism, hotels, event 
organisers, airlines, national ferries company and port authorities. 
The role of the researcher was facilitator, to guide the group to discuss issues in a 
systematic order and keep the group focused on discussing the same issues (Adams et 
al. 2014). The moderator’s role was to make sure that all members participate in the 
discussion and certain members do not dominate it. In addition to facilitating, the 
moderator ensured transition from one topic to another to ensure all areas are covered. 
The focus group interviews were well planned, all three groups were introduced to the 
purpose of the study and the aim of the focus group interviews was identified 
specifically. In addition to the participant’s information sheet, the consent forms were 
handed to all participants. The findings of the semi-structured interviews were 
explained in addition to the designed scenarios. The interviews lasted for 30 minutes 
to one hour. Each interview could not last for more than one hour because all 
participants are committed to the symposium schedule, which was full of exercises 
and discussion, so their time was exceedingly tight. 
Limitations of the Study 
The limitations of the study are that the interviews in Oman were conducted with 
participants representing the emergency management authorities like the Royal Omani 
Police and the Royal Navy, so there was limited accessibility to some information, 
which may be considered confidential; this affected the results’ general applicability. 
The Participants from Europe only numbered five, it was hard to find more 
participants, and this limits the general applicability of the findings. Due to the 
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sensitivity of the research topic, many people refused to participate in the study. 
Another limitation can be found in the fact that the research is qualitative, and therefore 
results cannot easily be generalised rather than transferred as whether the findings 
would be applicable in other countries, for example other Gulf countries, or in other 
contexts such as the in-land tourists. 
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: Findings and Discussion 
Part 1: Oman's Interviews Analysis 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter consists of two parts. The first part presents data analysis that focuses on 
evaluating the capability of the emergency response system in Oman. Interviews were 
held with eighteen individuals (See Table 7-1) from the tourism industry, port 
authorities and emergency services. While the second part presents data analysis that 
focusing on identifying needs, expectations and challenges of cruise lines. At the 
beginning of each interview it was explained to each interviewee that there are four 
phases for handling an emergency: mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. 
It was further clarified that this study was focusing on the response phase. This 
explanation was designed to ensure that the interviewees could bear these phases in 
mind when providing their answers. Scenarios were presented to the interviewees in a 
mixed order to minimise unsystematic variation (See Appendix 6). 
Table 7-1. Interviews Sample 1 
Number of 
Interviewees Sector Job Title 
Code 
used 
11 Tourism Industry  
● Director of Tourism Events (Cruise Shipping) 
● Director of Tourism Product Development 
● Tourism Product Development Advisor 
● General Director of Tourism Development 
● Chief Executive Officers of Tour Agents 
● Chief Executive Officers of Shipping Agents 
● Shipping Managers 
● Business Manager for Shipping Services  
T 
2 Port Authorities 
● Port Operations Manager 
● Engineer in Port Directorate-Ministry of 
Transportation and Communication 
P 
5 Emergency Services 
● Representative from the National Committee for 
Civil Defence/ Royal Oman Police (ROP) 
● Representative from the Coast Guard/ (ROP) 
● Representative from the Public Authority for Civil 
Defence and Ambulance/ (ROP) 
● Representative from the Maritime Security 
Centre/Royal Navy of Oman -Ministry of Defence 
● Member of the Public Health and Safety sector in 
the National Committee for Civil Defence 
E 
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Following the interviews, three focus group interviews were conducted in order to 
validate the findings of the interview data. Each focus group consisted of 8 members 
Table. 7-2. These participants did not participate in the previous interviews. 
Table 7-2. Focus Groups 
Focus Group No Focus Group Members Code 
Focus Group One Representatives from the Tourism industry  FG1 
Focus Group Two Representatives from the Emergency Services FG2 
Focus Group 
Three 
Representatives from both tourism industry and Emergency 
Services FG3 
 
The analysis is divided into two sections: data collected on tourism and port 
authorities, and data on the emergency services. A number of themes (Figure 7-1) 
have been identified using a combination of conventional and derived content analysis 
(Hsieh and Shannon 2005). 
 
Figure 7-1. Themes and sub-themes of Data Analysis 
(Author 2018) 
 
These themes formed a conceptual framework in order to help evaluate the capability 
of Oman’s emergency response system when receiving international cruise ships (the 
fourth objective of this research). Moreover, they assist in determining the roles and 
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responsibilities of stakeholders when undertaking emergency response planning and 
execution when receiving international cruise ships. 
7.2 Tourism Industry and Port Authorities 
7.2.1 The Perception of Emergency Management 
A number of questions were posed to the tourism and port authorities in order to 
evaluate their level of awareness, the importance of emergency management planning 
and the current control of negative incidents. Although there was a demonstrable lack 
of awareness, there was consensus on the importance of adopting emergency 
management planning within their organisations. The interviewees were unanimous 
that an absence of emergency management planning was chiefly attributable to the 
lack of awareness among all stakeholders. They mentioned that Cyclone Guno (2007) 
and Cyclone Phet (2010) were considered a wake-up call for the country: 
“We haven’t come across the concept of emergency or disaster 
management except when it had occurred but before we didn’t get any 
idea and we didn’t prepare well for it.” T3 
“If you came a couple of years ago there was nobody talking about 
emergency and disaster but for the last couple of years there were 
many changes because of the Guno and Phet Cyclones.” T2 
These statements show the impact of previous incidents in creating awareness of 
emergency and disasters. However, being aware or having basic knowledge does not 
mean they are familiar with the mitigation, preparedness, response or recovery 
procedures (Carlino et al. 2008). It also indicates that there is no adequate planning for 
emergencies in place. In addition, this indicates that they lack the understanding of the 
complexity and uncertainty of emergencies. They were not prepared until Guno 
happened, in 2007, and still another cyclone happened in 2010 and the situation was 
similar. One of the shipping agents (T9) seeks to provide emergency management in 
his organisation by employing someone who is an expert in this field, saying: 
“Emergency management in my organization I have ex-navy 
commander working as an operational manager and I have one more 
ex-navy working with me…” T9 
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This statement can be considered as a challenge; the lack of awareness and knowledge 
about what emergency management includes (Carlino et al. 2008) as well as the 
narrow vision of the organisation towards adopting emergency management. These 
challenges may hinder organisations from planning for emergency management 
(Hystad and Keller 2007) by setting clear objectives for how to deal with an 
emergency. It also shows that there is no consistency and control over the management 
of an emergency, because there is no plan and it is only the operational manager's 
action and decision. However, employing experts is helpful in getting the benefit of 
their experience (Glaesser 2006; Sanjeewa et al. 2012), but having the required 
capacities and developing plans would be more effective. This statement also indicates 
that this participant wanted to show that they have personnel capable of handling 
emergency incidents by having “ex-military employees”, whereas in fact they might 
not be familiar with such incidents and lack experience in handling a number of 
different cases that might happen. They may have not even worked in areas related to 
emergency management at all. 
Interviewees highlighted several reasons to support the importance of emergency 
management planning, in particular planning for response. For instance, interviewees 
pointed to Oman’s growing tourism industry (Mintel 2013). As the number of tourists 
increases (The Tourism Index Report 2016; Ministry of Tourism 2017; NCIS 2017), 
the country (Oman) is attempting to use tourism to diversify the economy (Winkler 
2007; TimesofOman.com 2015; The Reality of Omani Tourism: NCSI 2016; Umar 
2016). However, tourism is susceptible to the negative consequences of an emergency 
(Henderson 2007; Ritchie 2009). 
On the other hand, several explanations were put forward for the current absence of 
emergency management planning and its adoption. For example, as tourism consists 
of small to medium enterprises (SMEs) (Becken and Hughy 2013), there is a lack of 
capital and therefore they cannot invest in educating and training people for emergency 
response planning (Waugh and Streib 2006; Hystad and Keller 2007; Cioccio and 
Michael 2007; Wang and Ritchie 2012). For these above-mentioned reasons, there is 
a need to establish a partnership between the public and private sector to minimise the 
negative impact of emergencies and to enhance emergency and disaster resilience 
(Bajracharya and Hastings 2012; Auzzir et al. 2014; Hochrainer-Stigler and Lorant1 
2017). The private sector, they can provide different resources instead of money like 
(e.g. accommodation or transportation for tourists, information, skills, training, 
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destination marketing, etc.). Therefore, it is vital to integrate the emergency operation 
in most government operations like tourism (Wang and Ritchie 2012). They do not 
consider that tourism works as a complex adaptive system with several stakeholders 
that influence and are influenced however, they have limited resources and need 
support from others.   Some of them pointed out that planning for an emergency could 
be expensive (Wang and Ritchie 2012), especially due to low oil prices. Conversely, 
T1 argued that planning for an emergency is not as costly as the potential tangible 
impact of a disaster, such as loss of life or damage to ships, or the intangible impacts 
that would affect Oman’s image as a tourist destination (Huan et al. 2004; Armstrong 
and Ritchie 2007). So, since they do not have the budget to invest in planning and the 
effect of a disaster are more costly, they need to think about what the worst-case 
scenario is that might happen and to evaluate if they have allocated the required 
resources to handle it. Therefore, adopting strong mitigation and preparedness 
measures can minimise the negative effects and future incidents (Blaikie et al. 1994; 
Ronan and Johnston 2001; Waugh and Streib 2006; Carlino et al. 2008; Ireni Saban 
2014) as well as enhance response (Ritchie 2009). Adopting effective mitigation and 
preparedness measures will be active if stakeholders are fully aware of the complexity 
of an emergency. The more they are aware of its complexity, the more they provide 
better solutions and integrate effective procedures.   
In spite of their view on the importance of response planning, interviewees from the 
tourism sector (T1, T2, T3, T5, T6, T7, T8, and T9) reported the absence of any 
emergency planning department, proper procedures, programs or capacities, as two of 
them stated: 
“Until today I am talking with you, we don’t have a department for 
emergency management with regards to cruise ships” T1 
“We don’t have strong emergency management and now we feel that 
we need an emergency management program. …” T2 
The word “now” in the response from Ministry of Tourism respondent (T2) may refer 
to the current situation of the tourism sector in Oman because many projects have 
recently been launched or announced e.g. hotels (MoT 2016; NCSI 2017). It might 
also refer to the situation in the Middle East where there have been many terrorist 
attacks and incidents that may fuel the desire to be more prepared. However, 
preparation does not necessitate a separate department, if the required resources and 
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capabilities are available. Alternatively, another possible interpretation for this might 
be that the Ministry does not have plans, procedures or resources for handling 
emergencies, even though they are unpredictable and complex (Faulkner 2001; 
Helbing et al. 2005; Coskun and Ozecylan 2011; O’Sullivan et al. 2013). 
The interviewees further commented on the current situation in dealing with negative 
incidents. The port operator (P2) explained the integrated system of emergency 
response that is divided into levels and it depends on the nature of the situation. These 
three levels are: 
● Level 1 emergency  local alert 
 Confined to a specific location 
● Level 2 emergency  Site alert 
 May spread to affect a larger area 
● Level 3 emergency  External alert 
 Level 3 emergencies may affect people, Property and the 
environment outside the port, e.g. uncontrolled fire, and/or 
toxic gas release. 
P2 explained in case the emergency in level 1 occurs, the incident is handled by the 
Port Services Company (PSC) using its own resources and capabilities like IT network 
failure, electricity power failure, breakage of water pipe line, local minor fire incidents. 
While in case of an emergency in level 2 and 3 the PSC hands over the Emergency 
Response to external agencies (Civil Defence, Royal Navy of Oman and other 
ministerial representatives and monitoring agencies) through the Royal Omani Police 
to address the emergency as it may exceeds their capacity and ability. 
However, this system can be criticised for the lack of collaboration (Impcoor doc 2000; 
Kamensky et al. 2004). This is needed in case resources are scattered and roles are not 
identified clearly as incidents cannot be managed by one organisation (Waugh and 
Streib 2006) as collaboration can enhance the response (McKercher and Cohen 2004; 
Xia et al. 2011; Pramanik et al. 2015). Additionally, this system can be criticised for 
the lack of stakeholders involved (Eide et al. 2012) e.g. Ministry of Tourism in case a 
cruise is affected because collaboration is also highly required in case the emergency 
results in mass casualties (Kapucu and Garayev 2011). It can also be criticised for a 
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lack of coordination (Malone and Crowston 1990; Impcoor doc 2000; Drabek and 
McEntire 2002; Corbacioglu and Kapucu 2006; Comfort 2007) that is required to meet 
different needs in time of response (Bergströn et al. 2016) and to use the available 
capabilities (Ekman and Uhr 2015). It can also be criticised for a lack of information 
that is important for mitigation planning (Nateghi 2000; Wang and Ritchie 2012) and 
supports the work of the emergency response system (Chen et al. 2007) and facilitating 
coordination (Raju and Becker (2013). Effective communication, which is important 
for designing emergency plans, is also lacking (Pollard and Hotho 2006) and therefore 
poses a challenge to the National Disaster Management System in Oman (Al Shaqsi 
2011); this may result in a slow response (Ritchie 2009). Hence, slow response will 
result in increasing the number of victims like the case of Sewol ferry (Ramage 2015). 
So ineffective communication hinders coordination (Nowell and Steelman 2014). 
Participant from the Ministry of Tourism agreed there is a lack of coordination and 
that it should be established between all organisations (Ireni Saban 2014) which if not, 
in time of response may results in delays, costs, inefficiencies and ineffective solutions 
(Kettl 2003; Comfort 2007). However, the Ministry of Tourism is only coordinating 
different agencies in an attempt to avoid major incidents. If a significant negative event 
occurred, they would tell their stakeholders whom to contact. Thus, coordination is 
required between tourism and emergency services (UNWTO 2014). 
Concerning the responses of the tour and shipping agents generally, most of the cases 
they are dealing with involve sickness, which is not necessarily part of an emergency 
at a high level. Shipping and tour agents (T6, T7, T8, T9 and T10) handling negative 
incidents based on their experiences follow a reactive approach (Pauchant and Mitroff 
1992) and general procedures if anything happens, but do not follow specific 
procedures for specific incidents. If something does happen, most of them follow a 
communication chain: the tour guide must report to the line manager, who reports to 
the management of the company, who then evaluates the situation. Overall, it is a poor 
procedure due to the length of the chain and the long-time taken in order to solve a 
problem. In addition, it is a linear incidents management plan (Paraskevas 2006) used 
to solve complex and unpredictable incident (Faulkner 2001; Helbing et al. 2005; 
Coskun and Ozecylan 2011; O’Sullivan et al. 2013) that occurs in tourism as complex 
adaptive system (see Farrell and Twining-Ward 2005; Miller and Twining-Ward 2005; 
Baggio 2007; de Sausmarez 2007; Baggio 2008; Schianetz and Kavanagh 2008; 
Stevenson et al. 2009; Baggio and Sainaghi 2011). This unpredictable and complex 
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incident also has a knock-on effect on different stakeholders. One participant (T9) 
declared that they rely on the operational staff to handle any situation because they are 
used to handling such incidents. Again, this is also a reactive procedure with nothing 
done in advance. Other employees should be familiar with responding to incidents, as 
the operation staff may not be available all the time. Experienced employees might 
also leave and be replaced by new employees unfamiliar with such operations, 
presenting a threat for the company. The arguments presented highlight the current 
situation of handling different incidents in the tourism industry. This situation needs 
development and an upgrade from safety and security to emergency and disasters. In 
addition, further education and training are needed. The next theme proceeds to 
evaluate emergency mitigation and preparedness procedures. 
7.2.2 Mitigation and Preparedness Measures 
Mitigation Measures 
In order to assess their preventive procedures, the interviewees were asked if they 
conduct a risk management process (Barton and Hardingree 1995). Then they were 
asked whether they are continuing to monitor and evaluate new sources of risk and, if 
so, how? Prior to Cyclones Guno (2007) and Phet (2010) there was no annual risk 
assessment (Wang 2001) conducted at the port by P1 and P2. As a result of the 
significant impact of the cyclones, the risk was recognised as being considerable. It 
was clear that the risk of cyclones had not been considered since the port was 
constructed in 1974, but due to climate change, it became seen as a significant problem 
(O’Brien et al. 2010) as the country has become more vulnerable to tropical cyclones. 
However, the port’s operator (P2) was able to explain clearly the annual risk 
assessment process for different natural and human induced hazards put into place by 
their international code of safety and security. He illustrated one example of a new 
source of risk: the size of the channel in certain ports is very narrow, and yet larger 
ships are more common (Bowen et al. 2014; TimesofOman.com 2017). This causes 
difficulty for the ships when they turn; thus, they made a proposal to the governmental 
authority (P1) to widen the channels. However, there was no consideration of the 
Port’s capacity in dealing with a ship sinking, capsizing or a major fire. 
The Ministry of Tourism participants declared that they are not evaluating specific 
risks. Additionally, another interviewee from the Ministry concurred that nothing has 
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been done to evaluate risks that might happen or to look for new sources of risk. The 
reason given for this omission by a tourism industry interviewee was: 
“We are not that professional so far in this, I don’t know, and I haven’t 
seen anything of this in hand …” T2 
A possible explanation for this might be that it is not considered important to be 
professionally trained in planning for emergencies. Similar to planning for new 
projects, they might not be professional in planning for them, but they may consult 
experts or attend workshops or training courses. Therefore, evaluating such risks can 
be conducted with emergency organisations and thus it requires collaboration and 
communication with the specialist agencies (Waugh 2003) in order to respond 
effectively as part of complex adaptive systems (Ansell et al. 2010; Okros et al. 2011; 
Wyche et al. 2011). This statement can also be attributed to a lack of knowledge of 
what risk assessments should be undertaken and how they can be conducted (Lin and 
Song 2015). However, lack of knowledge is an important factor in planning for 
emergency mitigation (Nateghi 2000). Moreover, Lin and Song (2015) listed different 
approaches in understanding complex situations (emergency) such as looking at the 
views of stakeholders, experts and the public. This is because understanding their 
complex nature and their knock-on effect will result in an effective response (Coskun 
and Ozecylan 2011). 
The responses from the tour and shipping agents suggest that although they have 
different procedures, not all of them are under the umbrella of the risk assessment 
process. Different examples were provided by interviewees T5, T10, T11, such as 
checking for food safety due to a past experience of food poisoning, and regular checks 
to ensure vehicles and buses are equipped with fire extinguishers and hammers. T5 
and T11 mentioned that they receive requests from international cruise ship companies 
to conduct a safety and security audit and they send them a specialist to undertake a 
security check prior to arrival. This check includes the itinerary and the possible risks 
that might occur, a safety check form for coaches and vehicles, and risk assessment 
forms for hotels. These procedures are carried out to fulfil the requirements of the 
international cruise lines they are handling. Hence, to maintain their market share, they 
are following what they are required to do, even though it is not embedded in the local 
organisation’s work. This is because if a disaster affects a large-scale cruise ship it will 
affect the tourists’ perception (Huan et al. 2004) and result in a negative economic 
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impact (Paraskevas and Arendell 2007). Thus, the interconnectedness of the complex 
system elements is not considered and understood by the participants. The 
interconnectedness indicates that the system changes overtime where the 10-year 
stakeholders might not stay the same, they might no longer exist in the market or 
reposition themselves (Mckercher 1999). For example, when the international cruise 
ship asked a local company to do the risk assessment, the cruise line may not have 
worked with them before. Furthermore, the factor behind this might be the culture 
(Stead and Smallman 1999), which means that the safety and security in the culture of 
the partner and the international cruise lines may be more strongly considered than the 
situation in the destination (Chang 2002). Accordingly, the dynamic interaction is also 
not considered. This is because the dynamic interaction shows how each element 
influences and is influenced by others (Cilliers 1998). What influenced this local 
company to do so is external elements the culture and policies of the international 
cruise. However, they are not asked to be prepared for natural or human-induced 
emergencies. 
Interestingly, these regular checks have been implemented by organisations because 
they have experienced an incident, not because they were a natural part of their 
preventive measures or embedded in their work. This action of doing so demonstrates 
how history or past experiences of complex systems have the ability to change the 
strategies or to enable the adoption of new procedures (Cilliers 1998).  Surprisingly, 
two interviewees (T6 and T8) explained that they are conducting risk assessments, not 
in relation to the ship’s passengers, but for an emergency response in offices or 
buildings. For instance, if a fire breaks out in the building, they know the correct 
procedures, such as where to locate fire extinguishers, and where the fire exits are. In 
summary, tourism organisations are not dealing with this issue seriously and they are 
leaving the responsibility to emergency organisations. Although these organisations 
are not experienced in conducting the risk assessment process, liaising with disaster 
management agencies and easy access to information can assist them in implementing 
effective risk reduction measures. 
What was declared by the interviews was also agreed upon by the focus group 
participants and they mentioned that there is no integration within the tourism industry 
regarding risk assessment and early warnings. Participants in the FG1 and FG3 agreed 
that the tourism stakeholders are not working together to assess risk or to provide early 
warnings against particular threats like terrorism or earthquakes. They referred that to 
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the previously mentioned reasons by the interviewees (lack of coordination and 
cooperation, lack of Knowledge, lack of awareness, lack of cohesiveness). In short, 
they are not working as a complex adaptive system that leads to connectivity and to 
emergence, as their interaction will be with their surroundings. However, early 
warnings are important to notify the tourism stakeholders of any potential hazards, so 
it needs to be incorporated to the government (emergency services) responsibilities 
and reports. This demonstrates how the complex system works far from the 
equilibrium point where the regular updates (e.g. early warnings) help the system to 
survive (Cilliers 1998). They also mentioned although they are aiming for full 
integration in the future; coordination and cooperation can be improved and achieved 
in the short-term (Najam 2000; Cigler 2001; Brown and Keast 2003; Odlund 2010). 
The reasons given for full integration are to understand risk, to overcome future risk 
and to introduce protective measures. 
Additional tasks that organisations have to do in order to design mitigation plans and 
procedures for an emergency include identifying the channel of information on 
emergencies, mitigation and support networking. Interviewees were asked to identify 
their source of information for emergencies (What might happen and how is it to be 
handled?). There is no source of information for interviewees except attending 
meetings with different stakeholders. The port authorities (P1 and P2) attend meetings 
with the Royal Oman Police (the coastguard) to keep them updated with the latest 
safety and security measures at the port. The port operator (P2) explained that because 
they are following an integrated emergency system, they have to meet in order to avoid 
any duplication and conflict in performing tasks and responsibilities. It is noted that 
the Maritime Security Centre is not involved in such meeting that include the 
Coastguard, Immigration, Ministry of Tourism, Ministry of Transportation, Muscat 
Municipality, shipping agents and tour agents, even though it is a vital source of 
information. Furthermore, the Ministry of Tourism representatives declared there was 
no source of information other than that available through these meetings. 
As one of the interviewees mentioned, before the tourist season they conduct two 
meetings: one with the government stakeholders (Port authority, Port Operator, Coast 
Guard of ROP) and the other with industry stakeholders (Travel and shipping agents). 
The purpose of conducting such meetings is to make sure that everything is going 
smoothly, so they are operational rather than strategic. In these meetings they highlight 
the challenges faced and discuss how to solve them. The participant said: “Ensuring 
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things are going smoothly”, meaning the process of receiving the tourists and 
providing good services. These meetings are not conducted in order to get more 
information on emergencies, on handling them, or checking whether there is any 
alternative plan in case of emergencies. They are not conducted to get information that 
facilitates the coordination among all involved stakeholders (Raju and Becker 2013). 
In addition, the Ministry only involves the police (Coastguard) in the meeting while 
the Centre of Maritime Security (Royal Navy) is not involved. However, the more 
participants in the emergency, the more improved capability there is regarding 
communication and coordination (Morakabati et al. 2016). It is also noted that 
conducting two separate meetings with all stakeholders is not helpful in addressing the 
challenges. Briefly gathering them all together will be more helpful in addressing the 
challenges and identifying the best solutions, as each member can contribute with their 
experience and area of expertise. This indicates that organisations do not have the 
willingness and ability to collaborate with others (Kapucu 2006b). 
One of the shipping agents (T7) mentioned that before the tourist season they attend a 
meeting with the Police, Civil Defence and Ministry of Tourism to discuss what the 
challenges were the last season. One of the tour agents (T5) said their source of 
information involved communicating with the responsible agency to determine if a 
storm is coming (reactive approach) and to receive advice on where they can take 
tourists. They should, however, be prepared in advance with solutions, they should 
have plan A and plan B in case of any potential incidents. These responses indicate 
limited sources of information on potential incidents and their handling procedures. 
As one interviewee commented: 
“We need to be updated by the emergency and local authorities of what 
might happen, what should be done and whom to contact.” T6 
This indicates the lack of communication between the tourism and emergency sectors, 
which could increase awareness with regards to risk assessment and identify the safest 
areas for tourists. Communication is highly required due the complex nature of 
incidents and their destructive impact (Nowell and Steelman 2014). This is because 
failure in communication affects the emergency response system negatively (Comfort 
et al. 2004) and hinders coordination (Nowell and Steelman 2014).  
On the other hand, focus group participants revealed that sharing information through 
common meetings on type of hazards does not exist within the tourism industry. 
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However, they are aiming for full integration among all tourism stakeholders in order 
to gain more knowledge and share different experiences and avoid the bad cases and 
events the previously occurred. Again, here it is found that tourism stakeholders are 
not working as a complex adaptive system because there is no positive or negative 
feedback within the system (Tourism stakeholders) and from the external environment 
(emergency services) (Taborga 2012).  
In order to learn from the experience of others and prepare for future incidents, 
relations should be established with regional or national emergency management 
agencies, as well as industry and governmental organisations (Waugh and Streib 
2006). With this objective in mind, interviewees were asked about their current 
relationships with other agencies. The port authority (P1) has established relations with 
the ROP and Ministry of Tourism. By comparison, the port operator (P2) follows an 
integrated emergency response system and therefore has connections with many of the 
aforementioned agencies. On the other hand, the Ministry of Tourism has no regional 
relations with any agency except the ROP. However, investing to establish and 
develop relations with local and international organisations is required to handle the 
magnitude of the effects arising from disasters (Waugh and Streib 2006; O’Sullivan et 
al. 2013). 
Conversely, the tour and shipping agents don’t have relations with regional agencies, 
but rather see it as the government’s responsibility to establish these relations. Within 
the country, these agents are in contact with the Ministry of Tourism for other 
activities, but not for emergency management. They are in contact with the ROP in 
case of an emergency. Nonetheless, as agencies they should establish their own 
relations network to solve any potential problems or receive advice or assistance. 
Moreover, the relations within the sector itself to reach common standards for 
emergency management in Oman, does not exist as agreed by the focus group 
participants. The purpose of establishing such relations, especially prior to 
emergencies, is required in order to consult with those who are experts in this area 
(emergency management) to promote coordination and communication in the time of 
an incident.  Overall, these results indicate that the preventive measures taken by the 
tourism industry and its relevant stakeholders are currently weak. After taking the 
necessary precautions in order to prevent or mitigate adverse incidents, these 
organisations should improve their capacity by ensuring the effectiveness of their 
plans, personnel and resources.
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Preparedness Measures 
The interviewees were asked if they plan for the future by listing what kind of threats 
might occur and affect tourism or the destination and particularly the cruise industry 
in the next 12 months. All the interviewees admitted that they do not do so, although 
they agreed that it is an important task to be done. This indicates that the tourism 
industry is not well-prepared to deal with unexpected incidents (Ritchie 2004; Gundel 
2005; Pizam 2005) that have a knock-on effect on different stakeholders as the tourism 
industry according to Racherla and Hu (2009) is a complex mix of many stakeholders. 
It also shows that their activities are not affected by strategic planning (Ackoff 1970) 
that can strength the organisation’s ability to deal with unforeseen future incidents 
(Pollard and Hotho 2006). This strategic approach to emergency planning is vital to 
ensure the future tourists flow and reduce the emergency impact on destination (Ali 
and Ali 2010). They are not following a proactive approach in handling future 
incidents (Pforr and Hosie 2007). Some interviewees emphasised the absence of 
planning, as one stated: 
“Planning for emergency management in the next 12 month I am not 
sure how we are going to develop it for the whole sector. I think we 
have to work from now.” T2 
The interviewee is uncertain how to plan for incidents for the whole industry, 
indicating a lack of knowledge (Hystad and Keller 2007) and experience. This 
statement shows that the tourism industry doesn’t have well-trained staff to deal with 
emergencies, resources required in time of emergency are ill-defined as well as not 
having the ability to make decision in case of an emergency (Alexander 2009). 
However, interviewees agreed on the reasons for the absence of planning: 
“We don’t think too much (about) what is into the future and expect 
disasters to happen, the unexpected to happen…, ships have quite 
comprehensive emergency response plans ...and they have their own 
procedures they follow in event of incidents.” T8 
“We don’t prepare for an emergency, but we prepare for the season.” T1 
These statements indicate the low level of preparedness among the tourism industry 
and its relevant stakeholders in Oman. With respect to cruise incidents, interviewees 
do not expect incidents because of the highly advanced technology used in building 
the ships, and because cruises have international codes to follow (Vidmar et al. 2013). 
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However, a number of newly built cruise ships have experienced technical problems, 
and even those who follow international codes have been affected, such as the Costa 
Concordia (Schroder-Hinrichs et al. 2012). 
Others see it as too comprehensive a task to be done with their limited experience. 
This mentality may be explained by the size of the organisation, poor integration with 
emergency organisations, or a lack of knowledge concerning what such planning 
entails, as mentioned earlier. Another point could be made relating to culture (Ritchie 
2009). International cruise ships require safety and security checks, yet these agents 
declared that they do not plan. This shows the distinction between the eastern and 
western style in planning for and managing an emergency. There is also a contradiction 
as preparing for the season is seen as preparation for the provision of goods and 
services rather than securing tourists. 
An emergency management plan is an essential document to guide the organisation in 
taking effective measures and making the right decisions in a time of emergency. The 
interviewees were questioned if they have a written emergency management strategy 
or plan detailing the appropriate actions to be taken before, during and after an 
emergency, (Chen and Tsai 2010) and how often they revise it. The port operator P2 
has a written strategy that is revised annually, or after an incident or if there is an 
update in the international code they are following. 
All interviewees representing the Ministry of Tourism responded that the Ministry 
does not have clear plans to manage an emergency. This illustrates that the Ministry 
lacks resources, knowledge, and the experience required to develop such a plan 
(Cioccio and Michael 2007; Wang and Ritchie 2012). Conversely, the travel and 
shipping agents had diverse responses. One agent claimed to have an improper 
document: 
“I would say yes but I would not say it is a proper document … because 
it is done by us.” T5 
This indicates that they were acting only under an obligation to fulfil requirements, 
such as a contract with international cruise companies. Furthermore, since they 
prepared the document themselves, it means that it relied upon self-initiative since 
such a document was not required by the system, the tourism industry, or emergency 
organisations. This is because National Committee for Civil Defence (NCCD) roles 
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neither states its authority to enforce governmental or private agencies to apply 
emergency plans nor indicates who is in charge of ensuing and reviewing the 
application (Al Shaqsi 2011). Two participants (T6 and T8) agreed that they only have 
guidelines for a sick crewmember or passenger, and procedures in case something 
occurs in the building. It is notable that these organisations are addressing what they 
have previously experienced, such as health issues, and they do not prepare for the 
unexpected. It seems that they are only prepared for minor cases not major ones. They 
should rather be made aware of what might happen, and there should be appropriate 
drills and coordination with emergency organisations. 
Surprisingly, T7 and T9 declared that they only follow what they know without any 
written strategy or plan: 
“We don’t have a written strategy but … all our staff are aware what 
to do in case of an emergency.” T7 
“We have guidelines through experience by heart if someone tells me 
this happens so I will tell him what to do from my experience. There is 
no written document.” T9 
It is clear there is an absence of written documents or plans as the organisation should 
have these plans in a written format and connected to procedures (Alexander 2013b), 
and they should not depend on the experience of its employees due to staff turnover. 
This is attributed as human complexity in the emergency response when responders 
responding not following certain procedures and may in turn result in a poor response 
and ineffective decisions (Coskun and Ozecylan 2011). 
It is clear that responses vary to the question of having plans: some have plans, but not 
properly, and some of them they do not have one at all. In addition, focus group 
participants declared that currently there is no integration within the tourism sector for 
cooperation on writing an emergency plan. Two of the interviewees suggested that 
authorised organisations in the country should develop an emergency management 
strategy and hand it to all stakeholders in the tourism industry. They commented: 
“...it is good for the government to give a printed emergency 
management plan and procedures to all agencies something that is a 
standard to all” T9 
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“I would like it if there is professional document done for us it will be 
much better for us” T5 
Interviewees hand the task of designing plans over to the emergency organisations as 
it is their responsibility and they are the specialists. However, it should be a mutual 
responsibility of both the emergency and tourism sectors, so that each sector will have 
specific input in the plan. They can both work in designing such plans because the 
emergency sector might lack valuable tourism information. For more consistency and 
control on the written plan, the government need to be involved so full integration can 
be achieved. Moreover, focus group participants emphasised the need for integration 
in writing emergency plans within the sector in order to have a standard plan for 
managing tourism emergency as well as with the emergency services. These plans 
should connect to procedures to be followed and to resources to be used (Alexander 
2016) if an event occurs and to control risk to mitigate emergency from occurrence. 
Two of the focus group participants said: 
“There is no evidence that tourism stakeholders are knowledgeable to 
write a plan and willingness to participate” FG1 
“If I have been asked as a tourism stakeholder to write an emergency 
plan. It will be difficult unless I set with a person from the National 
Committee for Civil Defence; who is an expert in that” FG3 
These statements clarify the absence of the emergency plans, lack of knowledge as 
well as the absence of the initiative to gather all stakeholders to prepare one. The 
absence of planning and plans show how the stakeholders disregard the complexity 
and uncertainty of emergencies. It also indicates again they are not working as a 
complex adaptive system because they did not learn from previous incidents (e.g Guno 
and Phet Cyclones). Focus group participants highlighted the importance of having an 
emergency plan to prevent panic during an emergency and to avoid making wrong or 
irrational decisions. They suggested that the NCCD should provide the Ministry of 
Tourism the direction and help to set emergency plans. Then the Ministry will be the 
authority responsible for making sure that all tourism stakeholders have emergency 
plans after teaching and directing them. To overcome this deficiency, there should be 
an internal committee within each organisation and at the local level consisting of 
members from different organisations. 
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An emergency management planning committee needs to be activated in all 
organisations in order to carry out the responsibility of emergency response planning. 
The interviewees were asked about whether they have a team or planning committee 
for an emergency. Surprisingly, all 13 tourism industry interviewees in the study do 
not have such a team or committee except for the port operator (P2), which has an 
official internal team included in the organisational structure. The focus group 
participants also agreed upon the absence of the committee. One interviewee 
commented that maybe in the future when something happens, they might formulate 
such a team or committee. It is argued that committees should be formed in advance 
to prepare the organisation in anticipation of any incidents instead of managing 
specific ones reactively. This is due to the fact that disasters are complex, uncertain 
and unpredictable and when they occur, they have cascading consequences. Thus, a 
committee is needed to act on the results of a training scenario and there should be an 
appropriate follow up to update the current plans or the capabilities. Furthermore, the 
committee can work on evaluating the potential hazards and prepare plans to handle 
them. Furthermore, committee relations can be established with different stakeholders. 
Therefore, the committee should involve members from different major stakeholders 
or different organisations so that they can share their knowledge and experiences. 
Although tourism organisations have no committee, their personnel can be engaged in 
workshops or training programs in order to build up their skills and enrich their 
knowledge. 
Interviewees were asked if they have conducted or attended workshops in order to plan 
for an emergency, and if they have designed scenarios for simulations. The port 
governmental authority (P1) has no specific training or exercise, but sometimes they 
participate in courses and conferences related to this area. On the other hand, the port 
operator (P2) is guided by International Labour Organisation (ILO) guidelines, which 
provides safety guidance for ports, so they are following their instructions for health 
and safety. As a result, they give their employees simplified guidance as well as 
conducting lessons, presentations, workshops, discussion and group work for 
simulation. At the same time, they invite the managers of the cruise lines for a 
presentation of safety instructions and in case something goes wrong, they send an 
alert to the shipping agents. 
With respect to training and exercises, the Ministry of Tourism conducts no specific 
exercises or simulation for scenarios. However, they do conduct evacuation drills in 
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their office building in case of a fire because the Civil Defence Authority conducts 
this. One of the Ministry of Tourism interviewees emphasised this lack of training: 
“… except the International workshop on risk management conducted 
by the UNWTO in 2008” T4 
All of these indicate the lack of awareness and knowledge among the tourism industry 
and its relevant stakeholders. Surprisingly, the UNWTO conducted a workshop in the 
following year after Cyclone Guno (2007), yet there is still no obvious change in this 
area. This might be because these cyclones occurred in the off-season and no tourists 
were affected directly. Or it can be explained by the fact that there are no well-qualified 
people in the tourism industry. In addition, the tourism industry at that time was not 
developed; the Ministry was established in 2003 and the workshop was conducted in 
2007. Therefore, the focus of the industry was on increasing the contribution of 
tourism to the national economy and attracting more tourists and investments. Since 
the country is focusing on these investments, it should plan for an emergency. Since 
Oman has been affected by many cyclones and tropical storms in the past, and with 
the threat of terrorist attacks in the Middle East, there is no guarantee it will be always 
be immune to disaster. However, conducting specialised training helps in developing 
the current capacity of the industry (Waugh and Streib 2006; Nivolianitou and 
Synodinou 2011) and therefore reducing human error and improving response (Ritchie 
2009). 
The tour and shipping agents had similar responses: they do not conduct, nor attend, 
any workshops in this regard, and they consider it the responsibilities of the Ministry 
of Tourism and the emergency organisations. As two participants stated: 
“Not really we don’t... it should be done by the Ministry of Tourism or 
the Royal Oman Police” T8 
“In Oman there are no workshops for all organizations” T7 
 
Moreover, one of the interviewees explained this issue by the lack of cohesiveness 
among the organisations in the tourism industry (Hystad and Keller 2007); this is 
considered another challenge for emergency planning: 
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“…as I mentioned everyone is working individually. There is no 
association for tour operators and travel agencies in the country 
…There should be associations and have to meet … to know what the 
plans are and where the country is moving in a directive manner.” T11 
 
We may conclude from these responses that the Ministry of Tourism should 
collaborate with emergency organisations in training its employees as well as the 
industry’s different stakeholders in case an incident might affect the industry. This is 
because specialised training (e.g. Cruise, adventure etc.) will develop the capacity of 
the industry (Waugh and Streib 2006;Nivolianitou and Synodinou 2011), update the 
plan and enhance the decision making (Inzana et al. 1996; Lin and Su 1998; Crichton 
et al. 2000; Authoritative Guide for Tourism Risk Management 2006; Ritchie 2009; 
Edzen 2014) and to minimise future incidents (Ireni Saban 2014). Thus, awareness 
should be increased regarding emergency management, roles and responsibilities 
should be allocated, and resources should be evaluated because increasing awareness 
will help the tourism industry identify the most important information they need (Eide 
et al. 2013). However, the focus group participants mentioned that this seminar 
(Managing tourism crisis and emergency - October 2017) is the first seminar they have 
attended gathering tourism and emergency sectors. At the same time, they described 
their participation in the workshop is limited due to the lack of knowledge about 
emergency management. What was surprising is that some participants mentioned 
they got the invitation for the participation at the last minute, while the biggest travel 
and tour operators in the country (Oman) were not there. This it could be that they 
were not invited, or they had received the invitation late, so they did not have time to 
nominate anyone who could participate. It is suggested that an association should be 
established to gather all tourism stakeholders in order to keep them updated about 
plans and trends, not only for an emergency, but also at the industry level in general. 
Although the Public Authority for Civil Defence and Ambulance (PACDA) is 
conducting evacuation drills within the buildings of tourism organisations, as well as 
providing first aid training for guides and preventive driving for drivers, one of the 
interviewees expressed some criticism: 
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“…ok there are certain courses come for first aid training…. training 
but if it is a bigger thing and if there are some initiatives to tell us how 
to handle these things like planning and response. “ A7 
The first aid training was considered to be basic, and interviewees prefer training at a 
higher level from health and safety to emergency and disaster level. On the other hand, 
this training is given in classroom sessions. It might be explained that drivers and tour 
guides are given such training due to incidents, which happened locally. Generally, the 
role of training and workshops should be to increase the level of awareness of 
emergency and disasters among stakeholders. Furthermore, training is needed to build 
organisational capacity and resilience (O’Brien 2006; 2008; Nivolianitou and 
Synodinou 2011) as well as to overcome any cultural challenges (Adahl 2009). This 
can be achieved through collaboration because collaborative strategies according to 
Robert (2000) simplify wicked problems, like complex and unexpected emergencies 
because those have a high level of uncertainty and need to be managed in collaboration 
with different stakeholders’ part of the complex adaptive system (Ansell et al. 2010; 
Okros et al. 2011; Wych et al. 2011). Additionally, since collaboration is a long-term 
relation (Cigler 2001; Keast and Mandell 2012), the chance to conduct regular training 
and workshops is higher.      
Liaising with the media must ensure the continuity of communication among 
stakeholders and tourists, as well as raising the awareness of emergencies among all 
organisations with regards to emergency and disaster preparedness. The interviewees 
were asked if they have established such relationships with the media in order to raise 
the awareness of preparedness measures for emergencies. Significantly, the study 
found that most organisations avoid communicating with the media, especially if 
something happens. Some organisations consider their public relations department as 
responsible for communications with the media if something does occur. Different 
interviewees believe that the media should not be involved at all because it is a very 
strong tool to minimise or maximise the effect of any emergency, which will affect 
their reputation or public image (Armstrong and Ritchie 2007). One participant 
mentioned that they have relations with the media in terms of promoting domestic 
tourism in the country, but not for an emergency or any other issues. It can be seen 
here that most organisations avoid communicating with the media because they are 
concerned about their reputation and image (Armstrong and Ritchie 2007). No one 
considered the significance of establishing these relations pre-emergency in order to 
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inform all stakeholders of the importance of being prepared for emergencies. 
Moreover, focus group participants commented on sharing information and 
communicating with the media and that there is no such communication regarding 
emergency management. One of them commented: 
“We got most information and early warning of any cyclone or 
incidents through the media like others” FG3 
Focus group participants are suggesting activating operations room in the Ministry of 
Tourism to communicate with the NCCD in times of an emergency, for example 
cyclones. Thus, it can communicate directly with tourism stakeholders to direct and 
update them. This will help them in tracking their tourists, changing their plans and 
making effective decisions. These all help the system to function as a complex 
adaptive system by embracing dynamic interaction through exchanging information 
(Cilliers 1998) therefore tracking their tourists. Moreover, in this case the system is 
influenced by external factors (Cilliers 1998), for example weather, which leads tour 
operators to change their plans from A to B. Finally, receiving positive and negative 
feedback (Cilliers 1998) helps tour operators make decisions.  
The given reason for the integration with the media is stated by focus group 
participants: 
“Liaise with the media does not exist; everybody talks to the media but 
messages not mutual across government” FG1 
Thus, 
“The integration with the media is essential to make sure that common 
message is shared between private and public sectors” FG3 
Tourism staff should be updated with any warning alerts and should likewise keep 
tourists updated. Interviewees were also asked if they have a nominated spokesperson 
representing their organisation in case something happens. Not all the interviewed 
organisations have a nominated spokesperson, and those who do normally appoint 
someone in the organisation’s management. This indicates again the lack of awareness 
and experience. 
Finally, interviewees were asked if they have a specific website to share information 
relating to emergencies, disasters and correlated issues. None of the interviewees had 
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a specific website to share information regarding emergency or disaster management 
or topics or instructions to raise awareness in this area. Even their current websites do 
not share such information. And if something happens, they do not publicise it on the 
organisation’s website; they keep it confidential, and if they share something it is 
general or related to health and safety. The reason for this might be that they do not 
have the information related to emergency and disaster management to share with 
stakeholders or tourists. It might also be because they do not want to lose their 
customers by sharing incidents and showing their level of response. However, sharing 
general information that shows how prepared the organisation is for any incidents will 
indicate the high calibre of the company as well as enhance their customers’ trust. 
However, the behaviour of the complex adaptive system elements represents the 
interaction of all the elements, rather than individual elements (Cilliers 1998).  In 
addition, the flow of the information helps ensure the dynamics and survival of the 
system, which is a result of the availability of feedback.  Therefore, specifying a link 
on the tourism organisation’s current website is recommended because it will be easily 
accessible to tourists. In short, all these techniques (nominating a tourism emergency 
spokesperson, annual stakeholder workshops, liaising with the media and devoted 
webpages) help in building a more proactive emergency management approach and 
enhancing organisation resilience (Hystad and Keller 2008). 
Overall, the mitigation and preparedness measures taken by the tourism industry are 
poor, as Figure 7-2 and Figure 7-3 Show. 
 
Figure 7-2. Poor Mitigation Measures 
(Author 2018) 
 
		190	
 
Figure 7-3. Poor Preparedness Measures 
(Author 2018) 
 
 
However, the effectiveness of these two phases (mitigation and preparedness) appears 
in the response phase, by activating their measures. The next theme addresses the 
response measures. 
7.2.3 Response to Emergency and Disasters for and by Tourism and Port 
Authorities 
Interviewees were asked about the type of emergency or disasters they have 
experienced previously in order to evaluate how they responded and what they learnt 
from that experience. The study found that the most prominent disasters that affected 
the country generally, and therefore the tourism industry, were cyclones Guno and 
Phete in 2007 and 2010 respectively. They were considered by all interviewees as 
lessons they learned from in terms of becoming more aware, despite the fact they 
occurred in the off-season. 
Added to these cyclones were other cases experienced by the tourism industry, tour 
and shipping agents are minor as considered by all interviewees because they had a 
quick response to them. For example, sickness, heart attacks, technical problems, 
death, Swine Flu, H1N1, environmental issues affecting the mangroves, many projects 
established in sensitive areas causing congestion, noise, traffic and pollution which 
according to Ritchie (2009) slows the response in case of an emergency. In addition to 
car accidents, small incidents include tourists falling and breaking a leg, perhaps while 
taking a selfie-photo, food poisoning, and tourists being bitten by a snake, scorpion or 
other insects. There is a disconnection between the different cases that the tourism 
industry experienced and the lack of preventative and preparedness measures they 
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have as found in the previous theme. This shows that stakeholders did not learn from 
the past experiences and did not adapt to new situations to be prepared for the future.  
In terms of what they learned from all these incidents experienced, the port authority 
(P1) started to make plans for the ports to be stronger to avoid any damage and survive 
if something happens again. Although the port operator (P2) mentioned that they are 
working in a well-integrated system and are following the international code, these 
cyclones revealed their inadequacy in dealing with natural disasters. This also suggests 
that the code they are following is purely for safety and security measures, as they 
were focusing on the safety of their employees. Moreover, it indicates that their system 
is not integrated with strategic management, which is important in enhancing 
organisation’s ability to deal with incidents, enhancing organisational learning and 
minimising the probability of incidents occurring (Pollard and Hotho 2006). As both 
emergency management and strategic management have adopted an open system 
perception (Thompson 1967; Bowonder and Linstone 1987) for the earlier to identify 
any potential incident (Aguilar 1967) and develop adaptive techniques to handle them 
(Hofer and Schende 1978; Bourgeois 1980), and for the latter to get a better 
understanding the dynamic nature of emergencies in order to be able to develop 
emergency management procedures (Bowonder and Linstone 1987). Integrating 
emergency management with strategic management is also important due to the 
increasing number of incidents affecting tourism industry which require an integrated 
approach at different levels local, regional, national, and international levels (Ritchie 
2009) and due to their knock-on effect. So, managing incidents strategically indicates 
the strength of the organisation in handling unexpected incidents (Taneja et al. 2014; 
Fors et al. 2006). In addition, being familiar with strategic management help managers 
and leaders have a better understanding of emergencies (Taneja et al. 2014). In 
addition to what they have learned, they have considered their coordination role in 
case they do not have the required capacity. 
On the other hand, the tourism industry participants stated that they learnt lessons: 
“We learned a lot because there were a number of hotels affected, 
where tourists were in them, many flights cancelled, the airport 
operation was shut down for couple of hours” T1 
“We learned a lot because it was the first experience for us and now 
the country is more prepared for other emergency...” T2
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However, despite tourism being directly affected, the Ministry of Tourism surprisingly 
did not take the initiative to gather all stakeholders in order to raise the awareness of 
potential incidents that might affect the industry. The first responder (T1) said that 
they learnt from the experience, but nothing actually indicates what or how they learnt. 
With that being said, the affected hotels, airports and flights are managed by private 
companies; not operated by the Ministry. There is much the industry can learn to 
obligate hotels to have emergency management plans and to build future hotels in safer 
areas. Moreover, there was no prominent role for the Ministry of Tourism to conduct 
meetings or workshops or conferences addressing the challenges faced and how to 
avoid them in the future. The second participant (T2) said, “we learned a lot”, and by 
that he meant the country, not the industry itself, by becoming more aware of taking 
the necessary precautions. One of the interviewees emphasised the awareness: 
“I will say we are more aware …” T5 
Again, notably, all interviewees focused on awareness as something they learnt, but 
no physical things or mitigation or preparedness measures came about. However, 
becoming ‘aware’ does not mean that they are familiar or fully understand the response 
measures. Another interviewee (T10) agreed that they became aware of emergency 
and disasters management after these cyclones, but still not with regards to the tourism 
industry, rather with regards to the weather conditions. This demonstrates that the 
awareness was only related to natural incidents, especially cyclones, but no other 
incidents were considered, and this awareness was at the personal level. Moreover, 
another participant (T11) declared that they become more cautious if there is a 
prediction that something might happen, and they check the location of their clients. 
This agent is performing a good mitigation procedure in order to ensure their business 
continuity. 
Interviewees were asked for their response, or even their role in the event that one of 
the given scenarios happens, or any other potential incidents. The port operator (P2) 
declared they have a limited capacity and responsibility to deal with incidents in 
certain areas according to the emergency system as explained in the first theme. 
Interviewees from the Ministry of Tourism (T1, T2, T3 and T4) declared they do not 
have a specific role for these scenarios except coordination. All the tour and shipping 
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agents have coordination roles and liaise between the cruise company and the local 
authorities. 
Another agent explained his organisation’s role as follows: 
“We are not trained fire fighter … not doctors depending on that 
situation we must know whom to contact. We look at the yellow pages 
... for contacts of all parties, private and government, who will be 
involved in different emergency so we will coordinate between different 
parties.” T8 
It is clear that the role of most agents is coordinating between the cruise and the local 
agencies. Looking at the yellow pages for contacts in a time of emergency indicates 
the lack of preparedness for potential incidents, as the list of contacts should be readily 
available. Even if they declared they could coordinate, it depends if they have a 
strategy, framework or guidelines to follow or if it will be a spontaneous coordination. 
Thus, identifying the main point of contact for the tourism industry for emergencies is 
vital as well as following structured guidelines or procedures. 
When the interviewees were asked to identify their main point of contact if something 
happens, the majority said that the Royal Oman Police (ROP) is the first contact 
because they are perceived as responsible for acting in any situation due to their 
capabilities and available resources. As in most countries around the world, the police 
is the first and main point for contact in case of an emergency. It can also be said that 
the Police manages NCCD in the country. However, one of the tourism interviewees 
(T2) declared that, although they have allocated a large amount of money in order to 
activate what is called ‘tourism police’ since 2006, it is still not yet activated. One 
reason might be due to a misunderstanding between the tourism industry and the police 
on the aim of activating the tourism police, their role and responsibilities. 
Alternatively, it might be due to a lack of information about where to activate the 
tourism police, or that the police consider their personnel to be serving the tourism 
industry without needing to name them as ‘tourism police’. Furthermore, since the 
devastating Cyclone Guno affected the country in 2007, the attention of emergency 
organisations might have been redirected to the management of natural disasters that 
might affect the country and ensure their preparation. 
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However, the participant representing Ministry of Tourism (T1) mentioned that it 
depends on the case; they contact the appropriate specialised organisation: if it is 
related to security, they contact the police, and if it is related to health, they contact the 
Ministry of Health. So, they should be aware of what might happen and whom to 
contact in order to be able to take the right decision during an emergency, and to assess 
available resources. 
On the other hand, T5, T8, T9 and T10 stated that they have staff for the cruise that 
have to be on board when the cruise arrives, but in case of an emergency they have to 
contact the company management. This indicates that these employees are neither 
specialists nor trained to deal with different incidents since they are only receiving 
them. This may result in a delay in response because they are inexperienced and due 
to the lack of situational awareness (Chen et al. 2007; Maio et al. 2013). In addition, 
the lack of situational awareness results in poor communication (Waugh and Streib 
2006) that slows the response (Ritchie 2009) and hinders coordination (Nowell and 
Steelman 2014). It also indicates that these companies have general procedures to 
follow, but they do not have specific or clear ones. Another participant (T6) claimed 
they contact the police, but if the emergency is off-shore, they contact the Royal Armed 
Forces of Oman for the operation. So, not all organisations have a single point of 
contact; each company has identified its point of contact according to their relations 
network or the contact they already had. 
Looking at these different points of contact, one of the interviewees suggested the 
importance of having a central point: 
“… so there is a need if we have one main point or central coordination 
point for contact.” T6 
Establishing a central point of contact will be effective for all of the cruise ships as 
well as the tour and shipping agents. The absence of a central point of contact indicates 
that there is no meeting between all stakeholders organised by the emergency 
organisations in order to inform them of whom to contact for different cases. On the 
other hand, the tourism industry lacks information about what might happen and how 
to act. Therefore, there is a lack of sharing information between the tourism industry 
and emergency services. The tourism industry lacks information because of the 
differences in the personnel background (only tourism) and skill (they have not 
engaged in such experience or training before) (Xia et al. 2011). Consequently, 
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limitation in sharing information results in bad decision making and applying 
inefficient procedures to handle incidents (Helsloot 2005; Kelman 2006). Moreover, 
negative feedback and unclear information in the complex adaptive system leads to 
ineffective decisions. In this case where the tourism industry is not familiar in dealing 
with different incidents, the emergency organisations are obligated to share 
information with all stakeholders. They should build their work as complex adaptive 
system in collaboration. This is to ensure the identification of the possible measures to 
be followed and the required resources Kożuch and Sienkiewicz-Małyjurek (2015). 
Therefore, creating situational awareness and identifying a central point of contact can 
support the tourism industry in evaluating its capabilities and to support the emergency 
organisations by identifying their roles. 
Although there was a consensus on the great need for involving the tourism industry 
in planning for emergencies and disasters, most interviewees declared that the actual 
cooperation among tourism and the emergency organisations is poor in Oman. This is 
due to the lack of communication and integration. What can enhance this cooperation 
is that each sector (tourism and emergency) should get an understanding and attempt 
to know each other (Uhr and Johansson 2007; Uhr et al. 2008). Interviewees were 
asked if they have seat at the National Committee for Civil Defence. Only one 
organisation among those interviewed has a seat at the NCCD, which is the 
governmental port authority (P1) under the Ministry of Transportation and 
Communication. It is a member because they are responsible for one of the main 
critical infrastructures in the country: roads and communication networks that are vital 
in times of emergency and that need quick restoration to deliver first aid logistics 
(Barbarosoglu et al. 2004). It also might be explained that because the committee was 
formed after Cyclone Guno in 2007, its members were involved in fixing what had 
been affected. 
Then the interviewees were asked to what extent they agree with the involvement of 
the tourism industry within this committee. All interviewees agreed with the 
involvement of the tourism industry for several reasons. P2 stated that it was important 
to connect the cruise lines to the local authorities. Another participant (T1) added that 
due to the sensitive nature of the tourism industry (Henderson 2007; Ritchie 2009) and 
the nature of the emergency, a minor incident could lead to a major impact (Helbing 
et al. 2005). Participant T2 adds that because tourism projects are expensive, they 
require effective security and an emergency response plan. The participant 
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representing the tourism industry (T3) mentioned that the UNWTO has a department 
for risk management as an example for of the integration. Another interviewee (T4) 
cited the UK (Lake District) tourist sites have their emergency information accessible 
online. Thus, integration will facilitate the dissemination of emergency information on 
any incident and enhance the awareness of tourists in taking the necessary precautions, 
as well as guiding them to the safest area. 
The tour and shipping agents gave further reasons in support of integration, as one 
encouraged integration by saying: 
“I strongly feel we should be involved even if not to get into the 
physical aspects but to be more aware of what might happen and what 
our role is…specific role so when we see such a signal or sign or 
situation this is what we need to do.” T5 
This interviewee identified the inability of the tourism industry, stating that they do 
not have resources they need in order to be aware be able to take the right decision in 
time of emergency. This results in creating situational awareness among all tourism 
stakeholders. One of the interviewees (T10) stated that the reason for the lack of 
involvement was because most incidents occurred in the off-season and tourists were 
not affected directly. 
The tourism industry and its relevant stakeholders are recommended to identify their 
role and evaluate their capabilities to support the emergency organisations. Therefore, 
all interviewees were asked how they could assist emergency organisations in the 
event of an incident that affects tourists or tourism. The Port Authorities are familiar 
with their resources and roles and their limited responsibilities. But what was shown 
by the previous responses and their past experiences was that their roles and 
capabilities need further development, especially after the cyclones. One of the 
Ministry of Tourism interviewees (T1) commented that they could help with their 
relations because they are well connected with the local hoteliers and travel agencies. 
However, another interviewee from the Ministry of Tourism added: 
“It depends on the emergency if they need financial support; we try to 
help if we can help, if they need logistics, if they need communication 
with the higher authorities we will try to help.” T2 
		197	
Responses indicate that the tourism industry has no such identification or predictions 
of what might happen and what should be done and what kind of support is required; 
this emphasises lack of knowledge. This also shows that the tourism industry has never 
evaluated its resources and capabilities, although they are ready to provide financial, 
logistic and communication support. 
Another participant (T1) explained that they, as a Ministry of Tourism worker, are 
promoter, regulator, marketer and coordinator, and it is not their responsibility to 
respond if tourists are affected. He reasoned that tourists should know the procedures 
when they are insured and come through a specific agent. Although tourists are 
insured, it does not prevent tourism organisations from being prepared for any incident 
because tourists are unfamiliar with the destination (WTO 1998; Buckle et al. 2001; 
Lamanna et al. 2012) and the language (WTO 1998; Jeuring and Becken 2011). On 
the other hand, tour and shipping agents T5, T6 and T8 also emphasised the liaison 
role and what they can provide is information for emergency organisations. Even this 
role of coordination, and other roles, needs to be standardised for all tourism 
organisations through the NCCD, and they need to be updated. The NCCD must 
identify the role of all tourism stakeholders and their limited responsibilities up to the 
extent that they can react. 
The most prominent role of tourism organisations is coordination, as it is apparent that 
they do not possess physical resources, plans or well-qualified personnel. What they 
can provide is information, which is important before and during an emergency; in this 
case, communication with emergency organisations should be in advance. Likewise, 
the focus group participants agreed and in addition they declared what they could 
provide the emergency services is information (e.g. number of tourists, their 
nationalities). In addition, two interviewees (T3 and T11) mentioned their capacity to 
provide volunteer work. However, one of the tour agent interviewees (T10) said that 
if they are involved directly, they could only help with recovery, rebranding and 
updating the tourism product. This participant identified their role based on their 
capability and objective: business continuity. 
These responses demonstrate the reactive approach (Pauchant and Mitroff 1992) 
followed by the country in managing emergencies and disasters, especially those that 
might affect the tourism industry. Until a mass disaster affects the tourism industry, it 
will be highlighted in the emergency plans of the country and it will be a member in 
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the NCCD. Even this role of coordination and other roles need to be standardised 
throughout all tourism organisations via the emergency organisations, and they need 
to be updated. Emergency services should make the tourism industry familiar with 
what might happen and how it can be handled in order to develop contingency plans 
for the sector and involve them in the time of an emergency. Scenarios should be 
designed and tested to evaluate available resources, identify roles and allocate 
responsibilities to make effective decisions in times of an emergency. Generally, there 
should be coordination, collaboration, cooperation, information sharing and 
communication between the tourism industry and emergency services to enhance 
decision-making and resources allocation. Additionally, there is also a need for long-
term collaboration through establishing public private partnerships to engage the 
private sector with the public sector so that they can handle any potential incidents 
from mitigation to recovery. The next section provides an analysis of interviews with 
the emergency services. 
7.3 Emergency Services 
7.3.1 Capabilities and Resources 
The emergency sector is the authority in Oman responsible for handling different 
incidents, and it constitutes the military organisations that are working based on the 
emergency response system explained in Chapter Five. Emergency interviewees were 
asked if they have plans available for handling such incidents and how often they 
revise them. They responded that they all have plans for handling emergencies and 
disasters, either natural or human induced, however they are not related to the tourism 
industry. As mentioned previously in the interviews with the tourism industry, the 
tourism industry lacks plans of their own and requests the emergency organisations to 
provide standard plans for preparing and handling different incidents. However, the 
focus group participants confirmed that the available plans are general not specific, for 
example there is no specific plan for a Tsunami or earthquake or cyclones. However, 
emergency plans are adaptable (Alexander 2002) , thus if there is a cooperation 
between emergency sector and tourism, it will facilitate adopting such plans for the 
tourism industry. An emergency organisation (E1), which is responsible for designing 
the national emergency plan, sees a shortage from the tourism industry’s side as they 
should come and ask for advice or consultation: 
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“If these companies are not able to design a plan why don’t they 
contact the responsible authorities for consultation … they should have 
the initiative to ask as they are responsible for handling any emergency 
or disasters.” E1 
This result revealed that the shortage is from both sides. The emergency organisation 
due to the nature of their work because it is their responsibility to make sure that all 
organisations have emergency plans. The Emergency organisation should be involved 
in designing any plan to ensure the consistency and control and all sectors in the 
country including tourism are integrated with the emergency sector. It is also the 
responsibility of the tourism industry because they should ensure the safety and 
security of the destination and be well prepared for any potential incidents and to 
facilitate their integration with the emergency services. The emergency organisations 
especially the NCCD should have the leadership to achieve these goals (Gary Yukl 
2006; Peter Northouse 2010). They should start earlier from the mitigation phase 
before the occurrence of an emergency (Smits and Ezzat 2003) and in time of an 
emergency it is required at different levels (the organisational, sectorial, industrial, or 
country levels) depending on the magnitude of the incident (Ritchie 2009). This might 
be referred to the centralisation of the emergency response system of Oman (Ritchie 
2009; Al Shaqsi 2016). 
Regarding the revision of the available plans, emergency organisations because they 
are specialists, or after any incident in order to fill any gaps and to develop them for 
the future because circumstances are changing over time, this results in strengthen the 
resilience (Faulkner 2001; Alexander 2015). Another interviewee declared the 
motivation for revising plans: 
“We revise the plan after any accident occurs locally to develop it and 
internationally to learn from the international experiences” E2 
Consequently, the general plans and procedures for emergency management can be 
applied for different sectors, one of which is tourism. And this is agreed with the focus 
group statement that general plans can be applied to tourism. However, one of the 
emergency interviewees declared that there is no such plan for cruise ships: 
“The Civil Defence has an evacuation plan that is designed for 
different organizations and it is revised annually but for cruise ships 
that is something new.” E2 
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Regular evacuation drills are conducted in different organisations for buildings around 
the country, yet it addresses only one potential incident among many others that might 
happen in the future, and these also need drills and plans, as well as increasing 
awareness. 
Although emergency organisations have plans and regular revision is conducted, the 
tourism sector is still not considered. As an interviewee clarified, a new centre has 
been activated in order to deal with any maritime incidents called the Maritime 
Security Centre: 
“We have plans in different organizations, but the centre is now collecting 
all plans and merging them in order to have a centric point for dealing 
with incidents. After each incident the plans are revised.” E4 
This centre is to work on establishing its specific tasks and roles to avoid any 
duplication in responding to any emergency case, especially with the Coastguard and 
Civil Defence. They should all meet to identify their specific plans and roles to avoid 
duplication in roles and responsibilities and emergency organisations should cooperate 
with each other (Kapucu 2006a). Overall, it is important to have a central point for 
dealing with different incidents, and this centre should focus on handling cruise-ship 
incidents. Meanwhile, other emergency organisations can handle land-based incidents 
that might affect tourists. Acquiring emergency response plans is essential, but the 
most important thing is testing these plans via regular training and exercises. 
Emergency organisations around the world are conducting different types of training, 
which is discussion-based (to develop awareness), table-top (to test procedures and 
plan by developing scenarios) or live exercises (to test fully all aspects of disasters 
response) (Kim 2014). One of the emergency organisations (E2) is conducting internal 
training every month and international training twice a year because it needs 
coordination with different agencies. They start the training by discussing the possible 
hazards that might occur, followed by developing the plans and ending with live 
exercises. In all these types of training, the tourism industry and its stakeholders can 
be involved to develop their ability and increase their awareness (Waugh and Streib 
2006). The Coastguard provides their divers, and the search and rescue team provide 
regular internal and external training based on availability and need, but there is no 
specific schedule. However, one of the emergency organisations (E1) has daily 
training for emergency cases, and there is a training department that provides training 
		201	
programs according to a certain plan for all organisations in Oman. It follows the 
execution of evacuation plans, for example, in schools, shopping centres, and 
governmental associations, and there is an evaluation for the training program. As 
some tourism organisations revealed, they are involved in these drills, but there are no 
exercises on incidents that might affect the tourists with regards to cruise ships, as 
interviewees stated: 
“In regard to cruise ship we didn’t have any training.” E2 
“We have very rare training in regard to the cruise ships as most 
training is for the commercial ships...” E4 
However, although the Sultan Qaboos Port was transferred in 2014 from commercial 
purposes to purposes of tourism, cruise ships are still not included in the plans or 
training. This might be explained by the fact that cruise ships have not been affected 
by a major disaster, which would grasp the attention of emergency organisations and 
enter into their considerations. There is also no initiative from the emergency 
organisations to work with cruise ships in order to conduct evacuation drills when they 
arrive in Oman for the possibility of an incident happening in the port or in the 
destination. However, specialised training for cruise ship will help in developing the 
shared capacity of emergency-service organisations (Nivolianitou and Synodinou 
2011). These all indicate the lack of collaboration between emergency services and 
cruise-ship companies. 
Interviewees were asked if they consider cultural factors when they conduct training, 
since tourists are from different cultures. One of the organisations (E2) only considers 
the culture of those who are responsible for an evacuation, while others (E1, E3 and 
E4) responded that they have procedures, but “culture doesn’t exist”. Generally, the 
culture is a very important element to be considered when dealing with tourists in times 
of an emergency due to cultural and language differences; these are considered as 
barriers of the complex emergency response system (Uhr 2007). Here two types of 
complexities can be identified. First, the technological complexity (Coskun and 
Ozecylan 2011) because none of the emergency participants are use special technology 
(e.g. speech creators or display books) to communicate with those speaking different 
languages. As using such technologies facilitates response tasks. The second 
complexity here is the cultural complexity (Coskun and Ozecylan 2011) that is 
inherent in the communication between locals from the destination Oman with 
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European Cruise crewmembers and passengers as both have different cultures. 
Developing a common language and being culturally aware can facilitate collaboration 
(Waugh and Streib 2006), decision-making (Schramm-Nielsen 2001; Fan and Zigang 
2004; Heales et al. 2004), leadership (Pinsdorf 1991; Heales et al. 2004; Zagorsek et 
al. 2004; Chandler 2005; Laws et al. 2007; Ritchie 2009), communication (Adler 1991) 
and information sharing (Yang and Maxwell 2011). Overall cultural awareness 
facilitates emergency responses (Rozakis 2007). For example, what happened in Costa 
Concordia demonstrates the importance of considering culture and language 
differences (Nthia 2015) and managing SARS across boundaries (Johnson and Peppas 
2003). Thus, the tourism industry should be involved in planning the response to an 
emergency, as they are more familiar with the tourists’ backgrounds and cultures. As 
the incident severity is not same in all countries and cultures (Johnson and Peppas 
2003) and the way of managing an emergency is different due to responder’s national 
culture (e.g. Hofstede 2001; Liu and Mackinnon 2002; Schneider and Littrell 2003), 
cultural awareness should be integrated at all levels of emergency management 
strategies (Adahl 2009). The more culturally aware emergency services are, the more 
this will help them establish clear communication and easier work with different and 
similar cultures (Adahl 2009, p.8). In summary, having plans and testing them is 
essential in order to identify procedures and evaluate available resources. 
All the emergency organisations are well prepared with the required resources in 
dealing with different cases (in the given scenarios), for example dealing with fire, 
whether it is on or off shore. This includes the medical case (in the given scenarios), 
as one of the interviewees mentioned a case that required them to perform a medical 
evacuation by sending a helicopter into the middle of the sea. However, these 
capabilities and resources have not been tested for a mass number of victims or tourists 
as in the given scenarios, like the case of Costa Concordia where the evacuation system 
had never been tested (Bjorkman 2014). This will affect the response process as the 
following responses show: 
“So in case of the mass number of tourists as a military organization 
... but in fact these capabilities have not been tested yet. There is an 
ability to deal with many tourists but there might be delay in the 
response.” E4 
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“Most of the plans for response are available before, it is only a matter 
of identifying the capabilities and capacities.” E3 
This finding reveals that all emergency organisations have response plans ready to 
apply to handle the situation sufficiently, although they are not unified, which may 
lead to duplication of effort. Emergency organisations recommended sharing what 
might happen with the tourism stakeholders and how they respond to incidents to 
obtain situational awareness, to identify needs, roles and facilitate decision-making in 
times of an emergency. Additionally, the finding shows that tourism incidents are not 
considered to occur, especially on the cruise ships, although this centre is specialised 
for maritime incidents. Though E4 considered that the magnitude of an incident might 
affect the efficiency of the response, he also added that they had mutual response work 
as a centre for maritime security with the Armed Forces and the Police for certain 
incidents, such as the sinking of small ships. Moreover, they conducted many rescue 
operations and medical evacuations, but as he mentioned, it is hard to judge the 
effectiveness of the response system. These statements might also indicate that the 
actual capabilities might not match the estimated capability, especially in the case of 
large-scale cruise incident. Commenting on the scenario, he said: 
“As a scenario it didn’t happen to real judge and to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the response system … The resources are not tested to 
whether can cover or not the high-scale disasters therefore currently 
we see them as quite enough to cover a cruise ship incident ...” E4 
So, the type of complexity that can be identified here is the event complexity (Coskun 
and Ozecylan 2011) because an immediate response is required to the given scenarios 
and each case requires specific resources, however these resources are not well-
defined and tested by the emergency services. 
With regards to the handling of these specific cases in the fire scenarios, the 
interviewees as well as the focus group participants agreed on the capabilities and the 
availability of the resources, and that they can share resources with another 
organisation in case of a huge fire. On the other hand, one of the emergency 
participants commented on their response to a fire by saying: 
“We don’t have a problem to deal with a fire as from our experience 
as a Navy and the Coastguard as well it is included in our basic 
training firefighting either on shore or off shore … We have to consider 
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the capability and the capacity of our local resources for example 
hospital in case of dealing with huge cruise ships.” E4 
This shows that centralisation of the emergency response system in Oman where 
resources are not localised, forces local emergency services to response before asking 
for support from other authorities (Al Shaqsi 2011, p.12). Alternatively, the medical 
and public health emergency response sector, which is working under the NCCD, can 
also lead the health cases if the committee manages the incident. If it is off-shore, there 
will be evacuation in coordination with the military air force. 
A participant from the medical sector explained the process. At the beginning, the 
cruise ship sends a call to the Coastguard. The Royal Oman Police then activates the 
international codes they are following and communicates with the NCCD. Next, the 
committee directly gives the responsibility to Medical and Public Health to handle the 
health incident. Then, the sector activates the international health regulations and leads 
the response and the overall rescue operations. Therefore, in cases of health issues in 
a scenario, the Medical and Public Health sector will lead the incident response. 
Regarding the resources available to respond to the health incident (in the given 
scenarios) the Medical and Public Health participant said: 
“The government of the Sultanate of Oman has a six (6) month 
stockpile reserve of all its medication and certain vaccines ...” E5 
Although the emergency organisations are working consistently, they cannot judge the 
capability of their response system in handling mass scale incidents, as it has not 
happened before. Thus, there should be mutual communication between emergency 
and tourism sectors in order to facilitate emergency response planning for tourism 
incidents. Therefore, the next theme sheds light on the extent to which tourism can be 
integrated with the emergency response planning. 
7.3.2 Integrating the Tourism Industry with Emergency Response Planning 
This theme highlights the point where tourism can be integrated with the emergency 
response system in Oman. As stated earlier in Chapter Five, the NCCD has 
representatives from different governmental authorities, except the Ministry of 
Tourism. In addition, the PACDA and the Maritime Security Centre have similar 
members in their committees as the NCCD, but the tourism sector is likewise excluded. 
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However certain complex events that require interaction between different 
stakeholders could result in failure in the management due to inadequate planning and 
ill-informed stakeholder actions (Comfort 2005). The reasons could be that the sector 
has not been affected by a major incident so far, which would attract their attention, as 
well as a lack of communication between tourism and emergency organisations, and 
its lack of awareness due to the tourism industry protecting their reputation that might 
be negatively affected by news of a major incident. It might also be explained by the 
tourism industry’s focus on establishing projects and attracting investments rather than 
focusing on emergency management. The focus group participants mentioned that 
there is no clear reason for excluding the Ministry of Tourism from the NCCD and 
there might be related procedures to tourism included within the general one. As one 
of the focus group participants declared that there is no real evidence of the integration, 
although cooperation currently is little. Additionally, other participants also support 
that by saying: 
“The current situation does not enforce more requirements on 
coordination other than basic constitutional requirement for example 
to obtain permits to establish tourism enterprises like hotels, which 
need to be enforced to overcome future risk and to improve the level of 
preparedness” FG3 
“No proper integration between sectors founded in the mitigation 
stage for example. In fact, no awareness for any special plan or 
meeting covering such issues” FG3 
“For the mitigation stage there is limited efforts but scattered” FG2 
However, the emergency organisations gave supportive responses to the idea of 
integrating tourism with emergency response planning, with one of the emergency 
interviewees saying: 
“Tourism industry should participate and there should be coordination 
between the executive office of the National Committee for Civil 
Defence and the Tourism industry stakeholders.” E2 
This participant perceives it to be the responsibility of the NCCD to integrate the 
tourism industry. This offers a contrast to all the aforementioned reasons (time of 
previous incidents in the off season, tourism not affected directly, the direction of the 
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tourism industry towards investments) that support the exclusion of the tourism 
industry. Additionally, other interviewees declared reasons for the integration: 
“The tourism industry and the private sector should be involved in 
order to know their needs and the needs of the cruise ships and 
requirements and they can help in designing the required plans.” E3 
“Tourism industry should be a partner in building up the plans in case 
the tourism sector affected, they should participate in developing the 
plans as they have facts and statistics.” E4 
Since the tourism industry is in direct communication with the cruise companies, they 
can identify their needs and requirements as well as the capacities of tourism in the 
country. All of these will assist in designing effective plans for handling any potential 
incidents. Again, the statement considers the importance of getting information and 
facts from the tourism industry in order to fit them suitably into the plans. Overall, the 
tourism sector and emergency services should work as a complex adaptive system to 
enable the procedures of self-organisation and emergence by adopting strategies that 
allow for flexibility and the flow of information (Hunt et al. 2009).  
The focus group participants added more reason to support the need for integration as 
it will reduce the cost in terms of resources allocation and ensure a common message 
between private and public sectors. Though resource allocation requires better 
direction and coordination to manage the incident effectively (Moore et al. 2003; 
Stephenson 2005; Bergströn et al. 2016). Regarding the sharing of a common message, 
it is highly required in a time of emergency because if different messages are 
distributed it will affect negatively on the decision-making process and lead to taking 
insufficient actions to handle the incident (Helsloot 2005; Kelman 2006). However, 
some of them do not actually encourage the integration in the response because they 
are not familiar with handling such incidents, but they ask for a report about the event 
itself and the tourist’s situations. This is in line with Eide et al. (2013) where 
information about the incident is required by responders to communicate with others, 
in addition to information about resources. 
However, the participant representing the NCCD had a contrasting view. He said: 
“Regarding the tourism sector in Oman as my personal opinion the 
sector is still developing, and it needs more time for development. The 
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gradual development of the sector there must be an emergency plans 
and how to deal with emergency cases affecting the tourism sector.” 
E1 
Although this participant agrees that the industry is developing, the tourism industry 
should be involved at this time in order to develop with proper preparation for any 
potential incidents. It is not plausible to wait until it will be affected in this crucial 
stage of the development and taking such action at that time will be hopeless. 
As an example to demonstrate the need for integration, the emergency organisation E2 
managed to rescue many adventuring tourists stuck in high mountains that are only 
reachable by foot in 5 hours. This organisation received many rescue calls without any 
information about the tourists, such as who they were, how old they were, or their 
nationalities. When the researcher asked the emergency organisation whether they are 
in connection with the Ministry of Tourism or conducting meetings regarding 
adventure activities, locations and safety instructions, they responded no. Thus, they 
should meet in order to facilitate the response procedures as Page et al (2006) 
mentioned how adventure tourism is used as a promotional tool for destinations. 
Therefore, the focus group participants emphasised the need for integration and 
recommend it to be a national compulsory requirement. They also asked to have a 
flexible framework guiding the integration of tourism with the emergency sector. As 
well as this, aim for more cooperation by conducting more workshops, exercises and 
training. 
7.4 Summary 
This chapter has presented an analysis of data gathered by means of face-to-face 
interviews in Oman with eighteen participants from the tourism industry, port 
authorities and emergency services to fulfil the fourth and sixth objectives of the 
research. These were done in addition to the three focused groups detailed at the 
beginning of the chapter. The study found that tourism and emergency stakeholders 
are not working as a complex adaptive system. The findings can be divided into three 
levels (Figure 7-4): the organisational (within the organisation), industrial (within the 
tourism industry) and sectorial (between the tourism and emergency sector). 
On the organisational level, the study found that there is a lack of awareness and 
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and preparedness measures. On the industrial level, there is a lack of cohesiveness 
between tourism organisations and a lack of communication in terms of sharing 
experiences and feedback. On the sectorial level, there is a lack of communication 
between tourism and emergency services and a lack of integration, whereby tourism 
is not involved in any emergency committee. 
 
Figure 7-4. Summary of Findings 
(Author 2018) 
 
Thus, there should be intra and inter integration in the mitigation and preparedness 
phases and inter integration in the response stage as per Figure 7-5. intra integration 
within the industry in the mitigation and preparedness stages is justified by the need 
to share experiences and feedback, while the inter integration with emergency services 
is required to raise awareness, develop effective plans for response and to conduct 
regular training. 
•Lack	of	Awareness	&	Knowledge•Poor	Mitigation	&	Preparedness	MeasuresOrganisational	Level
•Lack	of	Cohesiveness•Lack	of	CommunicationIndustrial	Level
•Lack	of	Communication	•No	IntegrationSectorial	Level	
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Figure 7-5. Types of Integration in Mitigation and Preparedness Phases 
(Author 2018) 
 
However, it is recommended that the tourism industry should also establish inter 
integration with emergency services in the response phase (Figure 7-6). This will 
ensure that tourism can support emergency services with the required information, and 
emergency services can respond to incidents by using the resources available. 
 
Figure 7-6. Type of Integration in Response Phase 
(Author 2018) 
 
Overall, these results indicate that the tourism industry is currently following a reactive 
approach towards emergency management. Additionally, the emergency sector does 
not consider the tourism industry in its plans or training. Therefore, this integration is 
recommended in order to create situational awareness among all tourism stakeholders 
and to facilitate emergency response. The next part discusses the findings conducted 
to achieve the fifth objective of the research. 
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Part 2: European Interviews Analysis 
To identify the expectations and requirements of the European cruise lines (the fifth 
objective of this research), five interviews were conducted in Europe (Table 7-3). 
Table 7-3.  Participants list 
Participant Area  Code  
Head of Quality and Resources, Fred Olsen Cruise Line  Cruise Industry  C1 
Quality Management Manager, Carnival Cruise  Cruise Industry C2 
Head of Security and Crisis Management, Carnival Cruises  Cruise Industry C3 
Royal Navy Officer  Maritime  C4 
Crisis Management Expert, Ex-Navy Officer  Crisis Management  C5 
(Author 2018) 
 
A number of themes (see Figure 7-7) have been identified following a combination of 
conventional and derived content analysis (Hsieh and Shannon 2005). 
 
Figure 7-7. Themes of Data Analysis 
(Author 2018) 
 
The analysis is divided into three sections in order to answer the following research 
questions: 
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1. What capabilities and capacities do cruise ships have when responding to 
emergency scenarios near to, or alongside, a destination? 
2. What additional capabilities and capacities do cruise ships require from a 
destination’s emergency services and local authorities in the event of an 
emergency scenario? 
3. What are the potential deficits that might challenge cruise ships as a result of 
an analysis of their requirements within the given scenarios? 
Prior to addressing an analysis of the interviews, it is important to set out an overview 
of the sort of emergency response system commonly adopted by cruise-ship 
companies. It was within such a model that the interviewees (C1, C2, C3, C4 and C5) 
were able to more easily discuss the identified capabilities, needs and challenges 
respective to their cruise companies. 
Interviewee C5 confirmed that the primary objective of a Cruise ship’s captain would 
be to keep the ship afloat. The secondary priority would be to preserve the safety and 
lives of the passengers and crew. Thus, the starting point for any emergency 
management model for cruise ships is that there are two over-riding priorities: the ship 
and then the passengers and crew. 
Model.1 seeks to set out these two priorities in parallel with each other. All 
interviewees agreed that any initial emergency response would be initiated by an 
authorised senior officer on board. They added that if the capabilities and capacities of 
the cruise ship were overwhelmed, the decision would be taken to report the 
emergency to the cruise company’s “Fleet Operations Centre” whose responsibility 
would be to categorise the level of the response required and, if appropriate, activate 
the company’s emergency response centre (ERC). As model.1 shows, in the case of a 
fire breaking out on board ship, there are two parallel response procedures to protect 
both the ship and the passengers. 
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Model 7-1. Cruise Ship Emergency Response System 
(Author 2018) 
 
To protect the ship the initial response by the crew will be to fight the fire. If they are 
successful and the emergency has been averted, they contact Fleet Operations simply 
to advise them of the occurrence. However, if the capacity of the ship’s crew and 
equipment in dealing with the emergency is exceeded, they alert the Fleet Operations 
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accordingly who then assess the level of the response and activate their Emergency 
Response Centre (ERC). 
Similar procedures apply with respect to protecting the passengers. Initially, the ship’s 
officers will be responsible for the safe evacuation of all passengers and crew. 
However, should their capacity to safely conduct this operation be exceeded, the Fleet 
operations would be contacted and, having assessed the level of response required, the 
ERC would be activated. 
In both cases (responding to the needs of the ship and responding to the needs of the 
passengers and crew), a primary action for the ERC will be to contact the relevant 
Port/Shipping Agent within the host country to provide ‘in-country’ coordination with 
relevant emergency responders. Should the Port/Shipping Agent have failed to set in 
place adequate coordination and integration mechanisms for protecting the ship or 
passengers, the result will often be a situation of chaos turning the minor incident into 
a disaster. 
It was a common assumption amongst each of the interviewees that the Port/Shipping 
Agent would have already achieved a well-developed in-country coordination in the 
event of an emergency involving a ship. Such an integrated plan would comprise of 
relevant stakeholders with integrated emergency response plans already agreed and 
exercised. Typical tasks where the cruise company would be dependent upon the 
Port/Shipping Agent to coordinate in-country would include: search and rescue, a safe 
return of the ship to port, an environmental clean-up etc. 
Similarly, on behalf of the passengers it would be assumed that the Port/Shipping 
Agent will have achieved an integration and in-country coordination with relevant 
stakeholders to coordinate accommodation, health response, consular support, family 
liaison and subsequent repatriation. 
For this reason, the Port/Shipping Agent was considered by each of the interviewees 
as a potential ‘single point of failure’. This is because of the port agent’s sole 
responsibility for in country coordination. 
In the event of a failure from a Port/Shipping Agent, a cruise ship company has a huge 
task to perform in rapidly creating the necessary integration and coordination with the 
host country. At the same time, the company will be working hard to contribute to an 
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investigation of the cause of the incident as well as managing the company’s 
reputation. 
A key finding from each of the interviewees was that in most cases the Port/Shipping 
Agent will not have achieved an adequate degree of in-country coordination and 
integration ready to provide the necessary support in a timely and cost-effective 
manner. 
7.5 Cruise Ship Capabilities and Capacities 
Participants C1 and C4 agreed that properly trained and exercised staff are one of the 
essential capabilities and capacities that cruise ships depend on in time of an 
emergency. Because regular training can enhance the capacity (Waugh and Streib 
2006; Nivolianitou and Synodinou 2011), reduce human error and enhance response 
to an emergency (Ritchie 2009). Participant C5 made the following comment in the 
event of a fire (as given in all scenarios) (See Appendix 6): 
“Although the crew, including waiters, cabin stewards and cooks, are 
obligated to help in the event of an emergency they would not be top-
notch fire fighters. Their main job is to ensure that people are 
mustered.” 
This statement demonstrates that in the case of a fire, although crew staff may be 
available as help fire fight, they are not well qualified to help to fight the fire. This is 
in line with the Safety and Shipping Review (2015) that crew can be considered as  
weak points due to inadequate experience, training and lack of emergency 
preparedness. In any case, should a fire become uncontrollable or the event is ‘multi-
hazard’, the Cruise Ship will inevitably require specialist fire fighters from the 
destination’s local emergency services. They need help because when a fire breaks out 
in a cruise ship, passengers are highly exposed to many hazards' gases and materials 
in addition to the sight invisibility (Vairo et al. 2015). They also need help due to the 
large number of passengers on the ship, as nowadays cruise ships capacity is 
increasingly carrying more than 3000 passengers (Bowen et al. 2014). Cruise ships are 
a complex system due to the large number of passengers, crewmembers, and different 
functions in the cruise hotel and ship functions. Thus, crewmembers should be trained 
well in case the fire breaks-out offshore because they have to deal with it quickly and 
they might not get quick support from the destination. Consequently, a common set of 
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planning and procedures should be developed between the cruise ship and relevant 
stakeholders (both within the destinations and the cruise company’s head office) based 
on scenarios to train them on emergency procedures (Ritchie 2008). This is because 
the use of the scenario planning is helpful due to the complexity of the world we are 
living in (Perterson et al. 2003), since we are dealing with complex and uncertain 
events (Wilson 2000). All of these result in knock on effects on other stakeholders. 
For instance, when a cruise arrives to the destination in cooperation with the relevant 
stakeholders (emergency and tourism sectors) they should hold evacuation drills based 
on designed scenarios. These scenarios should capture complexities to fit with Omanis 
and consider foreign interest because the negative impacts of disaster will affect their 
image and reputation. In addition, because there is a need for collaboration, table-top 
exercises can be conducted between both Cruise Ships and those who are specialised 
in responding to emergencies in the destination (Payne 1999; Edzén 2014). This will 
help to train them, practice coordination arrangements and teach those involved how 
all elements work together as well as improving the current plan (Edzen 2014). In 
addition to this overcoming the complexity of the emergency response system is 
required because in this case it will involve responders from various organisations with 
different laws and regulations, culture, knowledge, values, tools, information systems, 
objectives, goals and their dynamical interactions and may be in different languages 
(Chen et al. 2007; Uhr 2007). 
On the other hand, if an evacuation becomes necessary (for any given scenario or 
incident), Participants C2 and C3 argued that they could book accommodation for 
shelter, and flights for repatriation, through online booking systems as one of them 
commented: 
“… We will book accommodation online… We would contact the 
scheduled flights from the airports if we had to repatriate people” C2 
Access to local destination accommodation and return flights is considerably easier if 
requests are channelled through direct contacts with the tourism industry or the 
Ministry of Tourism within the destination country. Surprisingly, none of the 
Participants mentioned contacting the destination’s tourism industry during the 
response phase. This also demonstrates the need for collaboration between cruise lines 
and local tourism authorities, so cruise lines should invest in building and developing 
relations with local authorities in addition to their main contact, the shipping or port 
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agent (O’Sullivan et al. 2013), to achieve an effective response (McKercher and Cohen 
2004). 
In the case of scenarios C and D (See Appendix 6) the spread of Norovirus, all 
participants (C1, C2, C3, C4 and C5) agreed that cruise ships have two doctors and 
four nurses and confirmed that these are not enough to deal with the large number of 
affected people mentioned in the scenarios (2500 passengers, 1250 crew members). 
Although they have in their plan, a capability to isolate affected sick people, in the 
case of the multi-hazard scenario (fire, norovirus and mass casualties) it was judged as 
difficult to be managed by the cruise ship only. Thus, collaboration is also required 
when masses of people are affected to reduce mass casualties (Kapucu and Garayev 
2011) and in complex situations when multi-organisations are involved in the response 
(Mendonça et al. 2007: Salas et al. 2008; Eide et al. 2012). What also emphasises the 
need for collaboration is what interviewees from the emergency services in Oman 
replied in the previous part that the capabilities of the system are not tested for mass 
casualties. 
Other new capabilities mentioned by all participants included the availability of a new 
technology system for the safe return of a cruise ship alongside the port if an incident 
occurs offshore. In addition, they have back-up power generating systems to provide 
alternative sources of power in case of electricity or engine shut down. Although 
technology helps in solving many problems, De Rademaeker et al. (2014) argue that 
accidents still happen due to human error. For example, the case of Costa Concordia 
Schroder-Hinrichs et al. (2012). Despite this, Vanem et al. (2006) indicate that they 
are very rare. 
Although cruise ships have some capabilities, they are limited, and they still have 
needs and expectations from the local destinations, especially when dealing with the 
unexpected, unmanageable situations and multi-hazards. 
7.6 Expectations and Needs 
Although the participants mentioned their capabilities in the previous theme to respond 
to such incidents, they still have needs and expectations from the destination (Oman). 
In Europe as C1, C2 and C3 mentioned they are familiar with the available resources 
and they have a good liaison with the local authorities due to the regularly conducted 
drills to test their plans. Therefore, they lack the capability of the emergency response 
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system and relations with local authorities in Oman. Thus, collaborative work is 
required between the ship and relevant stakeholders, in order to develop the applicable 
strategic plans to respond to an emergency (Shrivastava and Mitroff 1987). A lack of 
collaboration leads to poorer communication, which is an important challenge in times 
of emergency responses. Thus, to facilitate collaboration both cruise lines and local 
authorities (e.g. emergency services and tourism industry) should understand their own 
and other tasks, plans, resources, needs and strategies (Eide et al. 2012). However, 
different participants identified different needs, but none of them identified the full 
range of needs. This might reflect their experience because organisations that have 
experienced emergencies are able to identify the full range of needs and expectations. 
This might also reflect their culture as according to Adahl (2009) culture is considered 
as an important “ingredient” that enables the successful operation of emergency 
management and helps identify the possible solutions, for example identifying needs 
and expectations in this case. 
Participants C1, C4 and C5 indicated that they need to engage the local fire-fighters if 
the ship cannot control the fire on-board as C5 commented: 
“Pumping water to fight the fire will be a challenge it will cause the 
ship to sink especially if there is no electricity to pull the water out of 
the ship- this needs local emergency help.” 
So common work between cruise ships and local emergency services is recommended 
due to the nature of emergencies as unexpected and complex incidents (Faulkner 2001; 
Coskun and Ozecylan 2011), where one event can lead to another (Helbing et al. 2005). 
So, local help is needed to minimise the effect of the incident. This will help to avoid 
the problems that occurred during the response to the Kobe earthquake where the 
emergency organisations did not really work together (Heath 1995). However, the 
complexity of the emergency response system due to the involvement of many 
organisations that interact dynamically in a non-linear way requires coordination 
(Comfort et al. 2001; Comfort 1994 1995). 
They also, expect local authority cooperation for any evacuation to include help from 
the port authorities or emergency services especially in multi-hazard cases or off-shore 
incidents, especially with the large number of passengers. While in the case of 
scenarios C and D (Norovirus and fire) C2, C4 and C5 mentioned that they need 
coordination (for isolation and evacuation) with the local public health authorities 
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through the shipping agent. C2 also added they need clear coordination from the local 
authorities and the port authority, so they can ensure easy communication with them 
through the ship and emergency response centre in Europe. Participants require 
arrangement and communication to solve the problem and provide passengers their 
requirements such as public health, engineering, accommodation and logistics. All 
these requirements demonstrate the need for collaborative coordination and work 
between the ship and the relevant stakeholders in the destination which will facilitate 
the response and improve local capabilities (Shrivastava and Mitroff 1987; Ireni Saban 
2014). It also required by the cruise ship and the destination to use scenarios in 
designing common emergency plans in order to identify the required resources, 
distribute them and test the ability of the local responders (Alexander 2000). 
Participants were asked if they had any specific expectations from the tourism industry 
during a response. They identified no specific requirements from the tourism industry. 
One of the participants said: 
“I am not sure that we have any expectation at the moment from the 
tourism industry… but I think it is a good suggestion, but I have to say 
it is not currently in our plan, but maybe it should be...” C2 
This statement indicates that there is currently no active integration between cruise-
ship companies and destination stakeholders of tourism or emergency services in terms 
of managing unexpected incidents. Cruise ship plans seem to contain no plans for 
multi-agency exercises, or joint drills with destination stakeholders (Oman and Middle 
East). It is recommended that a cruise-ship company should understand the capacities 
of the different stakeholders and to what extent they can help in case of an emergency. 
In case of all scenarios due to the total loss of power; there is a need for the shore side 
power for the ship as revealed by C3, C4 and C5. Additionally, they need to make sure 
that there is space for the ship to anchor at the port if it is off-shore in order for it to be 
fixed and in order to get access to the dock for coaches, to move the passengers ashore. 
All participants C1, C2, C3, C4 and C5 confirmed there is a need to liaise with the 
local authorities before reaching the destination through their Head Office. C5 
believed that there is an additional need to liaise with local destination media. As 
discussed by Armstrong and Ritchie (2007), negative media coverage had an effect in 
declining tourist numbers as happened in Australia due to the Canberra bushfire in 
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2003. In addition, media will affect tourists’ perceptions when they perceive that the 
destination is unsafe (Calgaro 2010). Finally, C3 and C5 stressed the need to make 
sure that their emergency response plans corresponded with the local authorities’ plans 
and their local emergency response capabilities and capacities were tested. C4 suggests 
conducting face-to-face meetings to discuss response plans and key requirements with 
the local authorities. It is recommended that joint drills exercising realistic and relevant 
scenarios will significantly improve the efficiency of any future response (Perterson 
et al. 2003) and fill in any gap in the available plans (Pollard and Hotho 2006) as well 
as help in identifying the needed resources (Alexander 2000). So, identifying needs 
and expectations is helpful in overcoming future challenges. 
7.7 Challenges 
In answering the third research question, C2 highlighted that: 
“Our single point of weakness as an organisation is that we put all of 
our requirements through one point of contact, which is the port 
agent… they are good in dealing with routine cases but in case of these 
scenarios … we are not sure about their capability to deal with such 
incidents” 
So, from this statement even if the cruise ship is dealing with local shipping agents, 
they are still not sure of their capability in case of major incidents as they are dealing 
with them with routine cases. So, it is important to adapt the proactive approach and 
be ready for inexperienced incidents (Pforr and Hosie 2007). Therefore, C4 suggested 
sharing procedures and exchanging views with the local authorities in the destination. 
So, the port agent or the shipping agent here is considered as a single point of failure 
because the cruise is depending totally on the agent, and they lack its capability in time 
of an emergency. In addition, it is a single point of failure because if the coordination 
for a response failed, it will lead to chaos and turn the emergency case into a disaster 
(Coppola 2011). So, when the shipping agent does not work or respond to any potential 
incidents as expected by the cruise company, this will affect the emergency response 
system as well as the destination image. 
In cases where there is a need for evacuation and shelter, all participants (C1, C2.C3, 
C4 and C5) identified the most challenging things were providing passengers with 
food and water which are the main needs in time of emergency according to 
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Christopher and Tatham, (2011), in addition to communication and transportation. 
During evacuation C5 added one of the challenges they might face is evacuating 
people who are confined to wheelchairs as they might hinder evacuation and likewise, 
blind as well as deaf people are a challenge, especially if the ship is offshore. In 
addition to this, evacuating children might also be considered as a challenge as they 
might not understand the evacuation procedures. 
Moreover, due to the language differences communication problems may occur during 
evacuation (Alexander 2012), which is like the case of Costa Concordia (Nthia 2015). 
This is considered as challenge for the cruise ship because they have language barriers; 
the consequences of such were demonstrated by what happened in the Costa 
Concordia, (Nthia 2015) and in Norman Atlantic (Zikakou 2015). This may result in 
hindering or slowing the response due to language and cultural differences (Allinson 
1994; Heath 1995; Alexander 2000; Ritchie 2009) and this in turn may result in 
increasing the number of affected passengers like the Sewol Ferry case (Ramage 
2015). In addition to the complexity of the incident, language itself is, according to 
Cilliers (1998), considered to be a complex system due to the large number of words 
that carry several meanings.  So, in order to meet the challenges of the culture, Adahl 
(2009) mentioned it requires a specifically developed training program and well-
distributed responders to work on emergency operations. While, Johnson and Peppas 
(2003) emphasised the importance of developing emergency response plans for 
specific areas and integrating local management and public office to make some 
changes as needed. 
Additional challenges arise when stakeholders are not familiar with the capacity of the 
local hospitals, especially in the case of evacuating people affected by a virus. Besides 
considering whether the capacity of local hospitals is limited, there could also be a 
conflict of interest and objectives between the cruise ship and the destination. This 
arises because the cruise ship may have limited capability, so will want to evacuate 
affected people to hospitals, while the destination may refuse to admit them in local 
hospitals to avoid spreading any viruses to vulnerable people in hospital. Moreover, 
the highest priority for the destination (e.g. protecting destination image) is different 
to the highest priority of the cruise (e.g. business reputation). Therefore, destinations 
and cruise ships should understand each other’s priorities and objectives to help them 
when handling incidents. Furthermore, in case passengers need to be repatriated, 
especially if they are from different countries as C3 mentioned, they do not have 
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chartered flights. Moreover, if the ship needs to be repaired for long time participants 
are asking is there available berths at the port if they are expecting different ships 
coming. The last challenge added by the participants is to control the media; this might 
affect both the cruise lines and the destination for the reasons mentioned in the 
previous theme (Armstrong and Ritchie 2007; Calgaro 2010). All the mentioned 
challenges are due to the lack of joint work, communication and coordination with the 
local authorities that needs to be established before arriving to any destination. 
7.8 The Conceptual Framework 
Turning the discussion to the focus of this study: developing and integrated an 
emergency response system. A conceptual framework (Figure 7-8) based on the 
earlier work by Leiper has been developed in order to portray a clear path for the 
remainder of this study and to identify the existing gaps. Earlier literature (Figure        
3-1) highlighted the vulnerability of the tourism industry and pointing out four phases 
of emergency management . It was decided, given the scope and significance of this 
area, the current study will focus on the response phase. The vulnerability of the 
tourism industry by natural and human-induced hazards (Laws et al. 1998; Henderson 
2002; Prideaux et al. 2003; Ritche 2008; Tsai and Chen 2010; Becken and Hughey 
2013) and in particular the transit route (cruise ship) is the focus of this study. The 
cruise ship can be affected by natural or human-induced hazards in any phase of the 
operation (embarkation, departure, cruise, docking, arrival and disembarkation) 
(Vidmar et al. 2013). The complex events that include the interaction between many 
components could result in failure of the management, if there is insufficient planning 
and ill-informed individual or organisation actions (Comfort 2005). On the other hand, 
no study has examined the integration of the Omani tourism industry with response 
planning for emergencies. In addition, the dis-involvement of the Ministry of tourism 
with the NCCD indicates that there is a lack of collaboration between the different 
governmental departments. Additionally, the NCCD’s main concentrations are on the 
governmental and public sector response with little reference to private sector response 
(Al Shaqsi 2011), which is, in this case, the tourism industry including: tour operators, 
travel agencies, hotels etc. Additionally, Al Shaqsi (2011) mentions that roles do not 
clarify that the NCCD has the authority to impose on the governmental agencies to 
apply the emergency plans and there is no indication as to who is in charge of following 
up and reviewing the application of such plans. Furthermore, Al Shaqsi (2011) 
describes the NCCD disasters and emergencies management approach as reactive 
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rather than proactive. Therefore, the recent natural disasters demonstrate that the local 
authorities in Oman are not well prepared, thus there is a need for regional and national 
support. “This is because the current emergency management system in Oman is still 
largely centralized and resources are not localized” which limit the ability of the local 
authorities to handle emergencies before demanding a regional or national support (Al 
Shaqsi 2011, p.12). This means that if tourists are affected in any location by any 
incident, it will only be the responsibility of the NCCD and the Ministry of Tourism, 
its related stakeholders have no or limited involvement; they are basically not working 
as a complex adaptive system. And there is no assurance that if more than one incident 
happens at the same time in different areas, the necessary resources would be available. 
So, identifying the capabilities of the emergency response system in the destination 
(Oman) and identifying the capabilities, requirements and challenges of the cruise 
lines in case of an emergency occurring or multi-incidents happening at the same time 
(capabilities, needs and challenges) will help to design the intended model for 
integration gathering all emergency services, tourism industry and the related 
stakeholders. The study found that there is no inter or intra integration existing in the 
country Oman. In addition, cruise ships lack the capabilities required and so need for 
local authorities support. Thus, a recommended integrated emergency response system 
builds on the components of coordination, collaboration, cooperation and 
communication. This system will help enhance the efficiency and the effectiveness of 
the emergency response system by having strong leadership, making decisive 
decisions, having clear communication and facilitating information sharing among all 
involved stakeholders. Nowadays, due to the sudden outbreak of many emergencies 
around the world, even in the well-prepared countries with advanced and high capacity 
of the necessary resources, it is the matter of the response system and how resilient it 
is. 
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Figure 7-8. The Conceptual Framework 
(Author 2018) 
7.9 Summary 
The findings from the five conducted interviews in Europe revealed that cruise ships 
have some capabilities in managing certain incidents, but they lack coordination with 
Omani Emergency and Tourism sectors. The port or the shipping agent is the only 
point of contact with the cruise before arriving at the destination to facilitate their 
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arrival. However, in the case of an emergency they need assistance from the 
emergency services (Figure. 7-9). Surprisingly, cruise companies have no relations 
with any emergency services in the destination. 
   
Figure 7-9. The Current Situation of Communication between Cruise Lines and 
the Destination 
(Author 2018) 
 
However, cruise lines should establish relations with tourism stakeholders, as well as 
emergency services in the country, so that the coordination, collaboration, cooperation 
and communication will be easy in case of an emergency. Figure 7-10 shows the 
proposed communication and connection that cruise lines should establish before the 
arrival. 
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Figure 7-10. The Proposed Connection for Cruise Lines with the Destination 
(Author 2018) 
 
 
So, the study suggests future integration between Cruise Ship Companies, the tourism 
sector (shipping agent and relevant stakeholders) and the emergency services as 
Figure. 7-11 shows. 
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Figure 7-11. Suggested Future Integration 
(Author 2018) 
 
The reasons for this integration are first, to establish relations with the local tourism 
and emergency authorities, so in case of an emergency the coordination and 
communication will be facilitated. Second, to conduct joint drills in order to identify 
the required resources in case of an incident. Third, cruise should make sure that their 
plans correspond with the destination’s emergency plans, as there may be cultural 
differences. Finally, there should be collaborative work between them in order to deal 
with any incident effectively. 
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: Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter starts with a review of the research objectives and then summarises the 
main findings of the study. It highlights the theoretical, practical and methodological 
contributions of the study. Finally, it discusses the study limitations and explores the 
opportunities for further research. 
8.2 Review of Study Objectives 
8.2.1 Objective One 
To critically review complexity in relation to emergency response planning. 
Towards achieving this objective, it was important to critically review complexity and 
complexity theory (Webster 1956; Coskun and Ozecylan 2011; Roo et al. 2012) to 
understand the complex nature of emergencies. It was found that complex events 
(Comfort 2005; Helbing et al. 2005), complex systems (Kuhn and Beam 1982; 
Morowits 1995; Cilliers 1998; Chettiparamb 2013) and the complex adaptive systems 
(Gleick 1987; Waldrop 1992; McMillan 2008; Chettiparamb 2013) have features that 
are applicable to emergencies. For example, complex events, as listed in chapter two, 
are unexpected with uncertain consequences and their management requires the 
participation of multi-stakeholders interacting dynamically (Comfort 2005; Helbing et 
al. 2005). Complex systems and complex adaptive systems consist of many interacting 
elements that are adaptive to changes and able to learn (Cilliers 1998; Hilhorst 2003; 
McMillan 2008; Chettiparamb 2013). This explanation and its understanding were 
important when designing the scenarios of the study in the context of complexity and 
in order formulate the findings of the study. Chapter two highlighted how 
understanding complexity of uncertain emergencies can help organisations be ready 
to respond effectively (Ling 2012) by adopting a proactive strategic approach (e.g. by 
applying mitigation and preparedness measures). It was found that complexity is not 
inherent only in large-scale incidents, but also in routine incidents, which occur 
frequently, like floods (Coskun and Ozecylan 2011; O’Sullivan et al. 2012) due to 
their uncertainty and indirect effects. The knock-on effect in emergencies implies that 
those that hit locally might require international strategies and those that occur 
internationally may bring with them effects on the local community. Thus, this indirect 
effect results in complexity that requires advanced communication, coordination, 
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cooperation and collaboration among several stakeholders. Six types of complexities 
that might occur during an emergency response were identified as: human complexity, 
technologic complexity, event complexity, interaction complexity, cultural complexity 
and decision-making complexity (Coskun and Ozecylan 2011). 
These six identified complexities (Coskun and Ozecylan 2011) were also found by this 
study in the destination Oman through examining various scenarios. Firstly, for human 
complexity, the study found that some organisations when responding do not follow 
any standard instructions, or specific procedures; this leads to a poor response and 
inadequate decision-making. Secondly, for technologic complexity, the study 
discovered that the emergency services (first responders) do not use tools like speech 
creators or display books to communicate with affected people, who speak different 
languages than Arabic or English. In addition, the Emergency Services do not have 
access to check the vacancies of hotels rooms in case there is a need for shelter. The 
use of such technologies helps to do such tasks more efficiently. Thirdly, for event 
complexity, the study found that the capabilities of the country are not tested for 
response to large scale incidents like the case of cruise ships. So, the complexity of 
incident is not considered, thus the study recommended adding complexity in the 
context of designing scenarios. Fourthly, the interaction complexity was approved by 
the study in the lack of integration and interaction in terms of communication and 
coordination between emergency services and the tourism industry. Furthermore, this 
type of complexity was demonstrated in the lack of collaboration between the cruise 
lines, the local emergency services and tourism industry in Oman. Therefore, different 
types of integration (Intra and Inter integration) were suggested by the study to 
enhance future incident management in light of interaction complexity. Fifthly, 
cultural complexity was discovered in the scenarios where a European Cruise ship is 
affected in a Gulf country, which has a totally a different language and culture. Lastly, 
decision-making complexity was revealed by this study by the lack of the availability 
of a platform to access and share information between emergency services and the 
tourism industry in the time of incident. Thus, the study suggested having a 
communication hub for the tourism industry to enhance emergency responses. 
Previous research shows that the emergency management processes can be divided 
into four phases including mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery (Waugh 
and Hy 1990; McEntire 2007; Edzén 2014). Each phase has a different set of activities 
and procedures (Emergency Management Australia 2004; UNISDR 2009; Ritchie 
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2009; Cappola 2011; Haddow et al. 2011; Sanjeewa et al. 2012; Lindsay 2012; 
Jackman and Beruvides 2013; UNWTO 2014; Ireni Saban 2014). Highlighting the 
phases was helpful in identifying the research gap regarding the lack of capability of 
the emergency response systems in Oman, specifically with respect to the preparation 
of the tourism industry. It was also helpful in designing the interview questions to 
tackle the current and future levels of the tourism industry participants in terms of risk 
reduction and response. However, Ritchie (2008) explained that managing 
emergencies is not sequential because the occurrence of an emergency might not start 
from the mitigation or preparedness phase (following the cycle of emergency 
management) rather it might start immediately from the response phase. The focus of 
this study is on the response phase, which was deemed to be the most important and 
critical phase because it is a period of high stress that might result in irrational 
decisions and behaviour, with limited time and often conflicting information (Coppola 
2011). 
In chapter two planning was linked to complexity in order to identify ways of 
improving the planning and emergency management processes (Alexander and Cohen 
2000). Moreover, Webber (1978) emphasised that planners need to be familiar with 
complexity and complex dynamic systems to help them achieve effective planning 
outcomes. Although Christensen (2012) revealed that planners can use complexity as 
a building block and derive ways to solve problems and add new arrangements. This 
study found the degree of complexity increases from operational to strategic planning 
as illustrated in Figure 3-2. due to the increased interaction and the involvement of 
different stakeholders (Sybouts 1992) in the emergency management process. It was 
emphasised that planning should be for actions that can be taken in times of 
emergency, rather than planning for situations (Drabek 1995; Piotrowski 2006). Thus, 
Dowell (1995) linked planning for emergencies with strategic planning due to the 
complex nature of emergencies. This enables organisations to identify its strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats (Vargo and Seville 2011) and enhance future 
learning (Pollard and Hotho 2006). This was helpful in evaluating the level of 
organisation preparedness for future incidents by developing a more effective and 
proactive strategic approach to emergency management. In order to enhance the 
industry preparation and to protect the tourism destination’s reputation and ensure the 
resilience of future tourist flows, Ritchie (2009), Ali and Ali (2010) and Taneja et al. 
(2014) emphasised the integration of tourism emergency management with strategic 
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management. This study found that the tourism industry and related stakeholders’ 
activities in Oman are not linked to strategic management because although the 
country was affected by previous incidents, they still do not have the ability to deal 
with future incidents. Thus, integrating emergency management with strategic 
management will help organisations shift from responding and management to 
mitigation and preparedness to minimise the likelihood of an incident’s occurrence. 
Furthermore, it was found that such integration is inherent in the use of scenarios 
(Schoemaker 1993; Verity 2003; Van der Merwe et al. 2007; Page et al. 2010; Herve 
2011). The literature emphasised the importance of scenarios in building a proactive 
approach to handling emergencies (Perterson et al. 2003). Scenarios also help develop 
responders’ ability to make rapid and efficient responses to future incidents and to 
update the current response strategies (Schwartz 1996; De Geus 1999; Smallman and 
Weir 1999; Brown and Starkey 2000). This, in turn, helps managers identify the 
required resources for future incidents. Alexander (2000) mentioned that building 
scenarios has specific aims for each emergency management phase. Taking cognisance 
of this, this study applied scenario building to identify gaps in the research. Scenarios 
were built for the response phase within the context of complexity. They were built 
based on different factors (location and types of hazard) to find ways to solve the 
problems which occurred in the scenarios and to develop the concept of an integrated 
emergency response system for the tourism industry in Oman. 
8.2.2 Objective Two 
To draw on the complex adaptive system similarities within the tourism industry. 
The probability that tourism industry has to face negative events is almost certain 
(Pottorff and Neal 1994; Richter 1999; Evans et al. 2003; Laws and Prideaux 2005). 
However, the time and the types of these events require preparedness (see Ritchie 
2004; Gundel 2005; Pizam 2005). Thus, in order to identify how the tourism industry 
can respond to emergencies (Baggio 2007), the literature in chapter three (Farrell and 
Twining-Ward 2005; Miller and Twining-Ward 2005; Baggio 2007; de Sausmarez 
2007; Baggio 2008; Schianetz and Kavanagh 2008; Stevenson et al. 2009; Baggio and 
Sainaghi 2011) addressed the features that match the similarities between tourism and 
the complex adaptive system. Nevertheless, Hystad and Keller (2007) discovered 
different barriers that hindered the tourism industry from planning for emergencies 
such as shortages of money, lack of knowledge, size of organisations (SMEs) and lack 
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of cohesiveness among tourism stakeholders. These barriers were also found by this 
study, in addition to the lack of awareness, lack of communication, coordination and 
collaboration within the tourism industry and with emergency services. In the case of 
this study, to overcome these barriers, a Public Private Partnership was suggested 
(Bajracharya and Hastings 2012; Hochrainer-Stigler and Lorant1 2017) to help 
organisations reduce the negative effects and enhance resilience. 
It was recommended to integrate tourism with emergency services (UNWTO 2014). 
However, it was also considered that this integrated emergency response system was 
a complex system because of the heterogeneity of the responders’ culture, knowledge, 
tools, values, language or information system (Chen et al. 2007; Uhr 2007). To 
overcome these obstacles Alexander (2013b) suggested conducting regular training 
and education. Specifically, culture was also emphasised as an important element that 
can affect the management of emergencies (Adahl 2009) especially in tourism where 
tourists and involved stakeholders are from different cultures. Culture can hinder the 
communication and ability of organisations or destinations in handling emergencies or 
disasters at national, regional or local levels (Adahl 2009). Therefore, discussing 
culture in the case of this study was important because potential incidents might affect 
international cruise ships in local destinations where cultures are different. 
It was found that to overcome the complexity of integrated emergency response 
systems, there is a need for communication, coordination, cooperation and 
collaboration among all stakeholders in order to enhance leadership, to facilitate 
decision-making, to share information and to allocate the required resources 
effectively (Xia et al. 2011; Pramanik et al. 2015). Huxham and Vangen (2005) found 
that the complexity in the integrated emergency response system increases from 
coordination to collaboration, which is considered to have a high degree of complexity. 
This is because collaboration is a long-term relationship. However, resilience was 
considered the most important feature of this system and it is this that enhances the 
organisation’s preparedness and ability to mitigate the impact of an emergency (Jung 
and Song  2014). It was argued that resilience is a complex adaptive system (Allen et 
al. 2005) and that four factors can be identified and can enhance an organisation’s 
resilience; (1) ability to live with modifications and ambiguities, (2) fostering diversity 
for more opportunities and decreasing hazards, (3) raising the range of experience for 
learning and answering problems, and (4) generating opportunities for self-
organisation (Berkes 2007). In addition, it was found that the capacity for resilience is 
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constituted by empowering locals, responders, organisations, communities, 
governments, systems and the society to share the responsibility in preventing hazards 
from evolving into disasters (Canadian Emergency Management Framework 2011). 
8.2.3 Objective Three 
To examine the specific challenges presented by the Cruise Ship industry when 
undertaking emergency responses. 
The possible hazards that might occur in the cruise-ship industry (Vidmar et al. 2013) 
and the possible measures needed to handle them (FSA 2008) were identified in 
chapter four. From examining different case studies of Costa Concordia, MV Sewol 
Korean Ferry and Norman Atlantic, the reasons behind their inefficient emergency 
response systems were identified. These reasons were the levels of crew experience, 
lack of training (e.g. evacuation drills), inefficient emergency preparedness measures 
and differences in languages and cultures (Alexander 2012; Di Lieto 2012; Anstey et 
al. 2015; Nthia 2015; Ramage 2015). Therefore, the study to mitigate these issues 
suggested establishing relations with the local tourism and emergency authorities, 
conducting joint drills, developing corresponded and coordinated plans and 
conducting collaborative work. In addition, the study also suggested integrating 
culture into the tourism emergency plans. 
8.2.4 Objective Four 
To evaluate the capability of the emergency response system of Oman when 
responding to emergency scenarios on or off shore; 
This objective was achieved through a comprehensive review and analysis of related 
documents in relation to the tourism industry in Oman, focusing specifically on the 
cruise industry (Ministry of Information 2012). Chapter five revealed the policy of the 
country to diversify national income by developing the tourism industry so that 
dependence on oil can be minimised (Winkler 2007; Times of Oman 2015). It was 
found that the country is working to develop tourism industry in the country by 
facilitating visa procedures, adding activities, attracting investment, improving the 
tourism infrastructure and increasing hotel rooms (Oman 2009; Feighery 2012; PART 
2016). The review of literature showed an increasing number of tourists (NCSI 2017; 
The Tourism Annul Report 2016), however, the study found that there was a lack of 
preparedness for future emergencies, which might affect the tourism industry. Chapter 
five highlighted the emergency management system in Oman and how the system 
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works when there is an emergency (Al-Shaqsi 2010; Al Shaqsi 2011; Al Hajri 2011; 
NCCD 2016). The analysis found that although the country is working towards 
developing tourism as a major source of income and thereby increase the number of 
projects to attract more tourists, the Ministry of Tourism has no seat in the NCCD with 
other Ministries. 
In order to evaluate the capability of the emergency response system of Oman when 
responding to emergency scenarios, a set of 18 semi-structured interviews were 
conducted in Oman with tourism and emergency services representatives. The study 
found that with respect to the tourism organisation level, there is a lack of awareness 
of emergency management and a lack of mitigation and preparedness measures. 
Within the tourism industry it was found that there is a lack of cohesiveness as each 
organisation is working alone and has no communication network for sharing 
experiences or feedback regarding emergency management with other organisations. 
Finally, the findings revealed that there is a lack of integration between the tourism 
and emergency services (no communication, coordination, cooperation or 
collaboration,). 
Overall, a major finding was the clear push towards developing the tourism industry 
to build economic resilience for Oman. Yet, that push was not matched by a growing 
awareness and capability of the tourism industry and emergency planning agencies to 
be able to ensure that the tourism industry could be resilient in the face of a disaster. 
Therefore, the study suggests two types of integration intra- and inter-integration. The 
intra-integration (within the tourism industry) was suggested for the mitigation and 
preparedness phases. This was due to the need to share experiences and feedback. 
Additionally, inter-integration was also required in these phases (between tourism and 
emergency services) to raise awareness, develop effective plans for response and to 
conduct regular training. Furthermore, inter-integration was also suggested in the 
response phase to ensure that tourism can support the emergency services with the 
required information, and emergency services can respond to incidents by using the 
resources available. 
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8.2.5 Objective Five 
To identify European cruise lines’ capabilities, requirements and challenges when 
responding to emergency scenarios near to, or alongside, a destination. 
This objective was fulfilled by conducting semi-structured interviews with cruise 
representatives and experts in crisis and security management from Europe. The 
interviews were conducted in order to identify the requirements and expectations in 
case cruise ships were affected in the destination, using a set of given emergency 
scenarios. The focus of the interviews was derived from the analyses of the literature 
combined with the researcher’s own knowledge of the country and the issues involved. 
The study found that although cruise ships often have the capabilities to manage 
certain incidents, they lack the coordination with the Omani emergency and tourism 
sectors. It was also found that although the cruise ships are in contact with the 
port/shipping agent to facilitate their arrival to the country, in cases of an emergency 
they also need contact and help from the emergency services. Surprisingly, cruise 
companies lack relations with emergency services in Oman, in addition they lack the 
capabilities of the emergency response system of the destination. This case the study 
found that the port/shipping agent is considered a single point of failure due to the 
lack of capabilities in handling several concurrent incidents. Therefore, it was 
suggested that there should be collaboration between cruise-ship companies, port 
agents, relevant tourism stakeholders and emergency services in the destination. The 
reasons given to support this suggestion include: establishing relations in advanced to 
facilitate coordination, conducting regular drills to evaluate the capabilities, 
identifying the resources required, ensuring that their emergency plans correspond 
with the destination’s plans. Finally, there should be collaborative work between 
cruise-ship companies and emergency and tourism stakeholders in the destination to 
overcome communication challenges when incidents occur, to share situation 
awareness and to understand their own and other roles. 
8.2.6 Objective Six 
To develop the concept of an integrated emergency response system for the tourism 
industry. 
This aim was achieved through the research findings by developing the concept of an 
integrated emergency response system between emergency services and the tourism 
industry and its related stakeholders. The features of this integrated system are that 
there is a need for communication, coordination, cooperation and collaboration (4Cs) 
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between emergency services and the tourism industry and its related stakeholders. This 
integration leads to enhanced leadership, helps make effective decisions, facilitates 
information sharing and the effective distribution of the required resources in the 
response time. To achieve this integrated system, all organisations need to demonstrate 
the willingness to participate in the emergency management process starting from the 
preparedness phase to the recovery phase. 
8.3 Main Research Findings 
The findings of the study are presented here for the tourism industry, emergency 
services and cruise-ship industry. 
8.3.1 Tourism Industry 
The study has found that there is a lack of awareness among tourism industry 
representatives with respect to what incidents or hazards might affect the industry and 
how to deal with them. Therefore, the tourism stakeholders, as the literature in chapter 
two found, could not identify what kind of information they need in regards to the type 
of incidents and how to deal with them (Eide et al. 2013). Although the country has 
been affected by two recent cyclones, in 2007 and 2010, as mentioned in chapter five, 
the knowledge participants have is basic on the personal level and is related to natural 
hazards only. They lack knowledge regarding what emergency management includes. 
This will hinder organisations from planning for the future and the unexpected. The 
study has shown that there was no prominent role for the Ministry of Tourism in raising 
awareness of potential incidents or in conducting meetings or workshops for the 
industry’s stakeholders. Thus, the study suggested conducting training and workshops 
for the tourism stakeholders organised by emergency services and the Ministry of 
Tourism, in order to raise their awareness and enhance their knowledge.  
Regarding the current situation of dealing with incidents, the study found that tourism 
organisations in Oman are dealing with incidents based on their experiences and not 
following specific procedures. This finding demonstrates the reactive approach the 
tourism stakeholders are following (Pauchant and Mitroff 1992). In addition, there is 
no consistency and control over emergency management because there are no plans 
and organisations depend on the operational mangers to take action and make 
decisions. This will result in ineffective handling of the emergency and might affect 
the image of the destination. This will also result in making irrational or wrong 
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decisions in case managers are unavailable or have to deal with cases differing from 
the norm. The study found that the country is becoming more vulnerable to natural 
disasters such as cyclones than before. This requires more comprehensive preparation 
for the tourism sector because it is more vulnerable and also due to the complexity of 
emergencies. Therefore, the study suggested adopting written plans that are connected 
to procedures (Alexander 2013b) to respond effectively and to mitigate future hazards. 
From the interviews conducted with tourism and port representatives in Oman, the 
study found that there are poor mitigation measures. For example, tourism 
organisations are not conducting risk assessments to help them identify potential risks 
and how best to handle them; this demonstrates the previous findings derived from the 
literature of there being a lack of knowledge, awareness and cohesiveness (Nateghi 
2000; Hystad and Keller 2007). Nor was there any evidence that they were evaluating 
and/or monitoring new sources of risk. However, those who are doing safety check are 
doing so to fulfil the requirement of international cruise lines so that they can maintain 
the market. The study found that although the cruise industry is growing in the country 
and the number of ships is increasing annually, there are no procedures related to cruise 
incidents. Thus, it suggested including tourism and the cruise-ship industry in the 
emergency service’s plans. 
Additionally, there is no specific platform or source of information for mitigating 
hazards that might affect the industry. Although some organisations attend meetings, 
important stakeholders are not involved. Thus, the study suggested having a central 
platform to share information with all tourism stakeholders so that they can be in a 
well-prepared position in case of future incidents. As well as this, it suggested 
conducting regular meetings with all tourism stakeholders where the important 
stakeholders from the emergency services are involved. One of the main findings is 
that what tourism organisations are following are operational procedures rather than 
strategic because they are focusing on providing goods and services rather than safety 
and security of tourists or emergency management. The study suggested linking 
emergency management with strategic management. This was in line with the 
literature to identify any potential incident (Aguilar 1967) and develop adaptive 
techniques to deal with them (Hofer and Schende 1978; Bourgeois 1980), and to better 
understanding the dynamic nature of emergencies, so to be able to develop emergency 
management procedures (Bowonder and Linstone 1987). Finally, the findings have 
revealed that the tourism industry lacks networks and communication within the 
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industry itself and across the industry with emergency services. Hence, the study 
suggested the intra-and inter-integration that were illustrated in the findings chapter. 
In regard to preparedness measures, the study found that organisations are not planning 
for future incidents; they do not list what might happen and how they may be handled. 
This finding supports the other findings of the study which suggested the tourism 
industry does not have well-trained staff to deal with emergency management and the 
required resources in time of an emergency are ill defined. The study revealed that 
there is low level of preparedness because there is no clear or standard emergency 
management planning for the tourism industry, especially in regards to cruise ships. 
The reasons why organisation do not have plans were identified by the study and the 
literature. This included the size of organisation, poor integration with emergency 
organisations, lack of knowledge concerning planning and lack of cohesiveness 
(Hystad and Keller 2007). Therefore, the Ministry of Tourism should start with 
planning for emergencies before establishing any tourist projects, in terms of 
evaluating the vulnerability of the location of any project, for example any natural 
hazards like cyclones. As well as evaluating and identifying the future risk of already 
established projects and how the risk can be minimised to a minimum level. One of 
the main findings is that tourism organisations are not prepared for the unexpected; 
they are only prepared for minor cases. So, the tourism industry does not have the 
ability to make decisions in case of an emergency (Alexander 2009). There is also no 
single emergency plan available to tourism organisations, nor committees for 
emergency planning. Thus, the study suggested that emergency services should take 
the lead based on their experience and design proper standard plans for the tourism 
industry. It was also identified that there is a lack of training and workshops that could 
enhance the ability of organisations to prepare an emergency plan and take the 
necessary mitigation and preparedness measures. The study emphasised that there is a 
need to upgrade the training conducted by the Public Authority for Civil Defence and 
Ambulance from first aid and safety and security to emergency and disaster. As 
acknowledged by the literature, specialised training helps in developing the capacity 
of the industry (Waugh and Streib 2006; Nivolianitou and Synodinou 2011) and 
consequently reduces human error and improves responses (Ritchie 2009). In addition, 
the study has shown that there is no sharing of information regarding emergency 
preparedness within the tourism industry and across the sector with emergency 
services. Lastly, the study found that tourism organisations lack relations with the 
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media so that they can avoid or mitigate damage to the destination’s and industry’s 
image as well as the fact that no organisation has an assigned spokesperson. These 
issues can be solved through the integration suggested by the study in chapter seven. 
From the given scenarios and from examining the past experience from the responses 
in the tourism industry, the study found that the most devastating disasters in the 
country are cyclones. However, cyclones revealed the inadequacy in dealing with 
natural disasters because, for example Port authorities, are following codes for safety 
and security. The study found that what interviewees learnt from previous incidents is 
awareness, but no physical things or mitigation or preparedness measures have been 
taken. The study has shown that the tourism industry has no such identification or 
prediction of what might happen, what should be done and what kind of support is 
required. 
Moreover, employees who receive the cruise are not following specific or clear 
procedures; they have general procedures in case of an incident. In addition, the study 
found that there is no single unified point of contact in case of an emergency. Thus, it 
was suggested to have a central point of contact in time of an emergency to facilitate 
communication. The study acknowledged the limited capacity and responsibility of 
tourism stakeholders because it is largely comprised of SMEs, so their current role is 
to be a promoter and marketer for the destination. The study has identified no specific 
role for the tourism industry in the response phase, except one of coordination, because 
they do not have physical resources, plans, or well-qualified personnel. What the 
tourism stakeholders can provide is information alongside volunteer work and 
recovery in branding the destination. Thus, current roles and responsibilities need 
further development and because the actual cooperation is poor, there is a need to 
integrate the tourism industry with emergency services. The study identified several 
reasons for integration; to connect cruise lines to the local authorities due to the 
sensitivity of the industry, the nature and complexity of the emergency, also because 
tourism projects are expensive and require security and a quick response and 
additionally to facilitate the dissemination of emergency information on any incident 
to enhance awareness of taking the necessary precaution. 
8.3.2 Emergency Services 
Although emergency services are responsible for emergency responses, the study has 
identified that there was a duplication of some roles of the emergency services and 
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their plans are not unified. The study found that tourism and culture are not considered 
in the emergency services plans and trainings. The importance of cultural awareness 
in emergency management was also emphasised by the literature to establish clear 
communication and to facilitate work with different and similar cultures (Adahl 2009). 
In addition, the findings illustrated that there was lack of collaboration because there 
is no shared training between cruise and emergency services. Although emergency 
services are well prepared with the required resources, these resources and capabilities 
have not been tested to handle mass incidents like those related to a major cruise-ship 
incident. This is because tourism incidents are considered unlikely to happen, 
especially on cruise ships. The study found that although emergency organisations are 
working consistently, they cannot judge the capability of their response system. 
The study illustrated the reasons why tourism currently is not integrated with 
emergency response system. Firstly, it has not been affected by a major incident. Those 
incidents that happened in the past were in the off-season. Tourism was not affected 
directly. Secondly, lack of communication between tourism and emergency services. 
Lack of awareness among tourism stakeholders and emergency services. The focus of 
the tourism industry is on establishing projects and attracting investments. 
8.3.3 Cruise-Ship Industry 
The findings of the have revealed that although cruise ships have some capabilities, 
they lack coordination and communication with the Omani Emergency and Tourism 
sectors. It also found that cruise ships, when arriving at the country, only communicate 
with the port or shipping agent to facilitate their arrival. However, in the case of an 
emergency, they need to communicate with the emergency services. The most obvious 
finding to emerge from this study is that the port or the shipping agent is considered 
to be a single point of failure. This is because it is the only point of contact and its 
capability is highly limited. 
The study has identified several needs and expectations from the cruise ships, like in 
case of a fire, they need the support of the local emergency services and they expect 
the local authorities’ cooperation as well as coordination to solve any problems that 
might occur. In addition, they need the collaborative work with the destination to 
match their plans and overcome any cultural differences. Further needs as revealed by 
the study include cruise ships needing to communicate with the local media to manage 
situations positively. 
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In addition, the study found that basic services, such as those relating to the provision 
of food and water to passengers when there is a need for evacuation, is challenging 
and as is likewise the provision of appropriate shelter. Due to the language differences 
between cruise-ship passengers and the local destination, the findings identified 
communication as a challenge. This was also identified in the incident of Costa 
Concordia (Alexander 2012) because cruise ships carry so many passengers, the study 
found that there could be a lack of capacity in local hospitals if there was, for example 
an outbreak of the Nor virus. 
8.4 Contributions 
8.4.1 Contribution to Theory 
This study provides the opportunity to understand how complexity and complex 
adaptive system work within emergency response systems and argues there is a need 
for coordination, collaboration, cooperation and communication among the different 
stakeholders. The study tackled the relationship between complexity and between the 
different levels of planning (strategic, tactical and operational) and how the degree of 
complexity increases from operational to strategic planning. The focus of this study is 
more specifically on the cruise-ship industry, which has not been highlighted by other 
researchers. This study is considered to be the first study conducted in this area of 
emergency management for the tourism industry in Oman. It contributes to the body 
of knowledge of emergency management in Oman and the emergency response system 
in particular. This study is the first study that develops the concept of an integrated 
emergency response system for the tourism industry in Oman. In addition, it is the first 
that highlights incidents that might affect the cruise-ship sector in Oman. This study 
is the first in terms of identifying both the capability of the emergency response system 
of a destination, based on scenarios built using factor design. It also identifies needs, 
expectations and challenges for cruise lines in case of an emergency. So, the 
development of the concept of an integrated emergency response system is a result of 
identifying different issues from different sides, not only the destination. Furthermore, 
this study will add to the literature on emergency management in the tourism industry 
in Oman. The findings of the study contribute to the development of the concept of an 
integrated emergency response system for tourism. 
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8.4.2 Contribution to Practice 
This study identified the lack of capability of the tourism industry to handle potential 
incidents and discovered the reasons that hinder the tourism industry from planning 
for an emergency. Therefore, the study suggested intra-integration (within the tourism 
industry) and inter-integration (between tourism and emergency services) for the 
mitigation, preparedness and response phases. The findings of the study will help 
cruise lines develop more relations for effective coordination, collaboration and 
communication. The findings also suggested integration between destination 
stakeholders (Tourism and Emergency Services) and cruise lines to establish relations, 
to conduct joint drills, to ensure their plans correspond and to have more collaborative 
work. Implementing the proposed suggestion will help to enhance responses in case 
of an emergency. It also emphasises establishing public private partnerships to support 
the tourism private sector in handling any potential incident. 
8.4.3 Contribution to Methodology 
This study in order to evaluate the capabilities of the destination (Oman) emergency 
response system and to identify the capabilities, requirements and challenges of cruise 
lines designed scenarios. Scenarios were used in different research to collect data. 
However, this study built the scenarios based on a factor design for several reasons. 
First, to encourage participants to think logically and carefully because a little 
difference in the factors can reveal differences in capabilities, needs, expectations or 
challenges. For example, in this study the factors are type of hazards (single and multi) 
and the location (on-shore and off-shore). These different factors revealed to what 
extent an organisation has or does not have the ability to handle on-shore or offshore 
incidents. Second, to identify to what extent organisations are willing and able to 
participate in emergency management, especially with respect to response. Thus, 
building scenarios on factors can also show if an organisation is able to participate or 
not, as well as its willingness to do so. Some organisations, although they have the 
capabilities, are unwilling to participate or share resources with others. It also reveals 
if an organisation has the required resources and plans in times of incidents or if it 
lacks them. Third, to identify as well as evaluate the mitigation, preparedness and 
response measures of organisations. Fourth, to tackle the current situation and 
encourage participants to think about future incidents and identify new sources of risk 
and new potentials. So, the use of factors can help organisations to look for new 
sources of hazards and prepare for them with the required resources and plans. Fifth, 
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to identify and evaluate an organisation’s current capabilities and future needs by using 
different factors in designing the scenarios. For example, in the case of this study, the 
outcome showed the current capabilities are lacking and further improvement is 
needed for future incidents. Sixth, to discover the gaps in the emergency response 
system. For example, it helps easily identify the gap in the response that might be in 
coordination, or communication or information sharing or other. Finally, using factors 
to help to analyse the strength, weakness, opportunities and threats (SWOT) of an 
organisation. 
8.5 Limitations 
There are a few limitations with respect to this study. One of them is that there is no 
literature specifically on emergency management systems for tourism in Oman. 
Emergency representatives in Oman during the interviews could not release some 
information due to confidentiality. In Oman all interviews were conducted in Muscat 
and involved only Sultan Qaboos Port, although there are two tourism ports: Salalah 
and Khasab. These ports were excluded due to the long distance from Muscat and it 
was difficult for the researcher to travel to these ports. The study intended to use survey 
questionnaires to identify capabilities, requirements and challenges of cruise lines. 
However, due to the low response rate, this was substituted by semi-structured 
interviews. Due to the sensitivity of the topic, a number of cruise lines in Europe 
withdrew from the interviews. This results in a reduced number of participants (five). 
8.6 Recommendations 
8.6.1 The Tourism Industry Roles/Functions 
● The tourism industry should understand the business of the emergency services in 
order to help them identify future risks that might affect the sector. For example, 
the tourism industry should corporately understand how the emergency services 
identify potential hazards, how they categorise these hazards and how they apply 
the mitigation and preparedness measures to those hazards. The aim of such 
understanding is to improve integration and cooperation. 
● All tourism stakeholders should meet regularly to share any information, feedback 
and updates in the area of emergency management. This will help them update 
their plans and learn from the experiences of others. 
		243	
● A common system of communication is needed between the tourism industry and 
emergency services, so that both are fully aware of situations and updates and are 
prepared to respond to each other’s needs and so that resources can be located 
conveniently. 
● A law is required that all tourism stakeholders in the country should regularly 
update emergency management plans and exercises. The NCCD should be the 
responsible for auditing as it is the specialised authority in the country. 
● The tourism industry should develop, in collaboration with emergency services, a 
written framework agreement for tourism stakeholders that connects plans to 
procedures in case of any potential incident. 
● There should be an information platform where all tourism stakeholders can get 
information about crisis/disaster/emergency management. 
● International Tour operators or hotels, if they have emergency plans, they should 
share with local agencies and hotels. So, they can enhance their preparedness level 
because most organisations are SMEs and therefore lack resources and money. 
● All tourism stakeholders should organise a FAM trips for international tourists if 
an incident occurs. This to be done to ensure business continuity and enhance the 
destination’s image. 
● Critical infrastructure and their complex interactions should be considered when 
planning for tourism emergency management. 
● Tourism should set the objectives and priorities when handling tourism 
emergencies to avoid any conflict in objectives and priorities with the supply 
market, for example, the objectives of the destination vs. the objectives of the 
cruise ship.  
8.6.2 The Ministry of Tourism Roles/ Function 
● The Ministry of Tourism should establish a Directorate for Emergency 
Management in the sector with different sections based on the emergency 
management cycle (e.g. disaster risk reduction section, response section and 
recovery and business continuity section). This Directorate should have direct 
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contact with the emergency services to design emergency management plans for 
the sector and to update current plans. It should ensure that all travel agencies, tour 
operators and the accommodation sector all have emergency management plans 
that are updated regularly. 
● The Ministry of Tourism should have membership of the International 
Emergency/Crisis/Disaster or Risk Reduction Organisations to enhance the 
system in the country. 
● The Ministry of Tourism should establish a committee, which consists of all 
tourism stakeholders for emergency management. This committee is needed to act 
on the results of the scenario training and have an appropriate follow up to fill any 
gap in the capabilities or resources. This committee, prior to the cruise ship season, 
should meet all shipping agents, travel agents, port authorities and emergency 
services in order to prepare them for any potential incident. For example, they 
make sure that all stakeholders have plan A and plan B for in case of an emergency. 
● The Ministry of Tourism should hold an annual symposium and conferences 
related to crisis, emergency and disaster management in the tourism industry to 
gain benefits from international practice. 
● The Ministry of Tourism, in collaboration with the Emergency Services, should 
conduct workshops to increase tourism stakeholder knowledge and awareness. 
● Ministry of Tourism can send its employees for international training and in order 
to reduce the cost of training, these employees can be asked to train the tourism 
stakeholders, especially in the case of SMEs. 
8.6.3 The Emergency Services Roles/ Function 
● Emergency services should understand the economic importance of the tourism 
industry to the country. This will assist them in integrating tourism in their plans. 
● Emergency services should be familiar with the dates of tourism high season, the 
number of tourists annually, tourist routes, the most attractive areas, as well as the 
demographics of tourists. This will help them prepare for any potential hazards, 
helping them during responses in case of an incident. 
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● They need to establish policies and construct methodologies that are appropriately 
consistent across the sectors and are suited to Oman’s model and ensure they do 
not use a one size fits all foreign model. 
● There should be a system to link emergency services to the central reservation 
system of the hotels in Oman, so in case of an emergency, it will easier for them 
to accommodate passengers if they need emergency shelter. 
● There should be a communication hub for the tourism industry, so in case of an 
emergency they can easily communicate with response authorities and easily share 
required information. 
● Emergency Services should upgrade the currently conducted training from safety 
and security to emergency and disaster. 
● The training and scenario planning for emergency responses should capture 
complexities from bottom to the top and to fit with Omani, but it should also take 
the foreign interests into account because that will also affect their image and 
reputation. 
● Tourism Police should be adopted and they should be trained how to handle 
incidents that affect tourists from different cultures and who speak different 
languages. Tourism Police should be taught different languages for easy 
communication. 
● Emergency services should have visual books (using images) to facilitate 
communication with tourists who are not familiar with the main languages like 
Arabic or English to help them identify their needs in case of an emergency. A 
speech creator can also be used to help responders communicate with foreign 
tourists. 
● Planning for emergency management should be fed into the government and 
private sector strategic business decision. 
● The emergency management system in Oman is currently focusing on the response 
phase, it should be directed to all phases of emergency management. 
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● Emergency services should teach tourism stakeholders how to design an 
emergency management plan and they should follow it regularly. 
● Emergency Services, especially NCCD should work extensively to increase the 
awareness of crisis/disaster and emergency management in the tourism sector. 
● Emergency management should be taught, as a module in the tourism 
specialisations in universities and colleges in Oman and the content should be 
prepared in cooperation with the tourism and emergency services. 
● This study proposes a new structure for the NCCD (See Appendix 15) replacing 
the organisational structure in Figure 5-5. The NCCD can be replaced with the 
National Authority for Emergency and Disasters Management. This new structure 
assigns the Inspector General of Police and Customs as the president. While the 
Vice-President is the Assistant Inspector General of Police and Customs for 
Operations. Under the vice-president are the command and control officer, safety 
and security officer, liaison officer and communication and information officer. 
All of them are work at the strategic and tactical level. Then the new structure 
suggests replacing the name of the executive office with the Emergency 
Management Centre. This Centre is divided into four departments: Disaster Risk 
Reduction, Operations Department, Services and Support Department and 
Governorates Emergency Centres Management Department. The first department 
is divided into two section: mitigation which is responsible of early warnings, 
hazards identifications and risk assessment and any other activities related to 
mitigating incidents from occurring. Then the preparedness section, which is 
responsible for planning and designing, plans, increasing public awareness, 
education and training and other related activities that enhance the preparedness 
of the country and organisations. The second department sections are response and 
recovery. The response section will include all sectors mentioned in Table 5-1 the 
media and public awareness sector, search and rescue sector, relief and shelter 
sector, medical response and public health sector, basic services sector, hazardous 
material sector and victims and missing persons affairs sector. Then the recovery 
section, which is responsible for evaluating reparations and needs, removing 
damaged properties, the discarding of debris, restoration of infrastructure and any 
other related activities to recover the country after any incident. The third 
department is services and support, which consists of two sections: the human 
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resources section to manage all employees in addition to the local community, 
volunteers and the private sector. The second section is finance and logistics and 
is responsible for any financial expenditures and providing any support in terms 
of logistics needed. The final department is responsible for managing the 
Governorates’ emergency centres in terms of coordination, communication and 
follow up. The members of the Emergency Management Centre are those listed in 
Figure 5-5, in addition to the Ministry of Tourism and the involvement of locals, 
volunteers and the private sector. 
Overall, these recommendations can be communicated with the actors through 
conducting workshops or gathering for the tourism industry separately or between 
tourism and emergency services. All involved actors should evaluate their current 
situation regarding risk reduction response and recovery based on a checklist. 
Then all involved stakeholders should evaluate to what extent they can apply these 
recommendations and what the results will be. The obstacles that might hinder the 
tourism industry from applying any recommendation can be identified to look for 
better solutions. There should be clear communication between the tourism 
industry and emergency services in identifying and evaluating their capabilities 
and needs. 
8.6.4 For Cruise Lines 
● Cruise lines should establish and develop different relations with tourism and 
emergency services in the destination and not depend only on the port or shipping 
agent. 
● Cruise lines should communicate with the port agent and emergency services to 
conduct drills at least once a year, so that they can identify the available 
capabilities, needs and challenges. 
● The roles and responsibilities of all tourism stakeholders should be identified. 
8.7 Future Research 
Since this study is the first to develop the concept of an integrated emergency response 
system for tourism, further research can be conducted as following: 
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● Future research can be conducted in Oman using each phase of the emergency 
management cycle, for example it can highlight mitigation, or preparedness or 
recovery. 
● It can also be directed towards business continuity for the tourism industry. 
● The factor of the scenarios can be changed depending on the aim of the study or 
the phase of emergency management as well as the incident itself. 
● Further research can be conducted in different countries, such as the Gulf countries 
that have similar cultures or countries with different cultures. This can help to 
examine the relation between culture and emergency management and to identify 
a benchmark. 
● Future research on emergency management in tourism can be conducted on a 
specific type of tourism like adventure tourism, eco-tourism or business tourism 
etc. 
● Further research can be conducted specifically for other ports like Salalah Port or 
Khasab Port. 
● Future research can be also carried out to cover a case study of airplane incidents. 
● Different cases or hazards can be tackled. 
● More than two factors can be added when designing scenarios for future research. 
● Cruise passengers can be participants in a study so that they can identify the needs 
instead of cruise lines. 
● Further studies can be conducted using different method like focus groups with 
members of the Emergency Services, Tourism industry, Port Authorities, and 
shipping agents. 
● Further research can be conducted to identify the reliability of this emergency 
response system after identifying its capability. 
● Future research can be carried out to identify the point of failure for the emergency 
response system. 
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● Each component of the emergency response system can be highlighted in a single 
piece of research. The researcher can study a single strategy from these strategies 
(coordination, collaboration, cooperation, communication, leadership, decision-
making, information sharing and resource allocation). 
● A case study can be conducted on the effect of the recently occurred Mekuno 
cyclone in May 2018 in Salalah-Oman. This case study can highlight the effect of 
Mekuno Cyclone on the tourism since Salalah is a tourist destination depending 
on the monsoon and autumn season that starts in June. 
● Future research can be conducted on the vulnerability of the tourism critical 
infrastructure to natural or human-induced hazards. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Differentiating Criteria between Emergency 
and Disaster 
Differentiating criteria Emergency  Disaster  
Definition 
“An emergency is an out-
of-the-ordinary situation 
that must be managed by 
urgent procedures in order 
to stop it escalating and 
thus having consequences 
that are more serious and 
damaging.” 
“A disaster is an event 
that has a substantial 
negative impact on human 
lives and activities and on 
the built or natural 
environment. Commonly 
it will be marked by 
mortality and morbidity 
(death and injury), 
destruction and damage, 
interruption of normal 
activities and economic 
losses.” 
Dominant origin of the 
initial events  Internal  External  
Frequency of occurrence  Higher  Lower  
Events timeline  Prolonged  Brief  
Forecast potential  Higher Lower 
Degree of control over 
the evolution of the 
events  
Higher  Lower  
Reaction time frame  Preceded by a period that allows decision and action  
Immediately before or 
only after initial events  
Response  
It requires timely response 
and a high degree of 
organization.  
They can be dealt with 
using resources that are 
normally locally available 
without the need for 
significant changes in 
quantity and quality. 
Impacts and 
consequences  Lower Higher 
Source: Developed from Alexander (2016. p14); Laws el al. (2007. p56) 
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Appendix 2: Related Activities and Procedures Taken in all 
Emergency Management Phases 
  Activities/ Procedures 
Mitigation Phase  
The sequence of the mitigation plan according to Sanjeewa et al. (2012) should 
include; 
● Recognition of possible technique to identify the signs of a disasters, 
● Decreasing the probability of occurrence, 
● Decreasing the effect and magnitudes, 
● Evaluating the required capabilities (cost and time) that help in minimizing effect 
and magnitudes, 
● Link to the responsible authorities the possible signs of a disaster, 
● Prepare communication strategies to inform people when a disaster occur, 
● Putting an action plan in order to activate the mitigation plan and ; 
● List the relevant stakeholders who will participate in executing the mitigation 
plan. 
Preparedness Phase  
Good disaster preparedness follow certain steps according to (Ritchie 2009; Lindsay 
2012; Ireni Saban 2014) like: 
● The design of plans or measures to deal with incidents 
● Improving the capacity such as ensuring the competency of personnel and 
entities to respond to a wide range of potential events 
● Exercises, to ensure the efficiency of planning, 
● Purchasing required resources like water, food and medications, 
Response Phase 
The response phase involves activities (Cappola 2011; Jackman and Beruvides 2013; 
UNWTO 2014) like: 
● Search and rescue, 
● Emergency medical services, 
● Evacuation and shelter, 
● Casualty tracking and 
● Victim identification 
Recovery Phase 
Coppola (2011), Lindsay (2012) and Ireni Saban (2014) list the actions and activities 
to be undertaken in the recovery stage that are: 
● Frequent connection with the community, 
● Providing them shelters, 
		300	
● Evaluating reparations and needs, 
● Removing damaged properties and throwaway of debris, 
● Restoration of critical infrastructure, 
● Investigating and repairing damaged buildings compensation for estate losses 
and establishing new one when needed, 
● Social recovery program and offering job opportunities, 
● Recovering injured people; and  
● Re-evaluating the sources of hazards. 
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Appendix 3: Framework for Crisis/Disaster Management 
  
Source: Faulkner (2001, p.140) 
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Figure 9. Tourism Disaster Management Framework
Phase in disaster process
1. Pre-event
When action can be taken to prevent or
mitigate the effects of potential disasters.
2. Prodromal
When it is apparent that a disaster is
imminent.
3. Emergency
The effect of the disaster is felt and action
is necessary to protect people and
property.
4. Intermediate
A point where the short-term needs of
people have been addressed and the main
focus of activity is to restore services and
the community to normal.
5. Long-term
(Recovery)
Continuation of previous phase, but items
that could not be attended to quickly are
attended to at this stage.  Post-mortem,
self-analysis, healing.
6. Resolution
Routine restored or new improved state
establishment.
Elements of the disaster
management responses
Principal ingredients of the disaster
management strategies
Risk Assessment
• Assessment of potential
disasters and their
probability of
occurrence.
• Development of
scenarios on the genesis
and impacts of potential
disasters.
• Develop disaster
contingency plans.
Disaster Contingency
Plans
• Identify likely impacts
and groups at risk.
• Assess community and
visitor capabilities to
cope with impacts.
• Articulate the objectives
of individual (disaster
specific) contingency
plans.
• Identify actions
necessary to avoid or
minimise impacts at each
stage.
• Devise strategic priority
(action) profiles for each
phase.
♦ Prodromal;
♦ Emergency;
♦ Intermediate;
♦ Long-term recovery;
• On-going review and
revision in the light of:
♦ Experience;
♦ Changes in
organisational
structures and
personnel;
♦ Changes in the
environment.
Precursors
• Appoint a Disaster Management Team
(DMT) Leader and establish DMT.
• Identify relevant public/private sector
agencies/organisations.
• Establish coordination/consultative
framework and communication systems.
• Develop, document and communicate
Disaster Management Strategy.
• Education of industry stakeholders,
employees, customers and community.
• Agreement on, and commitment to,
activation protocols.
Mobilisation
• Warning systems (including general mass
media);
• Establish disaster management command
centre;
• Secure facilities.
Action
• Rescue/evacuation procedures;
• Emergency accommodation and food
supplies;
• Medical/health services;
• Monitoring and communication systems.
Reconstruction and Reassessment
• Repair of damaged infrastructure.
• Rehabilitation of environmentally damaged
areas.
• Counselling victims.
• Restoration of business/consumer confidence
and development of investment plans.
• Debriefing to promote input to revisions of
disaster strategies.
Recovery
• Damage audit/monitoring system;
• Clean-up and restoration;
• Media communication strategy.
Review
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Appendix 4: Crisis and Disaster Management: A Strategic 
and Holistic Framework 
 
Source: Ritchie (2004, p.674) 
provides, where applicable, specific tourism literature
and examples. However, to date the literature directly
related to crisis management in the tourism industry is
scarce, although it is growing due to recent incidents of
terrorism, war and the SARS outbreak (for recent books
on the subject see Beirman, 2002b; Glaesser, 2003).
4.1. Crisis and disaster prevention and planning
At the pre-event and prodromal stage of a crisis or
disaster activities can be undertaken by public and
private sector organisations and managers to develop
strategies and plans to stop or limit the impacts of a
crisis or disaster (ranging from employee strikes,
terrorist attacks, economic recessions, etc.).
Although organisations are able to design pre-crisis
strategies to help with crisis management they are often
unable to prevent a crisis from occurring. However, the
real challenge is to recognise crises in a timely fashion
and implement coping strategies to limit their damage
(Darling, Hannu, & Raimo, 1996). Authors such as
Burnett (1998) and Kash and Darling (1998) note that
decisions undertaken before a crisis occurs will enable
more effective management of the crisis, rather than
organisations being managed by the crisis and making
hasty and ineffective decisions. Proactive planning
through the use of strategic planning and issues
management will help reduce risk, time wastage, poor
resource management and reduce the impacts of those
that do arise (Heath, 1998).
A number of techniques have been identified by
researchers and practitioners to help in the proactive
planning and strategy development for the prevention or
reduction of crises and disasters through sensing
potential problems (Gonzales-Herrero & Pratt, 1998).
Authors such as Darling (1994) and Kash and Darling
(1998) suggest that developing processes to deal with
future crises as they arise are more efficient than
continually scanning for all potential impacts. Problem
recognition through environmental scanning and collect-
ing data on the political, economic, social and techno-
logical environment can provide information on possible
trends and their likely impacts on the organisation. Other
tools identified by Kash and Darling (1998) include:
* strategic forecasting: allowing for predictions based
on potential crisis or disaster situations and could
include opinion based quantification, extrapolation
of trends, simulation and cause and effect methods.
Examples include the forecasting of the impact of the
1997–1998 Asian Economic Crisis to determine its
impact on outbound travel to Australia.
* contingency planning: these are alternative plans
which can be implemented if a crisis or disaster hits
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Strategic Management Framework Anatomy of a Crisis/Disaster 
CRISIS/DISASTER PREVENTION AND PLANNING 
■ Proactive planning and strategy formulation: environmental scanning; issues analysis; 
scenario planning; strategic forecasting, risk analysis. 
■ Scanning to planning: developing plans from scanning and issues analysis; contingency and 
emergency planning.
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STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION
■ Strategy evaluation and strategic control: formulation of strategic alternatives, evaluation of 
alternatives, selection of appropriate strategies; making effective decisions quickly; influence 
or control over crises/disasters. 
■ Crisis communication and control: control over crisis communication; development of crisis 
communication strategy including use of a public relations plan; appointment of a
spokesperson; use of crisis communication to recover from incidents; short versus long term
crisis communication strategies.
■ Resource management: responsive organisational structures; redeployment or generation of 
financial resources; leadership styles and employee empowerment.
■ Understanding and collaborating with stakeholders: internal (employees, managers,
shareholders) and external (tourists, industry sectors, government agencies, general public, 
media) stakeholders; need for collaboration between stakeholders at different levels to resolve
crises or disasters. 
RESOLUTION, EVALUATION AND FEEDBACK 
■ Resolution and normality: resolution and restoration of destination or organisation to pre-
crisis situation; reinvestment strategies and resourcing; crises/disasters as agents of change.
■ Organisational learning and feedback: organisations or destinations may reassess and take 
‘stock’ of themselves; evaluating effectiveness of strategies and responses; feedback to pre-
event planning; levels of learning depend on single or double loop learning. 
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1. Pre-Event Stage 
■ action taken to 
prevent disasters
2. Prodromal 
■ Apparent a 
crisis/disaster is 
about to hit  
3. Emergency 
■ Incident hits;
damage 
limitation and 
action needed
4. Intermediate 
■ Short term
needs dealt 
with; restoring 
services 
5. Long term
(recovery)
■ Longer term 
clean up; repair; 
reinvestment;
post mortem
6. Resolution
■ Normal or
improved state 
created
Fig. 2. Crisis and disaster management: a strategic and holistic framework.
B.W. Ritchie / Tourism Management 25 (2004) 669–683674
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Appendix 5: Framework for operation of workshop and 
research process for crisis and disasters 
 
Source: Page et al. (2006, p.367). 
scenarios (Appendices A and B), previously tested with
Visit Scotland staff, the SEDH and the research team, these
were pre-circulated to the workshop attendees. After
several iterations, the scenario and models were provided
to a workshop comprising 20 attendees, prefaced by two
presentations from the SEDH and British Airways who
were currently embarking on a similar process for their
organisation.
7. Testing the validity of the scenarios
In a series of break-out groups, the scenarios were
looked at in terms of: coherence, content, validity and to
examine the impact so as to make recommendations to
Visit Scotland and the Scottish tourism industry on how to
cope with a pandemic. The workshop used an Idon
Scenario Thinking Methodology, in conjunction with a
scenario planning consultancy—Bee Successful Ltd. (Galt,
Chicoine-Piper, & Hogson, 1997) in line with the process
used in the study of the Iraq War by Yeoman et al. (2005).
This provided both a methodology for structuring the ideas
and free flow thinking from the break-out groups in the
workshops, whilst providing a formal method for record-
ing participants views. As Hodgson (1992, p. 227) states
scenario planning using hexagons ‘is the process of
rendering tacit models shareable by use of representational
mapping. This mapping is done by means of a variety of
techniques which are like moving diagrams’. In practice,
this allows individuals to note their ideas down on
magnetic, coloured hexagons which are placed on a
white-board. The hexagons can then be clustered to show
synergies and inter-connections between ideas that emerge
in the workshop groups. What is novel about the hexagon
technique is its ability to allow individual views to be then
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Scenario Planning Workshop 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Moffat Model 
for Scenario 1 
Moffat Model 
for Scenario 2 
Implications / Findings 
for Stakeholders 
The Response and Actions Required 
Critical Reasoning / 
Questioning 
What is missing 
from the Scenarios? 
What are the key 
issues? 
What is missing 
from the models? 
What are the key 
issues? 
Pandemic Timeline
Pre-crisis:
Crisis: 
Post-crisis:
Tourism 
industry/businesses 
Public sector 
(Government and 
tourism agencies) 
Visitors 
•
•
•
•
Fig. 2. Framework for operation of workshop and research process.
(footnote continued)
possible public panic in a pandemic and they are required to take drastic
measures. These measures could be sanctioned under the new 2004 Civil
Contingencies Act, that provides a more holistic view of an emergency and
the powers needed to deal with such an event, which could involve a public
health problem such as a pandemic.
S. Page et al. / Tourism Management 27 (2006) 361–393 367
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Appendix 6: Scenarios 
Scenario A (In-shore) 
A European cruise ship arrives in Oman in January during the tourist season (Jan, Feb 
Mar). The ship is carrying around 2500 passengers and 1250 crew. It anchors at Sultan 
Qaboos Port intending to stay for four days. During the first day ashore some of the 
passengers have a tour of the city of Muscat, finishing their day with an evening meal 
at a local restaurant before returning to the ship at 20:00 to spend the night. At around 
22:15 a fire breaks out in the main engine causing total loss of power in the ship. Since 
there is no electricity on board (affecting air conditioning, food refrigeration, toilets 
and showers and room locks) the Captain seeks guidance concerning a full evacuation 
of the ship pending repairs to the engine and the restoration of power. 
Scenario B (Off-shore) 
A European cruise ship is cruising 10 to 12 miles off the coast of Oman in January 
during the tourist season (Jan, Feb Mar). The ship is carrying around 2500 passengers 
and 1250 crew. At 06:00 the coastguard in Oman receive a distress call from the ship. 
A fire has broken out in the main engine causing total loss of power in the ship. Since 
there is no electricity on board (affecting air conditioning, food refrigeration, toilets 
and showers and room locks) the Captain is now requesting a rescue operation to assist 
the evacuation of passengers and crew from the affected ship. Wind speeds are up to 
60 km/h and rough waves will make the rescue operation difficult. 
Scenario C (In-shore) 
A European cruise ship arrives in Oman in January during the tourist season (Jan, Feb 
Mar). The ship is carrying around 2500 passengers and 1250 crew. It anchors at Sultan 
Qaboos Port intending to stay for four days. During the first day ashore some of the 
passengers have a tour of the city of Muscat, finishing their day with an evening meal 
at a local restaurant before returning to the ship at 20:00 to spend the night. The next 
day, during breakfast, several passengers display symptoms of vomiting and diarrhea. 
They blame the restaurant where they ate the night before. At 09:00 a fire breaks out 
in the main engine causing total loss of power in the ship. Since there is no electricity 
on board (affecting air conditioning, food refrigeration, toilets and showers and room 
locks) the Captain seeks guidance concerning a full evacuation of the ship pending 
repairs to the engine and the restoration of power. 
		305	
Scenario D (Off-shore) 
A European cruise ship is cruising 10 to 12 miles off the coast of Oman in January 
during the tourist season (Jan, Feb Mar). The ship is carrying around 2500 passengers 
and 1250 crew. A fire has broken out in the main engine causing total loss of power in 
the ship. Since there is no electricity on board (affecting air conditioning, food 
refrigeration, toilets and showers and room locks) the Captain is now requesting a 
rescue operation from the Omani Coastguard. Just as he commences his request the 
ship’s Doctor comes to his office to bring him the news that a number of passengers 
are displaying symptoms of vomiting and diarrhea and that it is believed that they have 
a particularly strong, and contagious form of norovirus. The passengers currently 
believe that it their symptoms have been caused by eating in one of the ship’s 
restaurants. The virus could rapidly spread between the passengers affecting around 
1000. Owing to the loss of power, the ship is obviously unable to leave Omani waters. 
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Appendix 7: Timeline of events associated 
with the wreck of the Costa Concordia 
 
Time CET) Event Elapsed time 
(hrs.mins) 
Friday, January 13th, 2012 
19:33 Ship sets sail from port of Civitavecchi 00.00 
21:30 Starts ‘salute’ approach to Giglio Island (Tuscan 
Archipelago) 
01.57 
21:45 Traveling at 15 knots, ship strikes the Scola Piccola rock off 
Giglio 
02.12 
21:45-21:55 Ship decelerates to zero knots and turns more than 180 
degrees 
02.12-02.22 
21:56 Ship comes to rest on the shore of Giglio north of the main 
tourist and fishing port 
02.23 
22:12 Officers begin contact with Port Authority of Livorno (on 
Italian mainland) 
02.39 
22:15 Passengers advised to “return to their cabins” 02.42 
22:26 Captain requests assistance of a tug 02.53 
22:42 Captain admits to Port Authority that situation is critical 03.09 
22:45 Ad hoc unofficial evacuation begins; main evacuation lasts 
until about 01.45 
03.12 
22:58 Captain gives general order to evacuate 03.25 
Saturday, January 14th, 2012 
01:30 Captain abandons ship 05.57 
01:45 Harbor Master of Livorno ‘orders’ Captain to return to ship 
(he does not do so) 
06.12 
03:45 Six hundred passengers evacuated from Giglio Island to 
mainland by ferry 
c. 08.15  
05:30 Last senior officer abandons ship: a few tens of people left 
on board 
c. 10:00 
Sunday, January 15th, 2012 
7:30 Last living person (a crew member) evacuated from ship; 
search for bodies continues for more than one month. 
c. 36.00 
Source: Alexander (2012, p.6-7) 
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Appendix 8: Interview Questions for the Tourism Industry 
its relevant stakeholders 
General Questions 
1. What type of emergency or disasters have you experienced most frequently? 
1. Which threat do you think is most likely to disturb your organisation or 
destination in the next 12months? 
2. How well embedded is crisis management in your organization? 
3. Does Ministry of Tourism or (your organisation) have a seat at the National 
Committee for Civil Defence? 
4. Where are the national emergency plans within which tourism can be 
effectively integrated? 
5. Who is the principal emergency management point of liaison for tourism? 
6. To what extent do you agree that tourism industry as a victim should be 
involved in emergency management planning and should play a full role in 
case emergencies affecting tourists? 
7. What are the barriers and challenges that may hinder the tourism emergency 
and disasters planning? 
List of Barriers 
Shortage of money 
Scarcity of knowledge on what an emergency management plans should include  
Continuous change within emergency management structures and systems  
Issue of confidentiality, duplication and security  
Incapability of making changes because of the small size of the organisation 
Lack of cohesiveness in the tourism industry 
Lack of awareness  
 
Mitigation phase 
1. Have you conducted a risk management process, which identifies analyses, 
evaluates and treats risk to your destination/tourism industry/business? 
2. Are you continuing to monitor and evaluate new sources of risk? How? 
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3. Do you attend multi-agency disaster management meetings or maintain 
information on their current activities? 
4. Have you established effective liaison with regional or national disaster/ 
emergency management agencies? With whom do you contact? 
5. Have you established liaison with industry organizations and government 
agencies? 
6. Have you established an effective working relationship with the media? 
7. Do you have clear guidelines detailing the appropriate actions to be taken before, 
during and after emergencies (emergency management strategy)? 
8. Do you have a continual revision of the available materials? 
9. How did you learn from the previous disasters effect of Guno and Phet cyclones 
on the tourism industry? 
Preparedness Phase 
Questions 
1. Have you established a tourism crisis planning committee? Who are involved? 
2. Has the committee developed a tourism crisis management plan which: 
● Describes activation procedures? Yes No 
● Allocates roles and responsibilities? Yes No 
● Identifies control and coordination arrangements? Yes No 
● Includes Standard Operating Procedures? Yes No 
● Identifies information management requirements? Yes No 
● Establishes communications methods? Yes No 
● Describes public relations and media management arrangements? Yes No 
● Includes response, recovery and business continuity? Yes No 
3. Has the committee identified training needs? What they are? 
4. Has regular training been developed and organized, including induction training 
for new staff? How many times you conduct training? 
5. Has the committee conducted/scheduled regular mock exercise? How many 
times? 
6. Has the committee included informal (discussion) exercises as part of its normal 
meeting routine? 
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7. What is the current scope of crisis planning and preparedness among tourism 
organisations or business? 
8. Are you familiar with the available frameworks and models for tourism 
emergency/ disasters or emergency management? 
9. Do you conduct regular workshops with the tourism stakeholders in order to plan 
and develop simulations based on scenarios to train staff on crises, disasters and 
emergency principles and practices? 
10. Is there any coordination between Ministry of Tourism and emergency 
management organisations? 
11. Do you nominated or have a tourism disasters spokesperson? 
12. Do you have a devoted webpages to cover these issues? 
Response Phase 
Questions 
1. In case a crisis or a disaster affects tourists or in the case of scenarios A,B,C and 
D, who are in charge, what is the role of the Ministry of Tourism? 
2. Have you assessed the: 
• Effects of the crisis upon regional tourism? 
• Damage to property and infrastructure? 
• Disruption to services? 
• Consequences of the crisis? 
• Personnel, equipment and measures needed? 
3. Are tactical and strategic plans being developed? 
4. Have you established a media Centre and appointed a media spokesperson? 
5. Are visitors’ needs being identified and met? 
6. Have you established liaison and communications with government official and 
emergency services? 
7. Do you have a emergency/disaster communication strategy and designed 
marketing campaign for recovery that you will implement once the destination is 
affected? 
8. How can you assist the emergency organisations during response? What kind of 
resources do you have? 
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Appendix 9: Interview Questions for Emergency Services 
 
 
Capabilities (resources, required equipment and their location) 
1. What are the needed resources to be developed in case of scenario A, B, C and 
D? 
2. Where is the location of your resources? How far each location from each 
other? 
3. How can you ensure the arrival of the needed resources at the scene of the 
incident in case of scenario A, B, C and D? 
4. Are the available resources enough to manage high-scale disasters for example 
in case the incidents in scenario A, or B or C or D? 
5. Who is in charge of evacuating the cruise ships and how? 
6. Who is in charge of search and rescue operation? 
7. Do you have a translator services in case passengers speaking different 
languages? And what they are and why? And based on what did you choose 
them? 
8. Do you have specific tools for communication for example speech creators or 
communication display board or book? 
Evalua
tion	of	
Emerg
ency	
Respon
se	Syst
em	 Capabilities	(resources,	required	equipment	and	their	location)Structure	and	system	(making	the	incident	system	operational	at	all	levels	and	integrating	it	with	the	national	response	plan)
People	(Training	and	exercise	of	responders	and	senior	managers)
Coordination	(at	different	level	of	the	country)
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9. What medical capabilities do you have for this number of affected passengers 
and crewmembers in scenarios C and D? 
10. Do you have or provide a mental health services? 
11. How would you contact the families and relatives of the affected passengers? 
12. How to respond rapidly and effectively while maintaining needed level of 
security? 
13. How are you going to provide the needed food and water in case of scenarios 
A, B, C and D?  
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Structure and system (making the incident system operational at all levels and 
integrating it with the national response plan) 
1. Do you have clear guidelines detailing the appropriate actions to be taken 
before, during and after emergencies? 
2. Do you have a continual revision of the available materials? 
3. How many members are in the National Committee for Civil Defence? 
Based on what they have been selected? What are their roles? 
4. In case of these scenarios, where are the national emergency plans within 
which tourism can be effectively integrated? 
5. To what extent do you agree that tourism industry as a victim should be 
involved in emergency management planning and should play a full role in 
case emergencies affecting tourists? 
 
People (Training and exercise of responders and senior managers) 
1. How often does your organisation train its crisis management team? 
2. What type of training do you conduct for your responders and relevant 
stakeholders? Discussion-based (To develop awareness), table top (to test 
procedures and plan by developing scenarios) or live exercise (to test fully all 
aspects of disasters response) 
3. When you train your personnel do you make them aware of the cultural 
differences and discuss the cultural awareness?  
 
Coordination (at different level of the country) 
1. Have you established liaison and communications with government official? 
2. How can collaboration between responding agencies be stimulated at the 
incident site? 
3. Are the local people involved in the planning process? Or in designing the crisis 
plans? 
4. Do you have volunteer groups that you can ask for their help or participation in 
case the disaster exceeded you available personnel? 
Do you have a special training program for the volunteer groups? 
		313	
How might you further incorporate volunteers in your operating models? 
How to coordinate massive numbers of volunteers? 
5. What can be done to obtain more information on what has happened and what 
was happening in a cruise? 
6. Where are your shelter sites? 
7. Does your organisation have access to a centralised reservation system to place 
evacuated in available lodging in your area or region? 
8. Have you established an effective working relationship with the media? 
9. Have you established a media centre and appointed a media spokesperson? 
10. How can you maintain effective communication with responders on scene 
and emergency organisations off scene? 
11. In case of communication failure what are the alternatives? 
12. Do you have a devoted webpage to share what is happing with the relevant 
stakeholders? 
13. Have you established a liaison with the embassies for victim identification 
and tracking? 
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Appendix 10: Interview Questions for the Cruise Industry 
The interview questions for cruise shipping Industry 
Scenarios A and B or C and D 
● Here are some typical key objectives when faced with a disaster. They are not in 
order of priority: 
● Save Life 
● Maintain Reputation 
● Maintain Business Continuity 
● Restore Normality 
● Maintain wellbeing of affected people 
● Maintain provision of timely and accurate information 
Please keep these objectives in mind as you answer the following questions: 
1. What are the challenges you think you will be facing when responding to these 
scenarios? 
• What is the challenge? 
List of the tasks that could be a challenge for the organisation: 
Tasks Yes No NA 
1. Achieve situational awareness by activating a 
communication hub that ensures relevant information and 
data being regularly transmitted to and from your operation 
room in order to build a commonly recognised information 
picture. 
   
2. Liaise with the local authorities    
3. Liaise with the head office    
4. Conduct evacuation    
5. Provide medical services    
6. Carry out search and rescue    
7. Provide reception center (shelter)    
8. Provide food and water    
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9. Identify the dead    
10. Track and locate the affected people    
11. Fight the fire    
12. Brief the media    
13. Assist all affected people in order to communicate with 
their friends and relatives    
14. Liaise with embassies    
15. Restore normal services    
16. Preserve the environment    
17. Repatriate affected passengers and crewmembers    
18. Maintain reputation    
19. Maintain business continuity    
20. Reassure the public    
1. Why is it a challenge? 
2. Who is in charge of it? 
3. What could be done to overcome this challenge? 
4. Does your organisation have plans in place to handle these scenarios? 
5. Does your organisation have resources in place to handle these scenarios? 
6. If you are sharing your plans and resources, which organisation(s) do you share it 
with? 
7. What are your requirements and expectations from the port authority, tourism 
industry and the emergency management? 
8. How confident you are when you travel to a port in the Middle East compare with 
your base and why? 
● Company Profile 
1. Company Name 
2. How long have you been working in this field? 
3. Job position 
4. What are the countries you sail to? 
Thank you again for your time and participation. 
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Appendix 11: Explanation of scenarios as presented for all 
participants 
 
Ty
pe
 o
f H
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d 
 
Location 
In-shore Off-shore 
Si
ng
le
- h
az
ar
d 
Scenario A 
● A European cruise ship arrives in 
Oman in January carrying around 
2500 passengers and 1250 crew 
members, intending to stay four 
days 
● After a city tour in Muscat the 
passengers return to the ship at 
20:00 
● At around 22:15 a fire breaks out 
in the main engine causing total 
loss of power in the ship 
● The Captain seeks guidance 
concerning a full evacuation of 
the ship pending repairs to the 
engine and the restoration of 
power 
Scenario B 
● A European cruise ship is cruising 
10 to 12 miles off the coast of 
Oman in January, carrying around 
2500 passengers and 1250 crew 
members 
● At 06:00 the coastguard in Oman 
receive a distress call from the 
ship. A fire has broken out in the 
main engine causing total loss of 
power in the ship 
● Captain is now requesting a rescue 
operation to assist the evacuation 
of passengers and crew 
● Wind speeds are up to 60 km/h 
and rough waves will make the 
rescue operation difficult  
M
ul
ti-
ha
za
rd
 
Scenario C 
● A European cruise ship arrives in 
Oman in January carrying around 
2500 passengers and 1250 crew 
intending to stay four days 
● After a city tour in Muscat the 
passengers had a dinner at a local 
restaurant 
● The next day, during breakfast, 
several passengers display 
symptoms of vomiting and 
diarrhea. They blame the 
restaurant where they ate the night 
before. 
● At 09:00 a fire breaks out in the 
main engine causing total loss of 
power in the ship. 
● The Captain seeks guidance 
concerning a full evacuation of 
the ship pending repairs to the 
engine and the restoration of 
power. 
Scenario D 
● A European cruise ship is cruising 
10 to 12 miles off the coast of 
Oman in January, carrying around 
2500 passengers and 1250 crew 
members 
● A fire has broken out in the main 
engine causing total loss of power 
● The Captain is now requesting a 
rescue operation from the Omani 
Coastguard at the same time a 
number of passengers are 
displaying symptoms of vomiting 
and diarrhea and that it is believed 
that they have a particularly 
strong, and contagious form of 
Norovirus 
● The virus could rapidly spread 
between the passengers affecting 
around 1000. Owing to the loss of 
power, the ship is obviously 
unable to leave Omani waters.  
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Appendix 12: Focus Group Questions for Tourism Industry 
Mitigation Phase (Intra-Integration) 
1. To what extent do you agree there is integration on crisis management within the 
Tourism Industry (T) in the mitigation phase? 
Instruction for Focus Group: Please note the extent of your agreement using a value 
of 1-10 in terms of scale where 1 represents no integration and 10 represents full 
integration. I would like you to demonstrate which elements you agree with in terms 
of activities. 
ACTIVITIES 
SCALE 
No 
Integration 
Score 
scale=1 
Little 
Integration 
Score 
scale=2-5 
Some 
Integration 
Score 
scale=6-9 
Full 
Integration 
Score 
scale=10  
Risk Assessment: (working 
together to analyse a hazard 
like fire or terrorism)  
    
Early Warning: (working 
together to provide early 
warning against particular 
threat e.g. like terrorism or 
earthquakes 
    
Sharing information 
(common meetings on types 
of crisis and intelligent 
gathering on threats)  
    
Establish relations with 
regional or national partners 
within the industry (on 
common standards for crisis 
management in Oman)  
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To what extent is there a need for future integration on crisis management within the 
Tourism Industry (T) in the mitigation phase? 
ACTIVITIES 
SCALE 
No 
Integration 
Score 
scale=1 
Little 
Integration 
Score 
scale=2-5 
Some 
Integration 
Score 
scale=6-9 
Full 
Integration 
Score 
scale=10  
Risk Assessment: (working 
together to analyse a hazard 
like fire or terrorism)  
    
Early Warning: (working 
together to provide early 
warning against particular 
threat e.g. like terrorism or 
earthquakes 
    
Sharing information 
(common meetings on types 
of crisis and intelligent 
gathering on threats)  
    
Establish relations with 
regional or national partners 
within the industry (on 
common standards for crisis 
management in Oman)  
    
 
Are there any particular reasons for these scores? 
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Mitigation Phase (Inter-Integration) 
1. To what extent do you agree there is integration on crisis management between the 
Tourism Industry (T) and the Emergency Services (E) in the mitigation phase? 
Instruction for Focus Group: Please note the extent of your agreement using a value 
of 1-10 in terms of scale where 1 represents no integration and 10 represents full 
integration. I would like you to demonstrate which elements you agree with in terms 
of activities. 
ACTIVITIES 
SCALE 
No 
Integration 
Score 
scale=1 
Little 
Integration 
Score 
scale=2-5 
Some 
Integration 
Score 
scale=6-9 
Full 
Integration 
Score 
scale=10  
Risk Assessment: (working 
together to analyse a hazard 
like fire or terrorism)  
    
Early Warning: (working 
together to provide early 
warning against particular 
threat e.g. like terrorism or 
earthquakes 
    
Sharing information 
(common meetings on types 
of crisis and intelligent 
gathering on threats)  
    
Establish relations with 
regional or national partners 
within the industry (on 
common standards for crisis 
management in Oman)  
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To what extent is there a need for future integration on crisis management between the 
Tourism Industry (T) and the Emergency Services (E) in the mitigation phase? 
 
ACTIVITIES 
SCALE 
No 
Integration 
Score 
scale=1 
Little 
Integration 
Score 
scale=2-5 
Some 
Integration 
Score 
scale=6-9 
Full 
Integration 
Score 
scale=10  
Risk Assessment: (working 
together to analyse a hazard 
like fire or terrorism)  
    
Early Warning: (working 
together to provide early 
warning against particular 
threat e.g. like terrorism or 
earthquakes 
    
Sharing information 
(common meetings on types 
of crisis and intelligent 
gathering on threats)  
    
Establish relations with 
regional or national partners 
within the industry (on 
common standards for crisis 
management in Oman)  
    
 
Are there any particular reasons for these scores? 
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Preparedness Phase (Intra-Integration) 
1. To what extent do you agree there is integration on crisis management within the 
Tourism Industry (T) in the preparedness phase? 
Instruction for Focus Group: Please note the extent of your agreement using a value of 
1-10 in terms of scale where 1 represents no integration and 10 represents full integration. 
I would like you to demonstrate which elements you agree with in terms of activities. 
ACTIVITIES 
SCALE 
No 
Integration 
Score 
scale=1 
Little 
Integration 
Score 
scale=2-5 
Some 
Integration 
Score 
scale=6-9 
Full 
Integration 
Score 
scale=10  
Cooperating on Writing an 
Emergency Plan     
Sharing best practice on 
forming crisis management 
committee or teams or 
nominating spokesperson  
    
Cooperating on workshops/ 
exercises/training on 
emergencies  
    
Liaise with the media      
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To what extent is there a need for future integration on crisis management within the 
Tourism Industry (T) in the preparedness phase? 
ACTIVITIES 
SCALE 
No 
Integration 
Score 
scale=1 
Little 
Integration 
Score 
scale=2-5 
Some 
Integration 
Score 
scale=6-9 
Full 
Integration 
Score 
scale=10  
Cooperating on Writing an 
Emergency Plan     
Sharing best practice on 
forming crisis management 
committee or teams or 
nominating spokesperson  
    
Cooperating on workshops/ 
exercises/training on 
emergencies  
    
Liaise with the media      
Are there any particular reasons for these scores? 
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Preparedness Phase (Inter-Integration) 
1. To what extent do you agree there is integration between the Tourism Industry (T) 
and the Emergency Services (E) in the preparedness phase? 
Instruction for Focus Group: Please note the extent of your agreement using a value 
of 1-10 in terms of scale where 1 represents no integration and 10 represents full 
integration. I would like you to demonstrate which elements you agree with in terms 
of activities. 
ACTIVITIES 
SCALE 
No 
Integration 
Score 
scale=1 
Little 
Integration 
Score 
scale=2-5 
Some 
Integration 
Score 
scale=6-9 
Full 
Integration 
Score 
scale=10  
Cooperating on Writing an 
Emergency Plan     
Sharing best practice on 
forming crisis management 
committee or teams or 
nominating spokesperson  
    
Cooperating on workshops/ 
exercises/training on 
emergencies  
    
Liaise with the media      
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To what extent is there a need for future integration between the Tourism Industry (T) 
and the Emergency Services (E) in the preparedness phase? 
ACTIVITIES 
SCALE 
No 
Integration 
Score 
scale=1 
Little 
Integration 
Score 
scale=2-5 
Some 
Integration 
Score 
scale=6-9 
Full 
Integration 
Score 
scale=10  
Cooperating on Writing an 
Emergency Plan     
Sharing best practice on 
forming crisis management 
committee or teams or 
nominating spokesperson  
    
Cooperating on workshops/ 
exercises/training on 
emergencies  
    
Liaise with the media      
Are there any particular reasons for these scores? 
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Response Phase (Intra-Integration) 
1. To what extent do you agree there is integration within the Tourism Industry (T) 
in the response phase? 
Instruction for Focus Group: Please note the extent of your agreement using a value 
of 1-10 in terms of scale where 1 represents no integration and 10 represents full 
integration. I would like you to demonstrate which elements you agree with in terms 
of activities. 
ACTIVITIES 
SCALE 
No 
Integration 
Score 
scale=1 
Little 
Integration 
Score 
scale=2-5 
Some 
Integration 
Score 
scale=6-9 
Full 
Integration 
Score 
scale=10  
Cooperating in allocating 
resources for response (e.g. 
food stockpiles, storage 
facilities, rooms) 
    
Identifying roles and 
responsibilities :(e.g. 
casualty tracking, victim 
identification) 
    
Sharing information and 
situational awareness      
Cooperating on common 
media communication for 
reputation management 
(common press release) 
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To what extent is there a need for future integration within the Tourism Industry (T) 
in the response phase? 
ACTIVITIES 
SCALE 
No 
Integration 
Score 
scale=1 
Little 
Integration 
Score 
scale=2-5 
Some 
Integration 
Score 
scale=6-9 
Full 
Integration 
Score 
scale=10  
Cooperating in allocating 
resources for response (e.g. 
food stockpiles, storage 
facilities, rooms) 
    
Identifying roles and 
responsibilities :(e.g. 
casualty tracking, victim 
identification) 
    
Sharing information and 
situational awareness      
Cooperating on common 
media communication for 
reputation management 
(common press release) 
    
 
Are there any particular reasons for these scores? 
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Response Phase (Inter-Integration) 
1. To what extent do you agree there is integration between the Tourism Industry (T) 
and the Emergency Services (E) in the response phase? 
Instruction for Focus Group: Please note the extent of your agreement using a value 
of 1-10 in terms of scale where 1 represents no integration and 10 represents full 
integration. I would like you to demonstrate which elements you agree with in terms 
of activities. 
ACTIVITIES 
SCALE 
No 
Integration 
Score 
scale=1 
Little 
Integration 
Score 
scale=2-5 
Some 
Integration 
Score 
scale=6-9 
Full 
Integration 
Score 
scale=10  
Cooperating in allocating 
resources for response (e.g. 
food stockpiles, storage 
facilities, rooms) 
    
Identifying roles and 
responsibilities :(e.g. 
casualty tracking, victim 
identification) 
    
Sharing information and 
situational awareness      
Cooperating on common 
media communication for 
reputation management 
(common press release) 
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To what extent is there a need for future integration between the Tourism Industry (T) 
and the Emergency Services (E)? 
ACTIVITIES 
SCALE 
No 
Integration 
Score 
scale=1 
Little 
Integration 
Score 
scale=2-5 
Some 
Integration 
Score 
scale=6-9 
Full 
Integration 
Score 
scale=10  
Cooperating in allocating 
resources for response (e.g 
food stockpiles, storage 
facilities, rooms) 
    
Identifying roles and 
responsibilities :(e.g. 
casualty tracking, victim 
identification) 
    
Sharing information and 
situational awareness      
Cooperating on common 
media communication for 
reputation management 
(common press release) 
    
 
Are there any particular reasons for these scores? 
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Appendix 13: Emergency Focus Group 
Mitigation Phase (Intra-Integration) 
1. To what extent do you agree there is integration on crisis management within the 
Emergency Services (E) in the mitigation phase? 
Instruction for Focus Group: Please note the extent of your agreement using a value of 
1-10 in terms of scale where 1 represents no integration and 10 represents full 
integration. I would like you to demonstrate which elements you agree with in terms 
of activities. 
ACTIVITIES 
SCALE 
No 
Integration 
Score 
scale=1 
Little 
Integration 
Score 
scale=2-5 
Some 
Integration 
Score 
scale=6-9 
Full 
Integration 
Score 
scale=10  
Risk Assessment: 
(working together to 
analyse a hazard like fire 
or terrorism)  
    
Early Warning: (working 
together to provide early 
warning against particular 
threat e.g. like terrorism or 
earthquakes 
    
Sharing information 
(common meetings on 
types of crisis and 
intelligent gathering on 
threats)  
    
Establish relations with 
regional or national 
partners within the 
industry (on common 
standards for crisis 
management in Oman)  
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To what extent is there a need for future integration on crisis management within the 
Emergency Services (E) in the mitigation phase? 
ACTIVITIES 
SCALE 
No 
Integration 
Score 
scale=1 
Little 
Integration 
Score 
scale=2-5 
Some 
Integration 
Score 
scale=6-9 
Full 
Integration 
Score 
scale=10  
Risk Assessment: 
(working together to 
analyse a hazard like fire 
or terrorism)  
    
Early Warning: (working 
together to provide early 
warning against particular 
threat e.g. like terrorism or 
earthquakes 
    
Sharing information 
(common meetings on 
types of crisis and 
intelligent gathering on 
threats)  
    
Establish relations with 
regional or national 
partners within the 
industry (on common 
standards for crisis 
management in Oman)  
    
 
Are there any particular reasons for these scores? 
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Mitigation Phase (Inter-Integration) 
1. To what extent do you agree there is integration on crisis management between 
the Tourism Industry (T) and the Emergency Services (E) in the mitigation phase? 
Instruction for Focus Group: Please note the extent of your agreement using a 
value of 1-10 in terms of scale where 1 represents no integration and 10 represents 
full integration. I would like you to demonstrate which elements you agree with 
in terms of activities. 
ACTIVITIES 
SCALE 
No 
Integration 
Score 
scale=1 
Little 
Integration 
Score 
scale=2-5 
Some 
Integration 
Score 
scale=6-9 
Full 
Integration 
Score 
scale=10  
Risk Assessment: 
(working together to 
analyse a hazard like fire 
or terrorism)  
    
Early Warning: (working 
together to provide early 
warning against particular 
threat e.g. like terrorism or 
earthquakes 
    
Sharing information 
(common meetings on 
types of crisis and 
intelligent gathering on 
threats)  
    
Establish relations with 
regional or national 
partners within the 
industry (on common 
standards for crisis 
management in Oman)  
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To what extent is there a need for future integration between the Tourism Industry (T) 
and the Emergency Services (E) in the mitigation phase? 
ACTIVITIES 
SCALE 
No 
Integration 
Score 
scale=1 
Little 
Integration 
Score 
scale=2-5 
Some 
Integration 
Score 
scale=6-9 
Full 
Integration 
Score 
scale=10  
Risk Assessment: 
(working together to 
analyse a hazard like fire 
or terrorism)  
    
Early Warning: (working 
together to provide early 
warning against particular 
threat e.g. like terrorism or 
earthquakes 
    
Sharing information 
(common meetings on 
types of crisis and 
intelligent gathering on 
threats)  
    
Establish relations with 
regional or national 
partners within the 
industry (on common 
standards for crisis 
management in Oman)  
    
 
Are there any particular reasons for these scores? 
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Preparedness Phase (Intra-Integration) 
1. To what extent do you agree there is integration on crisis management within the 
Emergency Services (E) in the preparedness phase? 
Instruction for Focus Group: Please note the extent of your agreement using a 
value of 1-10 in terms of scale where 1 represents no integration and 10 represents 
full integration. I would like you to demonstrate which elements you agree with 
in terms of activities. 
ACTIVITIES 
SCALE 
No 
Integration 
Score 
scale=1 
Little 
Integration 
Score 
scale=2-5 
Some 
Integration 
Score 
scale=6-9 
Full 
Integration 
Score 
scale=10  
Cooperating on Writing an 
Emergency Plan     
Sharing best practice on 
forming crisis management 
committee or teams or 
nominating spokesperson  
    
Cooperating on workshops/ 
exercises/training on 
emergencies  
    
Liaise with the media      
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To what extent is there a need for future integration on crisis management within the 
Emergency Services (E) in the preparedness phase? 
ACTIVITIES 
SCALE 
No 
Integration 
Score 
scale=1 
Little 
Integration 
Score 
scale=2-5 
Some 
Integration 
Score 
scale=6-9 
Full 
Integration 
Score 
scale=10  
Cooperating on Writing an 
Emergency Plan     
Sharing best practice on 
forming crisis management 
committee or teams or 
nominating spokesperson  
    
Cooperating on 
workshops/ 
exercises/training on 
emergencies  
    
Liaise with the media      
Are there any particular reasons for these scores? 
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Preparedness Phase (Inter-Integration) 
1. To what extent do you agree is there integration between the Tourism Industry (T) 
and the Emergency Services (E) in the preparedness phase? 
Instruction for Focus Group: Please note the extent of your agreement using a 
value of 1-10 in terms of scale where 1 represents no integration and 10 represents 
full integration. I would like you to demonstrate which elements you agree with 
in terms of activities. 
ACTIVITIES 
SCALE 
No 
Integration 
Score 
scale=1 
Little 
Integration 
Score 
scale=2-5 
Some 
Integration 
Score 
scale=6-9 
Full 
Integration 
Score 
scale=10  
Cooperating on Writing an 
Emergency Plan     
Sharing best practice on 
forming crisis management 
committee or teams or 
nominating spokesperson  
    
Cooperating on workshops/ 
exercises/training on 
emergencies  
    
Liaise with the media      
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To what extent is there a need for future integration between the Tourism Industry (T) 
and the Emergency Services (E) in the preparedness phase? 
ACTIVITIES 
SCALE 
No 
Integration 
Score 
scale=1 
Little 
Integration 
Score 
scale=2-5 
Some 
Integration 
Score 
scale=6-9 
Full 
Integration 
Score 
scale=10  
Cooperating on Writing an 
Emergency Plan     
Sharing best practice on 
forming crisis 
management committee or 
teams or nominating 
spokesperson  
    
Cooperating on 
workshops/ 
exercises/training on 
emergencies  
    
Liaise with the media      
 
Are there any particular reasons for these scores? 
		337	
Response Phase (Intra-Integration) 
1. To what extent do you agree there is integration on crisis management within the 
Emergency Services (E) in the response phase? 
Instruction for Focus Group: Please note the extent of your agreement using a 
value of 1-10 in terms of scale where 1 represents no integration and 10 represents 
full integration. I would like you to demonstrate which elements you agree with 
in terms of activities. 
ACTIVITIES 
SCALE 
No 
Integration 
Score 
scale=1 
Little 
Integration 
Score 
scale=2-5 
Some 
Integration 
Score 
scale=6-9 
Full 
Integration 
Score 
scale=10  
Cooperating in allocating 
resources for response (e.g. 
food stockpiles, storage 
facilities, rooms) 
    
Identifying roles and 
responsibilities :(e.g. 
casualty tracking, victim 
identification) 
    
Sharing information and 
situational awareness      
Cooperating on common 
media communication for 
reputation management 
(common press release) 
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To what extent is there a need for future integration within the Emergency Services 
(E) in the response phase? 
ACTIVITIES 
SCALE 
No 
Integration 
Score 
scale=1 
Little 
Integration 
Score 
scale=2-5 
Some 
Integration 
Score 
scale=6-9 
Full 
Integration 
Score 
scale=10  
Cooperating in allocating 
resources for response (e.g. 
food stockpiles, storage 
facilities, rooms) 
    
Identifying roles and 
responsibilities :(e.g. 
casualty tracking, victim 
identification) 
    
Sharing information and 
situational awareness      
Cooperating on common 
media communication for 
reputation management 
(common press release) 
    
Are there any particular reasons for these scores? 
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Response Phase (Inter-Integration) 
1. To what extent do you agree there is integration on crisis management between the 
Tourism Industry (T) and the Emergency Services (E) in the response phase? 
Instruction for Focus Group: Please note the extent of your agreement using a 
value of 1-10 in terms of scale where 1 represents no integration and 10 represents 
full integration. I would like you to demonstrate which elements you agree with 
in terms of activities. 
 
ACTIVITIES 
SCALE 
No 
Integration 
Score 
scale=1 
Little 
Integration 
Score 
scale=2-5 
Some 
Integration 
Score 
scale=6-9 
Full 
Integration 
Score 
scale=10  
Cooperating in allocating 
resources for response 
(e.g. food stockpiles, 
storage facilities, rooms) 
    
Identifying roles and 
responsibilities :(e.g. 
casualty tracking, victim 
identification) 
    
Sharing information and 
situational awareness      
Cooperating on common 
media communication for 
reputation management 
(common press release) 
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To what extent is there a need for future integration between the Tourism Industry (T) 
and the Emergency Services (E) 
ACTIVITIES 
SCALE 
No 
Integration 
Score 
scale=1 
Little 
Integration 
Score 
scale=2-5 
Some 
Integration 
Score 
scale=6-9 
Full 
Integration 
Score 
scale=10  
Cooperating in allocating 
resources for response (e.g. 
food stockpiles, storage 
facilities, rooms) 
    
Identifying roles and 
responsibilities :(e.g. 
casualty tracking, victim 
identification) 
    
Sharing information and 
situational awareness      
Cooperating on common 
media communication for 
reputation management 
(common press release) 
    
 
Are there any particular reasons for these scores? 
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Appendix 14: Explanation of the Degree of Integration  
between Tourism and Emergency Services for 
the Focus Group 
 
 
 
T E ETET
No	Integration Little	Integration Some	Integration Full	Integration
Each organization isapplying mitigationmeasures independently ofone another with minimallinkage.
Limited collaborationbetween tourism &emergency services. Theinvolvement with oneanother is viewed as anobligatory effort ratherthan a commitment to apartnership.
There is someinterconnectednessbetween tourism and anemergency service includesboth formal and informalagreements like allocationresources and identifyingroles and responsibilities.
A strong formalizednetwork betweentourism and emergencyservices working in anongoing coordinated wayto mitigate crisis anddisaster.
T&E1 2 3 4
MITIGATION PHASE
T E ETET
No	Integration Little	Integration Some	Integration Full	Integration
Each organization isapplying mitigationmeasures independently ofone another with minimallinkage.
Limited collaborationbetween tourism &emergency services. Theinvolvement with oneanother is viewed as anobligatory effort ratherthan a commitment to apartnership.
There is someinterconnectednessbetween tourism and anemergency serviceincludes both formal andinformal agreements likeallocation resources andidentifying roles andresponsibilities.
A strong formalizednetwork betweentourism and emergencyservices working in anongoing coordinatedway to prepare for crisisand disaster.
T&E1 2 3 4
PREPAREDNESS PHASE
T E ETET
No	Integration Little	Integration Some	Integration Full	Integration
Each organization isapplying mitigationmeasures independently ofone another with minimallinkage.
Limited collaborationbetween tourism &emergency services. Theinvolvement with oneanother is viewed as anobligatory effort ratherthan a commitment to apartnership.
There is someinterconnectednessbetween tourism and anemergency serviceincludes both formal andinformal agreements likeallocation resources andidentifying roles andresponsibilities.
A strong formalizednetwork betweentourism and emergencyservices working in anongoing coordinatedway to respond to crisisand disaster.
T&E1 2 3 4
RESPONSE PHASE
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Appendix 15: The proposed organisational structure for the 
National Authority for Emergency and Disasters 
Management  
 
(Author 2018) 
